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Abstract 
A striking way that humans differ from other species is our unique ability to represent and 
manipulate symbols. This ability to process numerical magnitudes symbolically (e.g., ‘three’, 
‘3’) is widely thought to be supported by an ancient system that evolved to process 
nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes (i.e., quantities).  In this thesis, I present four empirical 
studies to uncover whether symbolic representations are indeed supported by the system that 
evolved to process quantities, or if symbolic representations are sub-served by a similar but 
ultimately distinct system.  
In experiments 1 and 2, I investigate how the adult brain processes symbols and quantities 
using quantitative neuroimaging meta-analytic techniques (Experiment 1), and a tightly 
controlled fMRI paradigm (experiment 2). Results from the meta-analysis indicate that 
symbols and quantities are sub-served by both common and distinct brain regions along the 
frontal-parietal lobes. However, using a tightly controlled adaptation paradigm to isolate 
brain regions that underpin symbols and quantities reveal that regions supporting symbols are 
quite distinct from those supporting quantities, spatially and representationally. Thus, 
symbols might not be processed using the system that evolved to process quantities. 
In experiment 3, I examine whether the processing of symbols is similar to quantities under 
different attentional conditions.  I discover that in addition to participants being more 
efficient at effortfully comparing symbols than quantities, embedding distracting symbols 
into stimuli during a quantity comparison task affected performance more than embedding 
quantities into a symbolic comparison task. This indicates that symbols and quantities are 
processed differently, under different attentional conditions, and therefore are likely sub-
served by different representational systems. 
In experiment 4, I investigate the origin of the difference between how humans process 
symbols and quantities by exploring whether children’s symbolic number knowledge relates 
to their spontaneous attending to quantities. I find that children are more likely to attend to 
quantity if they know the number word that corresponds to the quantity, suggesting that 
learning symbols may influence how children conceptualize quantities. 
 
 
 
In summary, while there are some similarities in how humans process symbols and 
quantities, there are many important differences both behaviourally, and the neural level of 
organization. Consequently, these findings challenge the longstanding belief that the 
culturally acquired ability to conceptualize numbers symbolically is grounded in the ancient 
system that evolved to estimate quantities. 
Keywords 
Symbolic numerical magnitude, nonsymbolic numerical magnitude, non-numerical 
magnitude, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), human uniqueness, cognitive 
development,  
 
  
 
 
 
Summary for Lay Audience 
The uniquely human ability to think about numbers as symbols sets us apart from other 
species that can only think about numbers nonsymbolically (i.e., quantities, such as 
collections of dots). How does the human brain support this exceptional ability to 
conceptualize numbers symbolically?  Are the ancient systems that evolved to estimate 
quantities repurposed for symbolic thinking? I examine similarities and differences in how 
humans think about symbolic numbers compared to quantities.   
I explore whether the parts of the adult human brain that are activated in response to 
symbolic numbers are also activated in response to quantities. Specifically, I 1) synthesize 
previous research that examines brain responses to symbols and quantities to identify 
consistencies across these studies and 2) collect measures of brain activation while 
participants passively view symbols, quantities, and physical sizes.  I discover that brain 
regions that are associated with thinking about numbers symbolically are quite distinct from 
brain regions that evolved to understand quantities.  
Subsequently, I examine whether the similarities and differences between thinking about 
symbols and quantities depend on what participants are instructed to pay attention to.  I 
discover that participants are faster and more accurate, comparing two symbols than two 
quantities.  Additionally, when participants compare quantities, they perform more poorly if 
there is a distracting symbol present.  Interestingly, the presence of a quantity when 
comparing symbols is less distracting.  Together, this work shows that how human adults 
think about symbols and quantities is quite different.  
To understand the origin of this difference I explore the relationship between how humans 
think about symbols and quantities in children, while these systems are developing. I 
examine whether having knowledge of symbolic numbers influences the degree to which 
children notice quantities in their environment. I find that children are more likely to notice 
and use quantities to solve a problem if they have learned the verbal number word that 
corresponds to the quantity.  
Discoveries from this thesis reveal that humans conceptualize symbolic numbers in a way 
that is quite distinct from nonsymbolic quantities. This indicates that humans possess a 
 
 
 
system used to process symbols that is distinct from the evolutionarily ancient system used to 
estimate quantities. Future investigations are needed to understand better how we learn 
numerical symbols over the course of our development. 
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Chapter 1  
1 General Introduction 
Contemporary society could not function without numbers. We would be unable to draft 
architectural plans, calculate the value of a currency, design engines and motors, identify 
how many calories we need to maintain a healthy weight, or even tabulate votes in a 
democratic election. Since basic number processing is a cognitive foundation that 
supports mathematical thinking, understanding the development of the behavioural and 
neural signatures of number processing provides insight into how the brain manages the 
critical and distinctly human task of understanding complex math. Moreover, as 
mathematical ability is a learned skill that builds on related, previously acquired 
knowledge, the study of numerical and mathematical processing serves as a model for 
understanding learning more broadly, across multiple domains. The examination of 
numerical processing also has important practical implications. Indeed, early 
mathematical competence is the single strongest predictor of later academic achievement 
and financial stability (Duncan et al., 2007; Romano, Babchishin, Pagani, & Kohen, 
2010). At the societal level, improving math scores is tightly linked with cross-national 
GPD growth (OECD, 2010). In direct contrast, low mathematical ability is related to 
higher rates of mental and physical illness, unemployment, and incarceration (Bynner & 
Parsons, 1996; Parsons & Bynner, 2005).   
Critically, mathematical performance of Canadian students on international math 
assessments has been on a steady decline since 2003 (Stokke, 2015). As recently as last 
year, half of grade 6 students in Ontario failed to meet provincial standards for 
mathematics (Alphonso, 2018). Thus, the study of the neuropsychological underpinnings 
of numerical processing is not only intellectually fascinating but also practically relevant 
– and urgently needed – in understanding and improving the world-wide debilitating 
effects linked to low math achievement.   
In what follows, I will introduce you as the reader to the field of numerical cognition.  As 
such, I will provide a brief overview of dominant theories relating to basic number 
 
 
2 
processing across developmental time.  Following this, I will summarize the current state 
of the field and present outstanding questions.  Finally, I will outline the four empirical 
studies that address these outstanding questions and comprise the body of this thesis.  
Following the conclusion of chapter 1, the four empirical studies and their results will be 
described in detail within their own chapters.  The thesis will conclude with a sixth 
chapter that integrates findings from the four empirical studies and outlines future 
directions for the field of numerical cognition.  
1.1 Nonsymbolic Numerical Magnitudes 
Humans share with other animals, such as non-human primates, birds, bears, amphibians, 
and fish, the ability to process the quantities of nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes such 
as set of objects or an array of dots (For review see: Cantlon, 2012; Dehaene, Dehaene-
Lambertz, & Cohen, 1998; Nieder & Miller, 2004). This capacity to estimate and 
discriminate between nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes often referred to as ‘number 
sense,’ has been quantified and delineated across a large body of research (Cantlon, 2012; 
Dehaene, 2007; Dehaene et al., 1998; Nieder & Dehaene, 2009). This research has 
revealed that the ability to process nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes is conserved 
across species (Brannon, 2006; Cantlon, 2012; Dehaene et al., 1998; Nieder & Dehaene, 
2009) and that it emerges early in development (Izard, Dehaene-Lambertz, & Dehaene, 
2008; Starr, Libertus, & Brannon, 2013; Xu, 2003; Xu, Spelke, & Goddard, 2005).  This 
suggests that the ability to estimate nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes has a long 
evolutionary history. One potential explanation for the phylogenetic and ontogenetic 
continuity of this ability, to process nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes, is that the 
capacity to estimate quantities supports functions that have been and are currently critical 
for survival, such as identifying regions with an abundance of food or approximating the 
number of approaching predators (Cantlon, 2012; Geary, Berch, Mann Koepke, 2015; 
McComb, Packer, & Pusey, 1994; Vonk & Beran, 2012).  Critically, it has been 
suggested that the evolutionarily ancient ability to process nonsymbolic numerical 
magnitudes may be a necessary element of the foundation that supports the capacity to 
understand numerical information.  However, humans also have developed the ability to 
represent numbers symbolically. 
 
 
3 
1.2 Symbolic Numerical Magnitudes 
Relatively recently in human history, a broad set of capabilities emerged that resulted in 
the uniquely human capacity for symbolic abstraction (Ansari, 2008; Coolidge & 
Overmann, 2012). In view of this, in addition to having an ancient, nonsymbolic ‘number 
sense’ that is shared among non-human species and emerges early in development, 
humans have a unique ability to represent numerical magnitudes symbolically such as 
with the verbal word ‘three’ or the Arabic digit ‘3’ (Ansari, 2007, 2008; Coolidge & 
Overmann, 2012; Kersey & Cantlon, 2017; Núñez, 2017). In direct contrast to the 
evolutionarily ancient system that evolved to support the processing of nonsymbolic 
numerical magnitudes, the uniquely human capacity to represent numbers symbolically 
emerged as a result of enculturation (Ansari, 2008; Núñez, 2017). This culturally 
acquired capacity to understand and manipulate symbolic numerical magnitudes is 
foundational for later, more advanced mathematical abilities (De Smedt, Noël, Gilmore, 
& Ansari, 2013).  
The striking way that humans differ from non-human animals in our ability to represent 
and process numerical magnitudes symbolically is undoubtedly a core element of our 
unique human capacity for higher-level mathematical thinking. A key question in the 
field of numerical cognition has been whether the ancient system(s) that evolved to 
process nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are repurposed for symbolic thinking in 
humans (Dehaene & Cohen, 2007).  Researchers hypothesized that if the ancient systems 
that evolved to process nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are indeed repurposed for 
symbolic thinking, then different number formats (i.e., ‘3’, ‘three’, and ‘•••’) would be 
processed in the same way (i.e., abstractly). Therefore, researchers have examined 
whether numerical magnitudes are processed abstractly, using a single format-
independent number processing system, or if the underlying representations that support 
symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing are format-dependent 
(Ansari, 2016; Cohen Kadosh & Walsh, 2009; Coolidge & Overmann, 2012; Dehaene et 
al., 1998).  Despite years of research, it remains hotly debated whether symbolic 
numerical thinking is rooted in the evolutionarily ancient system used to process 
nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes. 
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1.3 Number Processing is Abstract 
For decades, the dominant perspective in the field of numerical cognition has been that 
symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical quantities are processed using an evolutionarily 
ancient abstract number processing system that supports numerical magnitude processing, 
regardless of number format  (Brannon, 2006; Dehaene, 2007; Dehaene, Piazza, Pinel, & 
Cohen, 2003; Halberda, Mazzocco, & Feigenson, 2008; Nieder & Dehaene, 2009). This 
idea has been supported by findings from both behavioural and neuroimaging research in 
adult and child populations. 
This dominant view, that symbolic and nonsymbolic numbers are processed using the 
same abstract number processing system, was first supported by the finding that similar 
behavioural effects are obtained for symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical stimuli when 
participants make comparative judgements between two numerical magnitudes (Dehaene 
et al., 1998; Fias, Lammertyn, Reynvoet, Dupont, & Orban, 2003; Fulbright, Manson, 
Skudlarski, Lacadie, & Gore, 2003; Holloway & Ansari, 2009; Holloway & Ansari, 
2008; Moyer & Landauer, 1967).  Two examples of behavioural effects that have been 
reported during both symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude comparison tasks 
are the distance effect and the size effect.  The distance effect refers to the finding that 
participants are faster and more accurate when comparing numbers – be they symbolic or 
nonsymbolic – if the distance between the two numbers being compared is relatively 
large (Buckley & Gillman, 1974; Krajcsi, 2017; Moyer & Landauer, 1967). For example, 
participants are typically faster and more accurate when comparing the numerical 
magnitudes ‘2’ and ‘8’ (a distance of 6) compared to ‘2’ and ‘3’ (a distance of 1). 
Complementary, the size effect is the finding that participants are faster and more 
accurate at comparing numerical magnitudes, again both symbolic and nonsymbolic, 
when the magnitudes are smaller (e.g., 1 vs. 2) compared to larger magnitudes (e.g., 8 vs. 
9), when holding distance constant (Krajcsi, 2017; Moyer & Landauer, 1967).  Distance 
and size effects (i.e., the effects that number comparisons are easier with large distances 
or small sizes) often combined into a single effect thought to reflect both distance and 
size, referred to as the ratio effect (Krajcsi, 2017). Distance, size and ratio effects have 
often interpreted to be a measure of representational precision (Nieder & Dehaene, 2009; 
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Verguts & Fias, 2004). These reports of similar behavioural signatures for the processing 
of symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes that have been replicated across 
many studies (Buckley & Gillman, 1974; Holloway & Ansari, 2008; Holloway, Price, & 
Ansari, 2010; Krajcsi, Lengyel, & Kojouharova, 2016; Moyer & Landauer, 1967), 
including developmental samples (e.g., Holloway & Ansari, 2008, 2009), have ultimately 
been taken as evidence of shared underlying representations (Dehaene, 2007; Dehaene et 
al., 1998).   
In addition to behavioural data in both adults and children suggesting that symbolic and 
nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes produce similar behavioural effects, researchers have 
canvassed the human brain, using neuroimaging methodologies, in search of brain 
regions that support both symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing 
(For review see: Sokolowski & Ansari, 2016).  Many neuroimaging studies have reported 
overlapping neural activation during symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude 
processing in adults (e.g., Holloway, Price, & Ansari, 2010; Piazza, Pinel, Le Bihan, & 
Dehaene, 2007; Pinel, Piazza, Le Bihan, & Dehaene, 2004) as well as children (e.g., 
Cantlon, Libertus, et al., 2009; Holloway & Ansari, 2010).  Regions of overlap are 
typically found along the bilateral intraparietal sulcus (hIPS). In view of this, the hIPS 
has been identified as an abstract number processing region (Cantlon, Brannon, Carter, & 
Pelphrey, 2006; Dehaene, 2007; Dehaene et al., 2003; Fias et al., 2003; Piazza et al., 
2007; Santens, Roggeman, Fias, & Verguts, 2010). Researchers have taken the finding 
that the same brain regions support different formats of numerical magnitudes to suggest 
that symbolic numerical magnitudes are processed using the ancient system that evolved 
to process nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes.  In other words, the evolutionarily ancient 
system used to process nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes has been repurposed to be an 
abstract number processing system that is used to process numerical magnitudes of all 
formats.  Together, these behavioural and neuroimaging findings in adults and children 
have led researchers to conclude that symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes 
are represented using the same abstract number processing system.  
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1.4 Number Processing is Format-Dependent 
Although many have argued, against the background of evidence reviewed above, that 
symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes have the same underlying 
representations, recent evidence has suggested otherwise. Indeed, a growing body of data 
has accumulated that suggests that symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude 
processing is more distinct than previously assumed (Ansari, 2007; Bulthé, De Smedt, & 
Op de Beeck, 2014; Cohen Kadosh & Walsh, 2009; Lyons, Ansari, & Beilock, 2012, 
2014; Lyons & Beilock, 2013; Sokolowski & Ansari, 2016). Here, I outline several 
important behavioural and neuroimaging findings that support this claim.  
A key study that supports the idea that symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes 
are supported by distinct systems, examined participant’s performance on a number 
comparison task when the two stimuli being compared were either the same format (i.e., 
both symbolic or both nonsymbolic) or different formats (i.e., comparing a symbolic 
numerical magnitude to a nonsymbolic numerical magnitude) (Lyons et al., 2012). 
Critically, if symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are indeed supported by 
an abstract number processing system, one would predict that there would be no cost of 
mixing.  In other words, conditions during which participants compared symbolic 
numerical magnitudes to nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes should not differ 
significantly from conditions where participants compared numerical magnitudes within 
the same format.  However, results revealed that when participants directly compared a 
symbolic numerical magnitude to a nonsymbolic numerical magnitude they were slower 
and less accurate than when they compared two numerical magnitudes that were the same 
format (i.e., two symbolic numerical magnitudes or two nonsymbolic numerical 
magnitudes) (Lyons et al., 2012).  This suggests that the way that humans process 
symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes may be more distinct than has been 
assumed. Converging recent behavioural evidence has revealed that the similar 
behavioural effects (namely the distance, size, and ratio effects) observed during 
comparison tasks for symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes do not correlate 
with each other, and may, in fact, be produced by two distinct systems (Krajcsi, 2017; 
Krajcsi et al., 2016). Notably, the finding that ratio effects (i.e., the single effect thought 
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to encompass both distance and size effects) for symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical 
magnitude processing are not as related to each other as has been assumed has also been 
reported in a cross-sectional developmental sample (Lyons, Nuerk, & Ansari, 2015). 
Specifically, in a longitudinal sample of almost 2000 children, researchers revealed that 
the whether a child’s nonsymbolic ratio effect was significant was not predictive whether 
the same was true of that child’s symbolic ratio effect. In other words, the presence of a 
nonsymbolic ratio effect is not related to the presence of a symbolic ratio effect at the 
individual level. These findings converge with data from human adults (e.g., Krajcsi, 
2017; Krajcsi et al., 2016; Lyons et al., 2012) to suggest that perhaps symbolic and 
nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are supported by distinct, systems that have some 
similarities that lead to similar behavioural signatures.  Krajsci and colleagues 
hypothesize that while nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are likely represented using an 
evolutionarily ancient approximate magnitude system, symbolic numerical magnitudes 
may be supported by a discrete semantic system.  Here, the term ‘discrete’ refers to a set 
of items where each item is distinct (i.e., the quantity of an array of dots).  This is in 
contrast to the term continuous, which refers to a set that can take on any value within a 
finite or infinite interval (e.g., the amount of physical space taken up by an array of dots). 
In a discrete semantic system, representations of symbolic numerical magnitudes are 
stored as values in a semantic network, that operates similarly to a mental lexicon or a 
conceptual network (Krajcsi, 2017; Krajcsi et al., 2016). Together, these findings 
contribute to a growing body of behavioural research that suggests that symbols and 
quantities are not processed as similarly as had previously been concluded.  
In addition to the behavioural evidence, discussed above, neuroimaging studies  have 
revealed distinct neural activity supporting the processing of symbolic and nonsymbolic 
magnitudes using both traditional univariate analysis techniques as well as newer cutting-
edge multivariate approaches (Ansari, 2007; Bulthé et al., 2014; Cohen Kadosh et al., 
2011; Fias et al., 2003; Holloway et al., 2010; Lyons et al., 2014; Lyons & Beilock, 2018; 
Santens et al., 2010).  In traditional univariate analyses, a General Linear Model (GLM) 
is used to fit a model to the time course of each voxel independently within a region of 
interest or at the whole-brain level. Notably, a voxel is a 3D pixel within the brain. 
Univariate analyses provide insight into whether a set of voxels in a particular area of the 
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brain are significantly activated in relation to a particular stimulus. When using a 
multivariate analytic approach, the patterns of activation that would normally be averaged 
are analyzed and compared between conditions. More specifically, using multivariate 
analytic techniques allows for the examination and comparison of distributed patterns of 
activity within a region of interest or at the whole-brain level. Indeed, studies that include 
univariate analyses (i.e., analyses where each voxel is examined independently) reveal 
spatially distinct patterns of activation for symbolic compared to nonsymbolic numerical 
magnitudes (e.g., Bulthé et al., 2014; Lyons & Beilock, 2013).  Relatedly, studies that 
used multivariate analyses (i.e., analyses that explore patterns of activation within 
regions)  indicate that the patterns of brain activation differ greatly between symbolic and 
nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing both within the hIPS and at the whole-
brain level (e.g., Bulthé, De Smedt, & Op de Beeck, 2014; Lyons et al., 2015). Taken 
together, these neuroimaging data indicate that there are many brain regions along the 
frontal and parietal lobes that represent numerical magnitude processing in a format-
dependent way (For review see: Sokolowski & Ansari, 2016).  Moreover, even the 
regions that exhibit spatial overlap at the univariate level typically have distinct patterns 
of activation at the multivariate level.  This more recent body of evidence highlights that 
the extent to which symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are processed using 
common representations should be more carefully examined.  Additional research is 
needed to unravel whether the similarities between symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical 
magnitude processing are due to the fact that these distinct formats of numerical 
magnitudes are processed using a shared abstract number processing system, or if instead 
symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are processed using two distinct 
systems that have some similarities. 
1.5 The Role of Non-Numerical Magnitudes 
To complicate matters further, the processing of non-numerical magnitudes (such as 
physical size, duration, and luminance) have been reported to exhibit similar effects to 
the processing of symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes, both at the 
behavioural and the neural level (Cantlon, Platt, & Brannon, 2009; Cohen Kadosh, 
Lammertyn, & Izard, 2008; Sokolowski, Fias, Bosah Ononye, & Ansari, 2017). 
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In addition to the similarities between symbolic, nonsymbolic and non-numerical 
magnitude processing, research has shown that the stimuli that are commonly used to 
assess nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing are inherently confounded by non-
numerical magnitudes such as the size of the dots, and density of the dots (For review 
see: Leibovich & Henik, 2013). For example, if there are four dots in one array and three 
dots in another array and all the dots are of the same size, the four dots have a greater 
total surface area than the three dots. To control for surface area, the size of the dots can 
be adjusted to equate the total surface area. However, doing this changes the density and 
the average size of the dots. Therefore, when judging which of three or four dots is 
greater, participants can use either nonsymbolic numerical magnitude, a non-numerical 
magnitude (such as surface area), or a combination thereof. Researchers have interpreted 
this data to suggest that the processing of numerical quantities is sub-served by a general 
magnitude system, rather than a system (or systems) that are specific to discrete 
numerical stimuli (Henik, Leibovich, Naparstek, Diesendruck, & Rubinsten, 2011; 
Sokolowski, Fias, Bosah Ononye, et al., 2017).  Therefore, in addition to a lack of 
conclusive evidence regarding whether symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes 
are sub-served by a single abstract number processing system or distinct format-
dependent systems, it is also of great importance to examine how numerical the 
processing of nonsymbolic stimuli (e.g., arrays of dots) actually is, and consequently 
examine the extent to which the processing of non-numerical variables plays a central 
role in nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing.  
1.6 The Acquisition of Symbolic Number Knowledge 
The data reviewed above suggest that representing numerical magnitudes symbolically 
involves processes that are at distinct from the way that nonsymbolic numerical 
magnitudes are processed in human adults.  These conclusions contradict the dominant 
perspective in the field of numerical cognition: that symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical 
magnitudes are processed using a single abstract number processing system.  From a 
developmental perspective, the dominant assumption in the field of numerical cognition 
would support the idea that symbolic representations are formed by mapping arbitrary 
labels onto pre-existing representations of nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes (Cantlon, 
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2012; Dehaene, 2007; Nieder & Dehaene, 2009; Piazza, 2010). However, a plausible 
alternative mechanism is that symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing 
are supported with similar but distinct mechanisms (Ansari, 2008; Leibovich & Ansari, 
2016). A key question that follows is: what would be the best developmental approach to 
investigating the relationship between symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude 
processing across developmental time?  
The majority of the research that has measured symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical 
magnitude processing across developmental time has compared symbolic and 
nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing within a sample of older child participants 
who have already acquired comprehensive knowledge of the symbolic number system 
(e.g., Bartelet, Vaessen, Blomert, & Ansari, 2014; Holloway & Ansari, 2009; Holloway 
& Ansari, 2008; Lyons & Ansari, 2015; Lyons et al., 2015; Reynvoet & Sasanguie, 2016; 
Sasanguie, Defever, Maertens, & Reynvoet, 2013). As with the adult data, this data 
seems to suggest that symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are not as linked 
as has been previously assumed and may, in fact, be supported by distinct mechanisms.  
However, a key developmental approach for investigating the relation between symbolic 
and nonsymbolic representations of numerical magnitudes is to probe at the link between 
symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing during the developmental 
window where children are in the process of acquiring symbolic number knowledge 
(Batchelor, Keeble, & Gilmore, 2015; Dehaene, 2007; Gunderson et al., 2015; Le Corre 
& Carey, 2007; Mix, 1999, 2008; Mussolin, Nys, Leybaert, & Content, 2014; Negen & 
Sarnecka, 2015; Shusterman et al., 2016, 2017; Slusser & Sarnecka, 2011; Slusser, Ditta, 
& Sarnecka, 2013; Wagner & Johnson, 2011).  Before I describe the findings from 
research examining the link between learning the meaning of symbolic numerical 
magnitudes and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing I will briefly outline the 
developmental process of acquiring symbolic number knowledge.  
Learning the meaning of symbolic numerical magnitudes is a slow process that typically 
takes children several years to master.  Children acquire the ability to recite the count 
sequence, procedurally, before understanding the semantic meaning of number words and 
Arabic digits (Karen Wynn, 1990, 1992).  Typically, it takes children two to three years 
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from the time they master the count sequence to master the principle of cardinality (often 
referred to as the cardinal principle (CP)): that the last number word that is stated when 
counting a set refers to the total quantity of objects within that set (Gelman & Gallistel, 
1978). The gradual process of acquiring the cardinal principle (i.e., becoming a cardinal 
principle knower) is as follows. First, children do not know the cardinal meaning of any 
number words and are consequently referred to as “pre-knowers.” Following this, 
children learn the meaning of small number words (i.e., numbers one to four) in a step-
wise manner (Wynn, 1992).  Children who know the meaning of the word ‘one’ and are 
referred to as “one-knowers.”  Several months later, children learn the meaning of the 
word ‘two’ and therefore have progressed to being “two-knowers”.  Subsequently, over 
time children become “three-knowers,” and some studies report the presence of “four-
knowers.”  This set of children who know the meaning of some small verbal number 
words (i.e., words one to four), but have not yet mastered the principle of cardinality (i.e., 
they do not understand that all number words in their count sequence refer to specific 
numerical magnitudes and that the last number counted refers to the total quantity of 
items in a set) are collectively referred to as “subset-knowers.’  Children who have 
learned the cardinal principle (i.e., CP-knowers) are qualitatively different from subset-
knowers in that they can generate cardinality for all numbers using their knowledge of the 
cardinal principle (Le Corre & Carey, 2007).  It is only once children have learned the 
cardinal principle that they are considered to have a preliminary understanding of the 
meaning of symbolic numerical magnitudes. 
Research exploring the link between learning the semantic meaning of symbolic 
numerical magnitudes and the ability to process nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes has 
resulted in mixed findings (e.g., Batchelor, Keeble, & Gilmore, 2015; Dehaene, 2007; 
Gunderson et al., 2015; Le Corre & Carey, 2007; Mix, 1999, 2008; Mussolin, Nys, 
Leybaert, & Content, 2014; Negen & Sarnecka, 2015; Shusterman et al., 2016, 2017; 
Slusser & Sarnecka, 2011; Slusser, Ditta, & Sarnecka, 2013; Wagner & Johnson, 2011). 
Indeed, some research indicates there is a link between children’s symbolic number 
knowledge and their ability to discriminate between nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes 
(e.g., Wagner & Johnson, 2011) whereas other research has indicated that children’s 
ability to process nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes is independent of that child’s 
 
 
12 
developing understanding of the meaning of symbolic numbers (Le Corre & Carey, 2007; 
Negen & Sarnecka, 2015).   
This body of research that has examined the link between symbolic and nonsymbolic 
numerical magnitudes during the developmental window where children are acquiring 
symbolic number knowledge (i.e., learning verbal number words) does not entirely 
support the assumption, based on the dominant perspective in the field of numerical 
cognition, that symbols are learned by mapping arbitrary labels onto a pre-existing 
evolutionarily ancient system used to processing nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes 
(Dehaene, 2007, 2008; Shusterman et al., 2016; Wagner & Johnson, 2011). More 
specifically, findings that suggest that preschool-age children’s nonsymbolic numerical 
magnitude processing abilities correlate with early symbolic number abilities (e.g., 
Mussolin et al., 2014; Wagner & Johnson, 2011) have been taken as support for the idea 
that children learn abstract number symbols by attaching the arbitrary number symbol 
onto a pre-existing nonsymbolic numerical magnitude representation. However, there is a 
growing body of evidence that contradicts this dominant assumption (For a 
comprehensive review see: Leibovich & Ansari, 2016; Merkley & Ansari, 2016). For 
example, research has reported that some children can count out an exact number of 
objects when asked to do so but did not use the corresponding number words when asked 
to map verbal number words onto nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes (Le Corre & 
Carey, 2007). Relatedly, when the nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing task is 
modified to make sure that children respond on the basis of numerical magnitude (rather 
than correlated non-numerical magnitude cues), the correlation between verbal number 
knowledge and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing abilities in typically 
developing children disappears (Negen & Sarnecka, 2015). These data suggest that the 
link between symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing is not as 
straightforward as previously assumed. Consequently, these data have driven researchers 
to question whether there is indeed a causal, developmental relationship between 
nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing and the acquisition of the capacity to 
conceptualize numbers symbolically (Barner, 2017; Merkley & Ansari, 2016).  
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An alternative explanation that may explain the link between nonsymbolic number 
processing and the acquisition of the cardinal principle in young children is that learning 
the cardinality of symbols may facilitate and even constrain children’s understanding of 
discrete nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes. This idea is supported by evidence showing 
that children’s verbal number knowledge was a stronger predictor of nonsymbolic 
numerical magnitude processing seven months later than the reverse relationship between 
nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing acuity and subsequent verbal number 
knowledge (Mussolin, Nys, Leybaert, et al., 2014).  This finding, in conjunction with 
other data suggesting that CP-knowers outperform subset knowers on a variety of 
nonsymbolic numerical magnitude tasks (e.g., Batchelor, Keeble, & Gilmore, 2015; Mix, 
Sandhofer, Moore, & Russell, 2012; Slusser & Sarnecka, 2011; Slusser, Ditta, & 
Sarnecka, 2013), suggests that the relationship between symbolic and nonsymbolic 
numerical magnitude processing in children who are in the process of learning symbolic 
numbers may be bidirectional, rather than unidirectional (Goffin & Ansari, 2019).  More 
research is needed to unravel whether acquiring the ability to represent numbers 
symbolically influences how children conceptualize discrete nonsymbolic numerical 
magnitudes. 
1.7 Summary and Outstanding Questions 
The field of numerical cognition has been dominated by the question of how numerical 
symbols are connected to evolutionarily ancient, pre-existing, representations of 
nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes (Dehaene, 2007). However, despite decades of 
research, it remains fiercely contested whether the uniquely human capacity to process 
numerical magnitudes symbolically is underpinned by mechanisms that are overlapping 
or distinct from the evolutionarily ancient system used to process nonsymbolic numerical 
magnitudes (for review see: (Ansari, 2008; Cohen Kadosh & Walsh, 2009; Sokolowski & 
Ansari, 2016).  Moreover, additional research is needed to understand how the system(s) 
that support symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes emerge over the course of 
development (for review see: Leibovich & Ansari, 2016; Merkley & Ansari, 2016).  
One potential explanation for these contradictory findings is that the relation between 
symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing may not be static.  Indeed, 
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perhaps numbers can be processed both abstractly and in a format-dependent way 
depending on the cognitive demands of the task and the individual’s developmental stage. 
Testing this idea requires an examination of whether the association between symbolic 
and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing changes when cognitive demands of 
the task change. For example, one could examine whether the processing of symbolic and 
nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes differ depending on whether the task requires 
participants to estimate, manipulate or ignore the magnitude of the stimuli.   
The key goal of the current thesis is to explore the link between symbolic and 
nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing, both behaviourally and at the neural level, 
as well as examine how this relationship can be influenced by task factors. Specifically, 
in adults, I explore the relationship between symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical 
magnitude processing in the brain by extracting regularities across a large set of studies 
with various task tasks demands; and by examining processing of symbolic and 
nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing in the absence of task demands; and 
manipulating task conditions intended to make the numerical magnitude more or less 
salient.  In children, I explore the link between the acquisition of symbolic number 
knowledge and spontaneously attending to nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes. Together, 
these different approaches provide novel insights into the way humans process symbolic 
and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes, both behaviourally and at the neural level, under 
different attentional conditions and at different points in development.   
1.8 Overview of the Current Thesis 
Many researchers have canvassed the brain in search of brain systems that support 
symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing.  Although researchers have 
probed at this question using cutting-edge neuroimaging techniques for nearly two 
decades, there is a lack of convergence among these neuroimaging studies regarding 
which brain regions support symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing.  
Consequently, it remains unclear whether the human brain represents numerical 
magnitudes abstractly, or if representations of numerical magnitudes in the human brain 
are format-dependent.  In chapter 2 of this thesis, I quantitatively evaluate available 
neuroimaging evidence to examine whether symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical 
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magnitudes are supported by common or distinct brain regions at the meta-analytic level.   
Specifically, I use activation likelihood estimation (ALE) to conduct the first quantitative 
meta-analysis of 57 empirical neuroimaging papers examining neural activation during 
symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing. This method is a necessary 
first step to quantify previous research that has examined symbolic and nonsymbolic 
numerical magnitude processing in order to identify whether the adult human brain hosts 
abstract and/or format-dependent representations of numerical magnitudes.  This study 
has been published journal Neuroimage (Sokolowski, Fias, Mousa, & Ansari, 2017).  
As revealed in chapter 2, a large body of research has examined the neural correlates of 
symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing (Sokolowski, Fias, Mousa, et 
al., 2017). Critically, the majority of these studies use active tasks, and do not adequately 
control for non-numerical magnitudes that are inherently correlated with nonsymbolic 
numerical stimuli. In active tasks, it is notoriously difficult to discern whether neural 
activation is associated with processing the magnitude of the stimulus or with decision 
making, motor processing, and task difficulty (Göbel, Johansen-Berg, Behrens, & 
Rushworth, 2004). To overcome the major limitations of active tasks, a small subset of 
research has used functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging adaptation (fMR-A) 
paradigms. fMR-A is a passive design that measures the neural correlates associated with 
a stimulus of interest without requiring participants to make a decision or motor response.  
This task relies on the principle that neural populations habituate (i.e., adapt) their 
activity following repeated presentations of the same stimulus (Grill-Spector, Henson, & 
Martin, 2006).  In fMR-A paradigms, a particular stimulus (i.e., the habituation stimulus) 
is repeatedly presented to evoke adaptation of brain regions associated with encoding this 
stimulus. Following this period of adaptation, a stimulus that differs in some way from 
the habituation stimulus (i.e., a deviant stimulus) is presented. The presentation of the 
deviant stimulus results in a rebound of activation in regions that are associated with the 
attributes of the particular deviant compared to the habituation stimulus. This rebound of 
activation in response to a deviant stimulus is referred to as the ‘neural rebound effect’. 
The extent of the neural rebound effect in response to a deviant is a function of the 
difference between the adapted stimulus and the deviant. 
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Despite the large body of research that has examined symbolic and nonsymbolic 
numerical magnitude processing, no single study has examined the neural underpinnings 
of both symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing within-subjects, 
while accounting for the confounds of general magnitude processing (e.g., physical size) 
and decision making.  In chapter 3 of this thesis, I develop and use a method I refer to as 
parallel fMR-A, to investigate which brain regions specifically support the processing of 
symbolic numerical magnitudes (symbol), nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes (quantity), 
and physical size (size).  In the parallel adaptation task, participants are repeatedly 
presented with a specific quantity of the same symbol in a white font of a specific 
size.  Following this, one aspect of the stimulus is changed (symbol, quantity, or 
size) while the other aspects remain constant.  Using this design, I examine whether 
symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes as well as non-numerical magnitudes 
are sub-served by similar or distinct systems in the human adult brain. 
In chapter 2 and 3, I explore the way that the human brain represents symbolic and 
nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes by extracting regularities across a large set of 
attentional task demands (chapter 2) and by using a paradigm that removes confounds 
associated with active task demands (chapter 3).  Critically, although these two 
methodologies are useful for developing our understanding of the way the human brain 
represents symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes in the absence of a task, they 
do not identify the attentional conditions under which symbolic and nonsymbolic 
numerical magnitudes are either linked or separate.  Chapter 4 of this thesis addresses the 
question of whether the similarities and differences between symbolic and nonsymbolic 
numerical magnitude processing depend on whether the magnitudes are being processed 
effortfully or automatically/unintentionally. Specifically, in chapter 4 I develop and 
implement a Symbolic-Nonsymbolic Stroop Task that assesses the effortful and automatic 
processing of symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes.  In the Symbolic-
Nonsymbolic Stroop task, participants are presented with two adjacent arrays of digits 
(e.g., 333 vs. 4444) and asked to either indicate the side containing the greater quantity of 
symbols (i.e., the nonsymbolic task) or the side containing the symbol associated with the 
greater numerical magnitude (i.e., the symbolic tasks). The task includes congruent trials, 
where the larger symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude appeared on the same 
 
 
17 
side of the screen (e.g., 22 vs. 66666), incongruent trials, where the larger symbolic and 
nonsymbolic numerical magnitude appeared on opposite sides of the screen (e.g., 222222 
vs. 66), and neutral trials, where the irrelevant dimension was the same across both sides 
of the screen (e.g., 22 vs. 66 for nonsymbolic; 22 vs. 222222 for symbolic). Additionally, 
the numerical distance between the numerical quantities being compared is systematically 
varied across trials as a way of manipulating the salience of the numerical magnitudes. 
This manipulation is based on the finding that numerical information is more likely to be 
processed (i.e., more salient) when the numerical distance between the stimuli being 
compared is relatively large. Examining whether numerical distance interacts with the 
effortful and automatic processing of symbols compared to quantities provides additional 
insight into the structure of the underlying representations supporting symbolic compared 
to nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing.  Using this task, I examine the effortful 
and automatic processing of symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes to assess if 
there is an asymmetry in the way that adults attend to these different formats of numerical 
magnitudes.  Identifying 1) whether there is an asymmetry in the way that human adults 
process symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes and 2) if this asymmetry exists 
during effortful and/or automatic processing of the numerical magnitudes is essential to 
gain insight into the representational structure of the underlying mechanisms that support 
symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing. 
The findings from chapters 2, 3 and 4 assess whether there is an asymmetry in the way 
that human adults represent and process symbolic compared to nonsymbolic numerical 
magnitudes. To understand the origin of the asymmetry between symbolic and 
nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing in adults it is critical to examine the 
relation between these different formats of numerical magnitudes while these systems are 
developing.  
As discussed above, learning the meaning of verbal number words is a major milestone 
for young children’s numerical thinking. Although a large body of research has examined 
how number words are mapped onto representations of nonsymbolic numerical 
magnitudes (e.g., Le Corre & Carey, 2007; Wagner & Johnson, 2011), no study to date 
has examined how the acquisition of verbal number words relates to the degree to which 
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children spontaneously attend to nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes in the world. In 
Chapter 5 of this thesis, I develop and use The Train Task to examine the degree to which 
preschool-aged children attended to discrete numerical magnitudes over and above 
attending to physical size.  The train task is an un-cued matching task that measures 
whether children use a number strategy or physical size strategy when being asked to 
make a train that is the same as the experimenter’s train.  The study in Chapter 5 
identifies whether verbal number word knowledge relates to the degree to which 
preschool-aged children attend to discrete numerical magnitudes of varied quantities. 
This final empirical chapter is essential to unravel how learning the association between 
symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes effects how children spontaneously 
attend to numerical information in their environment.  
In summary, the four empirical chapters that follow will present the data that investigates 
similarities and differences in the way that the human brain processes symbolic and 
nonsymbolic numerical magnitude, under different attentional conditions.  Specifically, 
the data presented will address the four areas our inquiry described above. Together, they 
will provide insight into the attentional conditions under which symbolic and 
nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are processed similarly and distinctly both 
behaviorally and at the neural level in adults and young children.  
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Chapter 2  
2 Common and Distinct Brain Regions in both Parietal 
and Frontal Cortex Support Symbolic and Nonsymbolic 
Number Processing in Humans: A Functional 
Neuroimaging Meta-Analysis 
2.1 Introduction 
The question of how the human brain represents numbers has been addressed through a 
multitude of neuroimaging experiments.  The overarching results from this rapidly 
growing body of research are consistent with a large body of neuropsychological 
evidence (Cipolotti, Butterworth, & Denes, 1991; Dehaene, Piazza, Pinel, & Cohen, 
2003). Specifically, neuroimaging research, like preceding neuropsychological studies, 
has suggested the bilateral parietal lobes, and specifically the bilateral intraparietal sulci, 
are important brain regions for processing the quantity of a discrete set of items (i.e., 
number) (for review see: Dehaene et al. 2003; Nieder 2005; Brannon 2006; Ansari 2008).  
Humans have the unique ability to represent numbers either symbolically, such as with 
Arabic symbols (2) or number words (two), or nonsymbolically, appearing as an array of 
items (••). The system used to process nonsymbolic numbers (e.g.,••), often referred to as 
the approximate number system, is thought to be innate, meaning that infants are born 
with the ability to process nonsymbolic numbers (Cantlon, Libertus, et al., 2009) and has 
a long evolutionary history (Brannon, 2006; Dehaene, Dehaene-Lambertz, & Cohen, 
1998).  In contrast, the acquisition of the culturally acquired, uniquely human ability to 
process abstract numerical symbols (e.g., 2 or two) is a product of learning and 
development and has emerged recently in human evolution (e.g., Ansari 2008; Coolidge 
and Overmann 2012). Because different stimulus formats can be used to represent the 
same quantity, numbers are said to have an abstract (i.e., format-independent) quality. As 
a result, one of the most dominant theories in the cognitive neuroscience of number 
processing, namely the three parietal circuits model, states that symbolic and 
nonsymbolic numbers are sub-served by the same underlying neuronal circuitry (Dehaene 
et al., 1998, 2003).  More specifically, the three parietal circuits model (Dehaene et al., 
 
 
31 
2003) predicts that three distinct neural systems support different aspects of basic number 
processing.  Importantly, the model was based on a qualitative synthesis of previous 
literature (Dehaene et al., 2003). This qualitative meta-analysis suggests that the bilateral 
intraparietal sulci support the processing of abstract numerical magnitudes, the left 
angular gyrus supports verbal aspects of basic number processing, and the bilateral 
posterior superior parietal lobules support visual attentional aspects of number 
processing. To empirically evaluate the parietal circuits model, researchers have 
canvassed the brain in search of neural responses associated with abstract representations 
of numbers (e.g., Dehaene et al. 1998, 2003; Brannon 2006; Piazza et al. 2007; Cantlon, 
Libertus, et al. 2009). 
Such efforts have generated a large body of research which has identified bilateral 
inferior parietal regions as brain regions that respond to numbers across stimulus formats 
(Dehaene et al., 2003).  Specifically, this research revealed that the intraparietal sulcus 
was activated by numbers when the numerical information was presented symbolically, 
either as Arabic digits (Ansari, Garcia, Lucas, Hamon, & Dhital, 2005; Chochon, Cohen, 
van de Moortele, & Dehaene, 1999; Holloway, Price, & Ansari, 2010; Pesenti, Thioux, 
Seron, & De Volder, 2000), number words (Ansari, Fugelsang, Dhital, & Venkatraman, 
2006), or nonsymbolically, such as dot arrays (Ansari & Dhital, 2006; Holloway et al., 
2010; Piazza, Izard, Pinel, Le Bihan, & Dehaene, 2004; Piazza et al., 2007; Venkatraman, 
Ansari, & Chee, 2005). This activation in the intraparietal sulcus during number 
processing was also found when the stimuli were presented visually (Arabic numerals) or 
auditorily (Eger, Sterzer, Russ, Giraud, & Kleinschmidt, 2003). Together, these results 
suggest that the intraparietal sulcus hosts a format and modality independent 
representation of number. However, the finding that the intraparietal sulcus is 
consistently activated across varying task types and methodologies do not necessarily 
imply that number is represented using only an abstract format-independent system.  
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in the distinction between the neural 
correlates of symbolic processing and nonsymbolic processing (Holloway & Ansari, 
2010; Lyons, Ansari, & Beilock, 2014; Shuman & Kanwisher, 2004; Venkatraman et al., 
2005).  Recent empirical research has highlighted striking differences in the brain 
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activation patterns of numerical stimuli based on stimulus format (Ansari, 2007; Cantlon, 
Libertus, et al., 2009; Holloway et al., 2010; Piazza et al., 2007; Venkatraman et al., 
2005). Right-lateralized parietal and frontal regions have been found to show greater 
activation for nonsymbolic addition compared to symbolic addition (Venkatraman et al., 
2005). However, brain regions in the left intraparietal sulcus have been shown to be more 
finely tuned to numbers presented as Arabic symbols compared to nonsymbolic dot 
arrays (Piazza et al., 2007). Holloway et al., (2010) directly tested whether the functional 
neuroanatomy underlying symbolic and nonsymbolic processing is overlapping or 
distinct.  They found overlapping activation for symbolic and nonsymbolic stimuli in the 
right inferior parietal lobule. They also found that distinct brain regions responded to 
symbolic compared to nonsymbolic numbers. Specifically, symbolic number processing 
recruited the left angular gyrus and left superior temporal gyrus while nonsymbolic 
number processing recruited regions in the right posterior superior parietal lobule 
(Holloway et al., 2010). These findings imply that distinct brain regions support format-
general and format-specific processing of numbers.   
This converging evidence that showed that distinct brain regions support format-specific 
processing led Cohen Kadosh and Walsh, (2009) to mount a significant challenge to the 
predominant view in the field that number is represented abstractly in the brain.  These 
authors highlighted caveats associated with studies that conclude that number is 
processed abstractly. For example, Cohen Kadosh and Walsh, (2009) called attention to 
the fact that many of the conclusions of these studies are based on null results and point 
out that shared neural representations may be driven by general task-related processing 
rather than by shared magnitude representations. The authors subsequently proposed the 
format-dependent processing hypothesis, postulating that the human brain possesses 
format-specific semantic representations of number.   
Although the primary focus in the field of numerical cognition has been on the 
relationship between activation in the parietal cortex and number processing, converging 
evidence has shown that brain regions in the bilateral prefrontal and precentral cortex are 
also consistently activated during numerical processing (Ansari et al., 2005; P Pinel, 
Dehaene, Rivière, & LeBihan, 2001).  The frontal cortex has been identified as important 
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for number processing in single-cell recordings from neurons in non-human primates 
(Nieder, Freedman, & Miller, 2002; Nieder & Miller, 2004).  Additionally, 
developmental imaging studies have documented that brain activation during numerical 
processing shifts from the frontal cortex to the parietal cortex across development (Ansari 
et al., 2005; Cantlon et al., 2006; Kaufmann et al., 2006). A quantitative meta-analysis 
that synthesized studies examining brain regions that are correlated with basic number 
processing and calculation tasks in adults further supported the idea that the frontal cortex 
is important for number processing in adults (Arsalidou & Taylor, 2011).  This meta-
analysis revealed that large regions of activation in both the parietal and frontal cortex 
support basic number and calculation tasks.  Results showed that calculation tasks 
elicited greater activation in the prefrontal cortex compared to basic number tasks. 
Consequently, these authors concluded that the prefrontal cortices are essential in number 
and computational tasks (Arsalidou & Taylor, 2011).  Together, these studies suggest that 
a frontoparietal network may support the processing of numerical information. Although 
the large body of research examining numerical processing in adults concluded that the 
parietal lobes support numerical processing, it remains unclear whether frontal activation 
is as consistent as parietal activation during numerical processing.  One potential 
explanation that parietal activation is more consistently reported than frontal activation 
during number processing tasks is that frontal activation may vary more than parietal 
activation between individuals. Since fMRI methodology cannot measure individual 
neural firing and requires averaging across many participants (Scott & Wise, 2003), it is 
possible that frontal activation varies more strongly than parietal activation between 
individuals. An alternative explanation is that perhaps parietal regions are selected more 
often than frontal regions in analyses involving regions of interest (ROI).  This selection 
bias could perpetuate an erroneous impression that the parietal lobe is more important 
than the frontal lobe for processing numbers. Consequently, quantitative meta-analytic 
tools are needed to overcome this potential unintentional bias within the field of 
numerical cognition.  
While converging evidence supports the notion that the processing of symbolic and 
nonsymbolic numbers relies on both common and distinct brain regions, this evidence 
has never been quantitatively synthesized.  Previous meta-analyses by Dehaene et al. 
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(2003), Cohen Kadosh et al. (2008) and Cantlon, Platt, et al. (2009)  examining brain 
activation patterns underlying number processing in adults did not investigate how the 
brain activation patterns during number processing differ based on number format (i.e., 
symbolic vs. nonsymbolic).  Instead, these qualitative meta-analyses grouped symbolic 
and nonsymbolic numerical stimuli into a general term: number (See also, Arsalidou & 
Taylor, 2011; Dehaene et al., 2003; Houdé, Rossi, Lubin, & Joliot, 2010; Kaufmann, 
Wood, Rubinsten, & Henik, 2011).  However, it is critical to examine symbolic and 
nonsymbolic numerical stimuli separately since a large body of empirical research has 
highlighted striking differences in the brain activation patterns of symbolic compared to 
nonsymbolic number processing (Ansari, 2007; Cantlon, Libertus, et al., 2009; Holloway 
et al., 2010; Piazza et al., 2007; Venkatraman et al., 2005).  Additionally, despite 
converging evidence revealing consistent activation in frontal brain regions (such as the 
medial frontal gyrus, inferior frontal gyrus and precentral gyrus) during number 
processing tasks (Ansari et al., 2005; Pinel et al., 2001), previous qualitative analyses 
focused exclusively on parietal regions (Cantlon, Platt, et al., 2009; Cohen Kadosh et al., 
2008; Dehaene et al., 2003). Moreover, these previous meta-analyses used Caret software 
(Cohen Kadosh et al. 2008; Cantlon, Platt et al. 2009), a tool that is widely used to 
visualize neuroimaging data by projecting the spatial mappings of brain activation 
patterns onto a population-averaged brain (Van Essen, 2012; Van Essen et al., 2001).   
This method of merging foci from several contrasts into a single figure or table has been 
the most common approach that researchers have used to combine data across studies 
(Turkeltaub, Eden, Jones, & Zeffiro, 2002).  Visualization-based methods like Caret may 
be safely used for presenting the results of a few studies but should not be used for large 
sets of studies. The use of this technique requires judgments of convergence or 
divergence across studies that are largely subjective. This subjectivity is undesirable for 
rigorous evaluation of the convergence of neuroimaging findings.  Therefore, quantitative 
meta-analytic tools, such as activation likelihood estimation (ALE) are critical for 
synthesizing studies with varying methodologies and inconsistent findings (Eickhoff et 
al., 2009; Turkeltaub et al., 2002, 2012).  
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2.1.1 The Present Meta-analysis 
There has been an emergence of quantitative meta-analytic techniques that use 
coordinate-based approaches to statistically determine concordance across functional 
imaging studies (Eickhoff et al., 2009; Turkeltaub et al., 2002, 2012). These methods 
minimize the subjectivity of meta-analyses by using statistical models to determine inter-
study trends. The present study uses activation likelihood estimation (ALE) to examine 
brain activation patterns underlying symbolic and nonsymbolic number processing. The 
aim of an ALE meta-analysis is to quantify the spatial reproducibility of a set of 
independent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies. ALE identifies 3D-
coordinates (foci) from independent studies and models probability distributions that are 
centred around foci.  The unification of these probability distributions produces statistical 
whole-brain maps (ALE maps) that show statistically reliable activity across independent 
studies (Eickhoff, Bzdok, Laird, Kurth, & Fox, 2012; Eickhoff et al., 2009; Laird, 
Lancaster, & Fox, 2005; Turkeltaub et al., 2002, 2012). The current study is the first 
study to use ALE to objectively examine brain activity that is overlapping and distinct for 
symbolic and nonsymbolic numbers.  This study aims to reveal which brain regions 
support abstract and format dependent number processing.  
2.2 Materials and Methods 
2.2.1 Literature Search and Article Selection 
A stepwise procedure was used to identify all relevant research articles.  First, the 
literature was searched using a standard search in the PubMed (http://www.pubmed.gov) 
and PsychInfo (http://www.apa.org/psychinfo/) databases. Combinations of the key terms 
“magnitude”, “number*”, “symbol*”, “nonsymbolic”, “PET”, “positron emission”, 
“fMRI”, “functional magnetic resonance imaging”, “neuroimaging” and “imaging” were 
entered into these databases.  Second, the reference list of all relevant papers found in the 
first step and all relevant review papers were reviewed.  A study was considered for 
inclusion if it included a passive or active symbolic number task, a passive or active 
nonsymbolic number task or both symbolic and nonsymbolic number passive or active 
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tasks.  The term ‘study’ refers to a paper and the term ‘contrast’ is defined as an 
individual contrast reported within a paper. 
2.2.2 Additional Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria: 
1. Studies had to use at least one of the following tasks: comparison, ordering, 
passive viewing, numerical estimation, numerosity categorization, counting, 
matching, size congruity, naming or target detection.  
• These studies were chosen to include both explicit and automatic 
magnitude processing. Studies with tasks that required cognitive 
processing (such as calculation) were excluded in order to have activation 
that is specifically related to format-independent or format-dependent 
magnitude processing. 
2. Studies had to include a sample of healthy human adults. 
3. Brain imaging had to be done using fMRI or PET.   
• PET and fMRI studies were included because these imaging methods have 
comparable spatial uncertainty (Eickhoff et al., 2009). 
4. Studies had to use whole-brain group analyses with stereotaxic coordinates in 
Talairach/Tournoux or Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) space. 
• Contrasts that used only region of interest analyses were excluded. 
• Contrasts that used only multivariate statistical approaches were excluded. 
5. Studies had to have a sample size of > 5 participants. 
6. Studies had to be written in English. 
Fifty-seven studies met the inclusion criteria, providing data on 877 healthy subjects. All 
of these studies included at least one symbolic and one nonsymbolic number task. See 
tables 2.1 and 2.2 for a detailed description of the main characteristics of each selected 
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study.  Together, these studies reported 575 activation foci obtained from 121 contrasts. 
The studies were reported in either Talairach or MNI spaces.  Studies that reported data 
in MNI space were transformed into Talairach space using the Lancaster transformation 
tool (icbm2tal) (Laird et al., 2010; Lancaster et al., 2007).  
2.2.3 Analysis Procedure 
Quantitative, coordinate-based meta-analyses were conducted using the revised version 
of the ALE method (Eickhoff et al., 2012, 2009; Turkeltaub et al., 2012). ALE analyses 
were conducted using GingerALE, a freely available application by Brainmap 
(http://www.brainmap.org). ALE assesses the overlap between contrast coordinates (i.e., 
foci) by modelling the coordinates as probability distributions centred on coordinates to 
create probabilistic maps of activation related to the construct of interest.  Specifically, 
foci reported from contrasts were combined for each voxel to create a modelled 
activation (MA) map. An ALE null-distribution is created by randomly redistributing the 
same number of foci as in the experimental analysis throughout the brain. To differentiate 
meaningful convergence of foci from random clustering (i.e., noise), an ALE algorithm 
empirically determines whether the clustering of converging areas of activity across 
contrasts is greater than chance as shown in the ALE null-distribution. In most empirical 
studies, a single group of subjects perform multiple similar tasks.  Therefore, as most 
studies report many different contrasts, these contrasts use the same participants in the 
same scanning session.  Consequently, the activation patterns produced by different 
contrasts do not represent independent observations. The ALE algorithm was modified to 
address this issue (Eickhoff et al., 2009; Turkeltaub et al., 2012).  Additionally, an 
alternative approach of organizing datasets according to subject group (rather than by 
contrasts) was implemented (Turkeltaub et al., 2012). The current study used the 
modified ALE algorithm and organizational approach to prevent subject groups with 
multiple contrasts from influencing the data more than studies in which only a few 
contrasts are reported from the same group of participants (Turkeltaub et al., 2012). 
Two separate ALE maps were created: One for symbolic numbers and one for 
nonsymbolic numbers. The current study examined brain regions that were active during 
each of symbolic (both Arabic and verbal) number processing and nonsymbolic number 
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processing.  A conjunction ALE analysis was then computed to examine brain regions 
that were active during both symbolic and nonsymbolic number processing.  Contrast 
analyses were computed between the symbolic number map of activation and the 
nonsymbolic number map of activation to determine which regions symbolic and 
nonsymbolic numbers specifically activated.  
2.2.4 Single Dataset ALE Maps 
Two separate ALE meta-analyses were conducted to examine the convergence of foci for 
1) symbolic number processing and 2) nonsymbolic number processing.  These two ALE 
maps used both active and passive contrasts. In addition, three separate ALE meta-
analyses were conducted to examine convergent foci for passive number processing: 1) 
all passive number processing (passive), 2) passive symbolic number processing (passive 
symbolic), 3) passive nonsymbolic number processing (passive nonsymbolic).  All papers 
were coded using Scribe (either version 2.3 or version 3.0.8).  Coordinates were compiled 
using Sleuth (version 2.4b). ALE meta-analyses were conducted using GingerALE 
(version 2.3.6). Of the 57 studies, 31 were used to create the symbolic map of activation 
(477 subjects, 69 contrasts, 265 foci) (cf. Table 2.1) and 26 were used to create the 
nonsymbolic map of activation (400 subjects, 52 contrasts, 310 foci) (cf. Table 2.2). 13 
studies were used to create the passive map of activation (184 subjects, 30 contrasts, 139 
foci) (cf. Table 2.3), of which 5 were used to create the passive symbolic map of 
activation (cf. Table 2.3), and 7 to create the passive nonsymbolic map of activation (cf. 
Table 2.3). One of the studies only included a conjunction analysis with both symbolic 
and nonsymbolic stimuli and therefore was not used to create the passive symbolic or 
passive nonsymbolic map. All ALE analyses were performed in GingerALE using a 
cluster-level correction that compared significant cluster sizes in the original data to 
cluster sizes in the ALE maps that were generated from 1000 threshold permutations. 
This was in order to correct for false-positive clusters that could arise as a result of 
multiple comparisons within the same voxel. Specifically, these maps had a cluster-level 
threshold of p<.05 and a cluster-forming (uncorrected) threshold of p<.001. The ALE 
maps were transformed into z-scores for display. This recently developed thresholding 
technique provides a faster, more rigorous analytical solution for producing the null-
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distribution and addresses the issue of multiple-comparison corrections (Eickhoff et al., 
2012). All single dataset ALE maps (symbolic, nonsymbolic and passive) were created 
using this correction.
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Table 2.1 Studies Included in the Symbolic Meta-Analysis 
1st 
Author Year Journal N 
Imaging 
Method 
Mean 
Age Gender Task(s) Contrast Name Loc 
Ansari D 2005 NeuroReport 12 fMRI 19 
 
Comparison Distance effect (small>large) adults 12 
Ansari D 2006 NeuroImage 14 fMRI 21 8F 6M 
Size 
Congruity 
Main effect: distance (small > large) 10 
  
       Main effect of distance in the 
neutral condition (small>large) 
7 
Ansari D 2007 
Journal of 
Cognitive 
Neuroscience 
13 fMRI 21.5 
 
Comparison 
Conjunction of Small and Large 
symbolic number 
8 
Attout L 2014 PLoS ONE 26 fMRI 21 
15F, 
11M 
Order 
Judgment  
Distance effect of numerical order 7 
Chassy P 2012 Cerebral Cortex 16 fMRI 28 16M Comparison Positive Integers<Negative Integers 1 
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Chen C 2007 NeuroReport 20 fMRI 22.7 
10F, 
10M 
Delayed-
number-
matching 
Unmatched Numbers > Matched 
Numbers 
8 
Chochon 
F 
1999 
Journal of 
Cognitive 
Neuroscience 
8 fMRI 
 
4F, 4M 
Naming, 
Comparison 
Digit Naming vs. Control 2 
  
       
Comparison vs. Control 13 
  
       
Comparison vs. Digit Naming 1 
Damarla 
S R 
2013 
Human Brain 
Mapping 
10 fMRI 25.5 7F, 3M 
Passive 
Viewing 
Stable Parietal lobe voxels in Digit-
object mode 
2 
Eger E 2003 Neuron 9 fMRI 27.9 5F, 4M 
Target-
detection 
Modality-related effects: Auditory 
Numbers >Visual Numbers (fixed-
effect) 
2 
  
       
Modality-related effects: Auditory 
Numbers >Visual Numbers 
(random-effect) 
4 
  
       Modality-related effects: Auditory 
Numbers >Visual Numbers 
5 
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Modality-related effects: Auditory 
Numbers >Visual Numbers 
(random-effect) 
4 
  
       Numbers > Letters and Colours 
(fixed-effect) 
4 
  
       Numbers > Letters and Colours 
(random-effect) 
2 
  
       
Numbers > Letters (fixed-effect) 2 
  
       
Numbers > Letters (random-effect) 2 
  
       
Numbers > Colours (fixed-effect) 4 
  
       
Numbers > Colours (random-effect) 3 
Fias W 2003 
Journal of 
Cognitive 
Neuroscience 
18 PET 23 18M Comparison  
Number comparison vs 
Nonsymbolic Stimuli Comparison 
13 
Fias W 2007 
Journal of 
Neuroscience 
17 fMRI 
 
9F, 8M Comparison 
(Number comparison-number 
dimming) - (letter comparison-letter 
dimming) 
3 
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Franklin 
M S 
2009 
Journal of 
Cognitive 
Neuroscience 
17 fMRI 21.8 10F, 7M 
Ordering 
Task 
Magnitude Near>Far (common 
regions with Order Near>Far) 
1 
  
       Order Far>Near (common regions 
with Magnitude Near>Far) 
1 
  
       Magnitude Near>Far (Unique 
regions) 
3 
  
       
Order Far>Near (Unique regions) 1 
Fulbright 
R K 
2003 
American 
Journal of 
Neuroradiology 
19 fMRI 24 8F, 11M 
Order, 
Identification  
Number vs Shapes 0 
He L 2013 Cerebral Cortex 20 fMRI 21 8F, 12M Comparison Symbolic > Nonsymbolic 2 
  
       
Digit-digit > cross notation trials 1 
  
       
Overlap between 
(Symbolic>nonsymbolic) and 
(small>large) 
2 
Holloway I 
D 
2010 Neuroimage 19 fMRI 23.5 10F, 9M Comparison 
(symbolic - control) - (nonsymbolic - 
control) 
2 
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Holloway I 
D 
2013 
Journal of 
Cognitive 
Neuroscience 
26 fMRI 25 22F, 4M 
Passive 
Viewing 
Adaptation to Hindu-Arabic 
Numerals for both groups 
2 
Kadosh R 2005 
Neuro-
psychologia 
15 fMRI 28 7F, 8M Comparison Numerical vs. Size 7 
  
       
Numerical vs. Luminance 8 
  
       
Numerical Distance 3 
  
       
Numerical Distance (IPS) 2 
Kadosh R 
C 
2007 NeuroImage 17 fMRI 31 7F, 10M Stroop Notation Adaptation 2 
  
       
Quantity Adaptation 1 
  
       
Notation x Adaptation 1 
Kadosh R 
C 
2011 
Frontiers in 
Human 
Neuroscience 
19 fMRI 26.3 12F, 7M 
Passive 
Viewing 
Magnitude Change Digits 10 
  
       
Magnitude Change Digits>Dots 3 
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Kaufmann 
L 
2005 Neuroimage 17 fMRI 31 7F, 10M Stroop 
Numerical comparison > physical 
comparison 
5 
  
       Numerical comparison (Distance 1 
> Distance 4, only neutral trials) 
5 
Le Clec'H 
G 
2000 Neuroimage 5 fMRI 37 5M 
Compare to 
12 
Numbers > Body Parts (Block) 4 
  
  
6 fMRI 27 3F, 3M 
Compare to 
12 
Numbers > Body Parts (Error) 3 
Liu X 2006 
Journal of 
Cognitive 
Neuroscience 
23 fMRI 
 
7 F, 5M Stroop Distance of 18 vs. Distance of 27 6 
Lyons I M 2013 
Journal of 
Cognitive 
Neuroscience 
35 fMRI 
 16F, 
17M 
Comparison 
Symbolic: Number Ordinal > 
Luminance Ordinal 
3 
  
       
Symbolic: Number Ordinal > 
Luminance Ordinal and Number 
Cardinal >Luminance Cardinal 
10 
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Notebaert 
K 
2011 
Journal of 
Cognitive 
Neuroscience 
13 fMRI 
 
6F,7M 
Passive 
Viewing 
Ratio 1.25 Below > Ratio 1  1 
  
       
Ratio 1.5 Below > Ratio 1  1 
  
       
Ratio 2 Below > Ratio 1  1 
  
       
Ratio 2 Below > Ratio 1.25 Below 1 
  
       
Ratio 1.5 Above > Ratio 1  1 
  
       
Ratio 2 Above > Ratio 1  1 
  
       
Ratio 2 Above > Ratio 1.25 Above 1 
Park J 2012 
Journal of 
Cognitive 
Neuroscience 
20 fMRI 23.4 11F, 9M 
Visual 
matching 
task 
Number > Letter 1 
Pesenti M 2000 
Journal of 
Cognitive 
Neuroscience 
8 PET 
 
8M Comparison Comparison vs. Orientation, Digits 7 
Pinel P 1999 NeuroReport 11 fMRI 26 2F, 9M 
Compare to 
5 
Arabic Number > Verbal Number 1 
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Close Distance > Far Distance 1 
  
       
Far Distance > Close Distance 1 
Pinel P 2001 Neuroimage 13 fMRI 
  
Comparison Verbal vs. Arabic 3 
  
       
Arabic vs. Verbal 6 
  
       
Distance Effect 7 
Pinel P 2004 Neuron 15 fMRI 24 
18 F, 
6M 
Stroop 
Number Comparison vs. Size 
Comparison 
5 
  
       
Number Comparison Small 
Distance vs. Number Comparison 
Large Distance 
3 
Price G R 2011 Neuroimage 19 fMRI 22.17 6F, 13M 
Passive 
Viewing  
(Conjunction) Arabic digits>Letters 
and Arabic digits>Scrambled digits 
1 
Vogel S E 2013 
Neuro-
psychologia 
14 fMRI 25 7F, 7M 
Number line 
estimation  
Number > Control 10 
                Number Specific Activation 5 
Loc, number of locations reported in contrast; fMRI, functional magnetic resonance imaging; PET, positron emission tomography; N, 
sample size of each study; M – Male, F – Female. 
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Table 2.2 Studies Included in the Nonsymbolic Meta-Analysis 
1st 
Author Year Journal N 
Imaging 
Method 
Mean 
Age 
Gende
r Task(s) Contrast Name Loc 
Ansari D 2006 
Brain 
Research 
16 fMRI 20.4 16M 
Passive 
Viewing 
Number Change Effect 4 
Ansari D 2006 
Journal of 
Cognitive 
Neuroscience 
9 fMRI 19.8 6M, 3F Comparison Distance Effect in Adults 7 
Ansari D 2007 
Journal of 
Cognitive 
Neuroscience 
13 fMRI 21.5 
 
Comparison Small Nonsymbolic > Large Nonsymbolic 1 
  
       
Large Nonsymbolic > Small Nonsymbolic 2 
  
       Conjunction of small nonsymbolic and large 
nonsymbolic 
3 
Cantlon J 
F 
2006 PLoS Biology 12 fMRI 25 5F, 7M 
Passive 
viewing 
Number > Shape (Adults) 2 
Castelli F 2006 PNAS 12 fMRI 24 4F, 8M Comparison Estimating Numerosity: In space and time 7 
  
       
Difficulty Effect Estimating Numerosity: Space 2 
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Difficulty Effect Estimating Numerosity: Time 2 
Chassy P 2012 
Cerebral 
Cortex 
16 fMRI 28 16M Comparison Disk > Dots 1 
Damarla S 
R 
2013 
Human Brain 
Mapping 
10 fMRI 25.5 7F, 3M 
Passive 
Viewing 
Stable Parietal lobe voxels in Pictoral Mode 6 
Demeyere 
N 
2014 
Human Brain 
Mapping 
12 fMRI 26 9F, 3M 
Passive 
Viewing 
Adaptation to categories (repeated pairs vs. 
different pairs) 
4 
  
       Repetition of small category versus large 
category (large < small) 
1 
  
       Repetition of small category versus large 
category (small < large) 
9 
  
       
Numerosity specific repetition [Repetition-
Category > (Repetition-numerosity + 
Repetition-Exact)] 
14 
  
       Interaction Small/Large with 
Category/Numerosity/Exact 
3 
  
       
Small numerosity < Small category 4 
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Dormal V 2009 
Human Brain 
Mapping 
14 fMRI 21 14M  
Numerosity 
Categorization 
Numerosity Processing - Reference for 
Numerosity 
9 
Dormal V 2012 
Human Brain 
Mapping 
15 fMRI 21 15M 
Numerosity 
Categorization 
Numerosity - Reference for Numerosity 5 
  
       (Numerosity - Reference for Numerosity) - 
(Duration vs Reference for Duration) 
1 
Dormal V 2010 Neuroimage 15 fMRI 21 15M 
Numerosity 
Categorization 
[Simultaneous Numerosity]-[Reference 
Simultaneous Numerosity] 
6 
  
       [Sequential Numerosity]-[Reference 
Sequential Numerosity] 
6 
  
       
[Simultaneous Numerosity–Reference for 
Simultaneous Numerosity]-[Sequential 
Numerosity–Reference Sequential 
Numerosity] 
4 
  
       
[Sequential Numerosity-Reference Sequential 
Numerosity]-[Simultaneous Numerosity-
Reference Simultaneous Numerosity] 
3 
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[Sequential Numerosity]-[Reference 
Sequential Numerosity] and [Simultaneous 
Numerosity]-[Reference Simultaneous] 
3 
Eger E 2009 
Current 
Biology 
10 fMRI 23 5F, 5M Comparison Number Comparison Same List 8 
  
       
Number Comparison Different List 10 
Hayashi M 
J 
2013 
Journal of 
Neuroscience 
27 fMRI 
 14F, 
12M 
Comparison Main Effect of Numerosity Task 13 
He L 2013 
Cerebral 
Cortex 
20 fMRI 21 
8F, 
12M 
Comparison Nonsymbolic > Symbolic 8 
  
       
Dot-dot > cross-notation trials 4 
  
       Overlap between (nonsymbolic>symbolic) 
and (large>small) 
6 
Holloway I 
D 
2010 Neuroimage 19 fMRI 23.5 
10F, 
9M 
Comparison (nonsymbolic-control)-(symbolic-control) 7 
Holloway I 
D 
2013 
Journal of 
Cognitive 
Neuroscience 
26 fMRI 25 
22F, 
4M 
Passive 
Viewing 
Nonsymbolic Comparison 6 
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Jacob S N 2009 
European 
Journal of 
Neuroscience 
15 fMRI 
  Passive 
Viewing 
Dot Proportion full brain analysis 1 
  
       
Adaptation to Dot Proportion 27 
  
       
Numerosity full brain analysis 1 
Kadosh R 
C 
2011 
Frontiers in 
Human 
Neuroscience 
19 fMRI 26.3 
12F, 
7M 
Passive 
Viewing 
Magnitude Change Dots 10 
  
       
Magnitude Change Dots>Digits 6 
Leroux G 2009 
Developmenta
l Science 
9 fMRI 23 9M 
Number-length 
interference   
(Interference-reference interference ) AND 
(Covariation-Reference covariation) 
10 
Lyons I M 2013 
Journal of 
Cognitive 
Neuroscience 
33 fMRI 
 16F, 
17M 
Comparison 
Nonsymbolic: Number ordinal>Luminance 
Ordinal 
7 
  
       Dot Ordinal >Luminance Ordinal (dot) and 
Dot Cardinal >Luminance Cardinal (dot) 
10 
Piazza M 2002 Neuroimage 9 PET 29 9M Count All 6-9 > All 1-4 8 
  
       
6-9 Random > 1-4 Random 6 
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6-9 Canonical > 1-4 Canonical 5 
Piazza M 2004 Neuron 12 fMRI 23 
 Passive 
Viewing 
Regions Responding to Deviations in Number 7 
Piazza M 2006 
Brain 
Research 
10 fMRI  3F, 7M 
Estimation, 
Counting 
Estimation > Matching 9 
         Counting > Matching 14 
         Counting > Estimation 7 
Roggeman 
C 
2011 
Journal of 
Neuroscience 
23 fMRI 25.8 23M 
Passive 
Viewing 
Large vs. Small Numerical Deviants 2 
  
       
Far vs. Close Numerical Deviants 1 
Santens S 2010 
Cerebral 
Cortex 
16 fMRI 22.2 
13M, 
1F 
Match-to-
numerosity 
conjunction: (Numerosity large > Numerosity 
medium) and (Numerosity medium > 
Numerosity small) 
6 
Shuman M 2004 Neuron 9 fMRI   2F, 7M Comparison 
Experiment 1: Nonsymbolic number 
comparison > Nonsymbolic colour 
comparison 
2 
Loc, number of locations reported in contrast; fMRI, functional magnetic resonance imaging; PET, positron emission tomography; N, 
Sample size of each study; M – Male, F – Female.  
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Table 2.3 Studies Included in the Passive Meta-Analyses 
1st Author Year Journal N 
Imaging 
Method 
Mean 
Age Gender 
*Symbolic or 
Nonsymbolic Contrast Name Loc 
Ansari D 2006 Brain Research 16 fMRI 20.4 16M Nonsymbolic Number Change Effect 4 
Cantlon J 
F 
2006 PLoS Biology 12 fMRI 25 5F, 7M Nonsymbolic Number > Shape (Adults) 2 
Damarla S 
R 
2013 
Human Brain 
Mapping 
10 fMRI 25.5 7F, 3M Nonsymbolic 
Stable Parietal lobe voxels in Pictoral 
Mode 
6 
  
      
Symbolic 
Stable Parietal lobe voxels in Digit-
object mode 
2 
Demeyere 
N 
2014 
Human Brain 
Mapping 
12 fMRI 26 9F, 3M Nonsymbolic 
Adaptation to categories (repeated 
categories pairs vs. different 
categories pairs) 
4 
  
       Repetition of small category versus 
large category (large < small) 
1 
  
       Repetition of small category versus 
large category (small < large) 
9 
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Numerosity specific repetition 
[Repetition-Category > (Repetition-
numerosity + Repetition-Exact)] 
14 
  
       Interaction Small/Large with 
Category/Numerosity/Exact 
3 
  
       
Small numerosity < Small category 4 
Holloway I 
D 
2013 
Journal of 
Cognitive 
Neuroscience 
26 fMRI 25 
22F, 
4M 
Symbolic 
Adaptation to Hindu-Arabic Numerals 
for both groups 
2 
Jacob S N 2009 
European 
Journal of 
Neuroscience 
15 fMRI 
  
Nonsymbolic Line Proportion full brain analysis 1 
  
       
Adaptation to Dot Proportion 27 
  
       
Numerosity full brain analysis 1 
Kadosh R 
C 
2007 NeuroImage 17 fMRI 31 
7F, 
10M 
Symbolic Notation Adaptation 2 
  
       
Quantity Adaptation 1 
  
       
Notation x Adaptation 1 
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Notebaert 
K 
2011 
Journal of 
Cognitive 
Neuroscience 
13 fMRI 
 
6F,7M Symbolic Ratio 1.25 Below > Ratio 1 1 
  
       
Ratio 1.5 Below > Ratio 1 1 
  
       
Ratio 2 Below > Ratio 1 1 
  
       
Ratio 2 Below > Ratio 1.25 Below 1 
  
       
Ratio 1.5 Above > Ratio 1 1 
  
       
Ratio 2 Above > Ratio 1 1 
  
       
Ratio 2 Above > Ratio 1.25 Above 1 
Piazza M 2004 Neuron 12 fMRI 23 
 
Nonsymbolic 
Regions Responding to Deviations in 
Number 
7 
Piazza M 2007 Neuron 14 fMRI 
  **Symbolic & 
Nonsymbolic 
Overall fMRI Adaptation Effect 
(Activation decrease with repetition of 
same approximate quantity) 
16 
  
       
Distance-Dependent Recovery from 
Adaptation across conditions 
(Far>Close) 
21 
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Price G R 2011 Neuroimage 19 fMRI 22.17 
6F, 
13M 
Symbolic 
(conjunction) Arabic digits>Letters and 
Arabic digits>Scrambled digits 
1 
Roggeman 
C 
2011 
Journal of 
Neuroscience 
23 fMRI 25.8 23M Nonsymbolic Large vs. Small Numerical Deviants 2 
                Far vs. Close Numerical Deviants 1 
Loc, number of locations reported in contrast; fMRI, functional magnetic resonance imaging; PET, positron emission tomography 
*Symbolic vs. Nonsymbolic column shows whether contrast was used in symbolic or nonsymbolic map for format-specific passive 
viewing maps. 
**Study used in the full passive map but not in symbolic or nonsymbolic
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2.2.5 Conjunction and Contrast Analyses 
Conjunction and contrast analyses were computed to examine overlapping and distinct 
brain regions for the two ALE maps that included both active and passive tasks for 
symbolic and nonsymbolic number processing (Eickhoff et al., 2011). All conjunction 
and contrast ALE analyses were performed in GingerALE and used an uncorrected 
threshold of p<.01 with 5000 threshold permutations and a minimum volume of 50mm3.   
Although the cluster-level correction used to produce the single file ALE maps is the 
optimal thresholding technique available (Eickhoff et al., 2012), this correction is not yet 
available for conjunction and contrast analysis. The only available correction available to 
date for conjunction and contrast analysis is false discovery rate (FDR) thresholding.  
However, because ALE models the foci as 3D Gaussian distributions and FDR is not 
recommended to be used with Gaussian data (Chumbley & Friston, 2009), an uncorrected 
threshold of .01 was used for the conjunction and contrast analyses. Therefore, due to 
methodological constraints, a cluster-level correction was used for the single file maps 
and uncorrected thresholding for the conjunction and contrast analyses1,2.  An 
uncorrected threshold of .01 was appropriate for the conjunction and contrast analyses 
because the algorithm used by these analyses only includes clusters that have already 
passed the strict threshold of cluster-level .05 and uncorrected .001, used to create the 
single file maps.  Therefore, this threshold is ideal to ensure that the threshold is stringent 
 
1
 Leading experts on ALE are recommending against using FDR and thus, for the use of uncorrected 
thresholds when doing conjunction and contrast analyses.  
Discussions on the GingerALE forum: 
http://www.brainmap.org/forum/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=499&sid=6c3ba03dfecbce73933a22acbd6fe2c1 
http://brainmap.org/forum/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=320#p1012 
http://brainmap.org/forum/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=485#p1505 
2
 The main findings do not change when using an FDR correction of .05 to calculate the conjunction and 
contrast analyses comparing symbolic and nonsymbolic single file ALE maps with a cluster-level threshold 
of p<.05 and a cluster-forming (uncorrected) threshold of p<.05.   
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without masking any important regions.  This threshold was combined with an extent 
threshold, which suppressed clusters that were smaller than 50 mm3. 
A conjunction analysis was computed to examine the similarity of activation between the 
ALE maps generated by symbolic number processing and nonsymbolic number 
processing.  The voxel-wise minimum value of the input ALE images was used to create 
the conjunction map. The conjunction was considered to be significant for each voxel if 
all contributing ALE maps showed significant activation in that voxel at the thresholds 
described. A conjunction ALE map was created to determine overlapping activation of 
symbolic and nonsymbolic numbers. 
Contrast analyses were computed to compare activation between the ALE maps 
generated for symbolic and nonsymbolic number processing.  ALE contrast images are 
created by directly subtracting one input image from the other.  GingerALE creates 
simulated null data to correct for unequal sample sizes by pooling foci and randomly 
dividing the foci into two groupings that are equal in size to the original data sets. One 
simulation dataset is subtracted from the other and compared to the true data.  This 
produces voxel-wise p-value images that show where the true data sit in relation to the 
distribution of values within that voxel. The p-value images are converted to Z scores.  
The following ALE contrasts were computed: 1) symbolic > nonsymbolic, 2) 
nonsymbolic > symbolic. 
It is possible that the activation commonly found across studies is related to top-down 
task-related brain activations during the explicit processing of number tasks.  Although 
the majority of neuroimaging studies investigating number processing have used active 
paradigms in which participants have to make a decision about numerical stimuli being 
presented, there is a growing body of research that has examined the neural processing of 
symbolic and nonsymbolic numbers in the absence of an explicit numerical processing 
task (e.g., Piazza et al. 2004, 2007; Ansari, Dhital, et al. 2006; Holloway et al. 2013; 
Vogel et al. 2014).  In order to determine which brain regions support symbolic and 
nonsymbolic number processing in the absence of task demands, ALE maps were created 
included papers which exclusively used passive viewing paradigms.  Specifically, an 
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ALE map was computed to examine convergent activation of all papers that used a 
passive viewing paradigm (symbolic and nonsymbolic). Additionally, two separate ALE 
maps were created using papers that employed passive viewing paradigms: One for 
passive viewing of symbolic numbers and one for passive viewing of nonsymbolic 
numbers.  
There were not enough papers to conduct conjunction and contrast analyses to examine 
the overlapping and distinct activation for the passive symbolic and passive nonsymbolic 
single file ALE maps. Therefore, these maps were compared qualitatively.  
2.2.6 Anatomical Labeling 
Anatomical labels from the Talairach Daemon (talairach.org) were determined 
automatically using GingerALE software for each of the automatically generated peak 
ALE locations within all clusters. All (x, y, z) coordinates and anatomical labels of peak 
ALE values are reported in Table 2.4, Table 2.5 and Table 2.6. 
2.3 Results 
This section is organized in the following manner.  First, the results are presented for the 
two meta-analyses that include active and passive tasks: 1) symbolic number processing, 
2) nonsymbolic number processing.  This is followed by the results of the conjunction 
analysis for symbolic and nonsymbolic magnitude processing. Following this, the brain 
regions active for the following contrasts are shown for symbolic>nonsymbolic, 
nonsymbolic>symbolic. These contrast analyses are repeated using a symbolic map that 
only includes Arabic digits.  Subsequently, the results are presented for the three ALE 
maps that include only passive tasks: 1) passive (both symbolic and nonsymbolic), 2) 
passive symbolic and 3) passive nonsymbolic. Finally, reliability analyses for the 
symbolic and nonsymbolic ALE maps are presented. 
2.3.1 Single Dataset Meta-Analyses (Passive and Active) 
Two separate single dataset ALE meta-analyses were conducted to examine the 
convergence of foci for symbolic number processing and nonsymbolic number 
processing. 
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2.3.1.1 Symbolic ALE Map   
The symbolic number processing single dataset meta-analysis revealed activation in a 
widespread frontoparietal network of brain areas during symbolic number processing 
(Fig. 2.1 and Table 2.4). The largest clusters of converging brain activation across 31 
studies (Table 2.1) were in the left superior parietal lobule, inferior parietal lobule and the 
precuneus, as well as the right inferior parietal lobule and precuneus. In addition to the 
parietal lobes, there was convergent activation in the left lingual gyrus and the left middle 
occipital gyrus as well as in the right superior frontal gyrus. 
2.3.1.2 Nonsymbolic ALE map 
The nonsymbolic number processing single dataset meta-analysis also revealed activation 
in a widespread frontoparietal network of brain areas during nonsymbolic number 
processing (Fig. 2.2 and Table 2.4). Convergent brain activation across 26 studies (Table 
2.2) was found in a region spanning the right inferior parietal lobule, superior parietal 
lobule, precuneus and middle occipital gyrus, as well as a region spanning the left 
superior parietal lobule and the precuneus.  Convergent activation was also found in the, 
right medial frontal gyrus and cingulate gyrus, the right insula, right precentral gyrus, and 
left middle occipital gyrus.  
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Table 2.4 Single Dataset Analyses (Active and Passive) 
Hemisphere Brain Area BA X Y Z ALE Vol/mm 
Symbolic 
 
      
L Superior Parietal Lobule 7 -28 -58 42 0.026 8944 
L Superior Parietal Lobule 7 -26 -54 44 0.026  
L Inferior Parietal Lobule 40 -38 -48 48 0.022  
L Inferior Parietal Lobule 40 -40 -44 38 0.021  
L Inferior Parietal Lobule 40 -34 -52 36 0.020  
L Precuneus 31 -20 -72 30 0.014  
R Inferior Parietal Lobule 40 34 -44 40 0.031 6208 
R Precuneus 19 30 -64 38 0.028  
R Precuneus 7 22 -52 46 0.021  
L Lingual Gyrus 18 -22 -74 -4 0.017 1096 
L Middle Occipital Gyrus 18 -26 -86 2 0.014  
R Superior Frontal Gyrus 6 2 10 48 0.021 768 
Nonsymbolic 
       
R Inferior Parietal Lobule 40 44 -40 46 0.032 10448 
R Precuneus 7 28 -50 48 0.030 
 
R Superior Parietal Lobule 7 28 -58 46 0.026 
 
R Precuneus 7 18 -64 50 0.026 
 
R Middle Occipital Gyrus 19 30 -78 18 0.020 
 
R Precuneus 31 28 -72 24 0.018 
 
R Middle Occipital Gyrus 18 34 -84 4 0.013 
 
L Superior Parietal Lobule 7 -30 -54 46 0.032 5472 
L Precuneus 19 -26 -70 30 0.019 
 
L Precuneus 7 -22 -64 36 0.018 
 
L Precuneus 7 -20 -58 54 0.017 
 
L Precuneus 7 -20 -62 44 0.016 
 
L Superior Parietal Lobule 7 -26 -52 60 0.012 
 
R Medial Frontal Gyrus 32 4 10 46 0.032 3464 
L Cingulate Gyrus 32 -6 12 40 0.013 
 
R Insula 13 32 20 8 0.034 1888 
R Precentral Gyrus 6 42 2 28 0.036 1704 
L Middle Occipital Gyrus 19 -26 -88 18 0.020 824 
X, Y and Z – x,y,z values of the location of the maximum ALE value  
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ALE - maximum ALE value observed in the cluster 
Vol/mm3 - volume of cluster in mm3 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Single dataset ALE map of symbolic number processing. The ALE analysis 
revealed significant clusters of convergent brain clusters (cf., table 2.4).  Activations were 
identified using a cluster-level threshold of p<.05 with 1000 threshold permutations and 
an uncorrected p<.001 Brain slices are shown at coordinates (x, y, z) in Talairach space. 
 
Figure 2.2 Single dataset ALE map of nonsymbolic number processing. The ALE 
analysis revealed significant clusters of convergent brain clusters (cf., table 2.4).  
Activations were identified using a cluster-level threshold of p<.05 with 1000 threshold 
permutations and an uncorrected p<.001 Brain slices are shown at coordinates (x, y, z) in 
Talairach space. 
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2.3.2 Conjunction and Contrast Analyses 
2.3.2.1 Conjunction ALE Map 
A conjunction analysis was conducted to reveal brain regions with convergent clusters of 
activation between the symbolic and nonsymbolic single dataset ALE maps.  Significant 
clusters of activation for symbolic and nonsymbolic number processing converged in the 
bilateral inferior parietal lobules, bilateral precuneus, left superior parietal lobule, as well 
as the right superior frontal gyrus (Table 2.5 Figure 2.3). 
2.3.2.2 Contrast ALE Maps 
To assess which brain regions were specifically activated for symbolic and nonsymbolic 
number processing, contrast analyses were conducted to compare the symbolic and 
nonsymbolic single dataset ALE maps.  These contrast analyses revealed significant 
clusters of activation in the right supramarginal gyrus and inferior parietal lobule, as well 
as the left angular gyrus, for symbolic>nonsymbolic (Table 2.5, Figure 2.3).  There were 
significant clusters of activation in a right-lateralized frontoparietal network including the 
superior parietal lobule, inferior parietal lobule, precuneus, insula, superior frontal gyrus, 
and middle occipital gyrus for nonsymbolic>symbolic (Table 2.5, Figure 2.3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
65 
 
Table 2.5 Conjunction and Contrast Analyses 
Hemisphere Brain Area BA X Y Z ALE Vol/mm 
Symbolic and Nonsymbolic 
      
L Superior Parietal Lobule 7 -26 -54 44 0.026 2544 
L Inferior Parietal Lobule 40 -34 -48 44 0.016 
 
R Precuneus 7 22 -52 46 0.021 2464 
R Inferior Parietal Lobule 40 36 -46 44 0.020 
 
R Inferior Parietal Lobule 40 38 -42 42 0.020 
 
R Inferior Parietal Lobule 40 32 -46 44 0.019 
 
R Precuneus 19 30 -62 42 0.017 
 
R Superior Frontal Gyrus 6 2 10 48 0.021 728 
L Precuneus 7 -28 -66 32 0.014 184 
L Precuneus 7 -26 -64 36 0.013 
 
L Precuneus 19 -24 -72 30 0.012 
 
R Precuneus 7 22 -66 38 0.012 24 
R Precuneus 7 24 -66 36 0.012 8 
Symbolic > Nonsymbolic 
      
R Supramarginal Gyrus 40 36 -48 32 2.911 304 
R Inferior Parietal Lobule 40 34 -52 34 2.820 
 
L Angular Gyrus 39 -36 -60 36 2.878 240 
Nonsymbolic > Symbolic 
      
R Precuneus 7 18 -61 51 2.848 1128 
R Precuneus 7 15.5 -64.5 52 2.820 
 
R Superior Parietal Lobule 7 21.3 -66.7 51.3 2.794 
 
R Insula 13 38 20 11 3.156 648 
R Insula 13 32 20 14 2.636 
 
R Inferior Parietal Lobule 7 34 -56 46 3.156 440 
R Inferior Parietal Lobule 40 34 -48 54 2.794 
 
R Superior Frontal Gyrus 6 8 22 50 3.156 408 
R Inferior Parietal Lobule 40 46 -44 49 2.652 328 
R Middle Occipital Gyrus 19 34 -80 12 2.687 200 
 X, Y and Z – x,y,z values of the location of the maximum ALE value  
ALE – conjunction analysis: maximum ALE value observed in the cluster, contrast 
analyses: maximum z-score observed in the cluster 
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Vol/mm3 - volume of cluster in mm3. 
 
Figure 2.3 ALE maps of the conjunction and contrasts between the symbolic and 
nonsymbolic single dataset ALE maps.  The ALE conjunction analysis revealed 
significant clusters of convergence between symbolic and nonsymbolic (blue). ALE 
contrast analyses reveal specific activation for symbolic>nonsymbolic (orange) and 
nonsymbolic>symbolic (green). Conjunction and contrast analyses were conducted using 
an uncorrected p<.01 with a minimum volume of 50mm3. Brain slices are shown at 
coordinates (x, y, z) in Talairach space. 
2.3.2.3 Contrast ALE Maps (Arabic Digits Only) 
Of the 31 studies, which were included in the symbolic single file ALE map, 24 studies 
visually presented Arabic digits.  Of the remaining 8 studies, 2 visually presented either 
number words or a combination of number words and Arabic digits, and 6 studies used 
both visual and auditory presentations of numbers. In order to determine whether the 
significant clusters of activation revealed by the symbolic vs. nonsymbolic contrast 
analyses were driven by the diversity of the symbolic number formats, a single dataset 
ALE map was created containing papers that contrasted Arabic digits (24 papers, 399 
subjects, 43 contrasts, 172 foci). To assess which brain regions were specifically 
activated for Arabic digits and nonsymbolic number processing, contrast analyses were 
conducted to compare the Arabic digit and nonsymbolic single dataset ALE maps. 
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These contrast analyses revealed significant clusters of activation in the left inferior 
parietal lobule and precuneus for Arabic digits>nonsymbolic (Table 2.6, Figure 2.4).  
There were significant clusters of activation in a right-lateralized frontal-parietal network 
including the superior parietal lobule, insula, and medial frontal gyrus, 
nonsymbolic>Arabic digits (Table 2.6, Figure 2.4).   
Table 2.6 Contrast Analyses: Arabic Digits vs. Nonsymbolic 
Hemisphere Brain Area BA X Y Z ALE Vol/mm 
Arabic Digits > Nonsymbolic 
      
L Inferior Parietal Lobule 39 -35 -62 40 2.590 152 
L Precuneus 19 -30 -62 40 2.576 
 
Nonsymbolic > Arabic Digits 
      
R Superior Parietal Lobule 7 23.1 -62.5 53.3 3.719 2064 
R Superior Parietal Lobule 7 38 -57 48 3.540 
 
R Inferior Frontal Gyrus 13 38 24 8 2.948 416 
R Insula 13 38 20 12 2.911 
 
R Insula 13 36 24 12 2.848 
 
R Medial Frontal Gyrus 8 9.3 21.3 48.7 2.794 208 
X, Y and Z – x,y,z values of the location of the maximum ALE value  
ALE – conjunction analysis: maximum ALE value observed in the cluster, contrast 
analyses: maximum z-score observed in the cluster 
Vol/mm3 - volume of cluster in mm3 
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Figure 2.4 ALE maps of contrasts between the Arabic digits and nonsymbolic single 
dataset ALE maps. ALE contrast analyses reveal specific activation for Arabic 
digits>nonsymbolic (orange) and nonsymbolic>Arabic digits (green). Contrast analyses 
were conducted using an uncorrected p<.01 with a minimum volume of 50mm3. Brain 
slices are shown at coordinates (x, y, z) in Talairach space. 
2.3.3 Single Dataset ALE Maps (Passive only) 
In order to determine which brain regions support symbolic and nonsymbolic number 
processing in the absence of task demands, ALE maps were created that only included 
papers that used passive viewing paradigms (Table 2.7, Figure 2.5).  
2.3.3.1 Passive (symbolic and nonsymbolic) ALE Map 
The passive single dataset meta-analysis revealed a frontoparietal network of brain areas 
that qualitatively overlaps with many of the regions that were found in the ALE maps 
from the conjunction and contrast analyses (Table 2.7, Figure 2.5, Figure 2.6).  
Specifically, the single dataset ALE map for passive symbolic and nonsymbolic revealed 
convergence of activation in the left superior parietal lobule, precuneus and middle 
temporal gyrus, the right inferior parietal lobule and precuneus, and left cingulate gyrus. 
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2.3.3.2 Passive Symbolic ALE Map 
The single dataset meta-analysis for passive symbolic revealed a large cluster of brain 
activation in the left precuneus and in the left fusiform gyrus (Table 2.7, Figure 2.6). 
2.3.3.3 Passive Nonsymbolic ALE Map 
The single dataset meta-analysis for passive nonsymbolic revealed brain activation in the 
right precuneus, superior parietal lobule, and middle occipital gyrus (Table 2.7, Figure 
2.6). 
Table 2.7 Passive Single Dataset Analyses 
Hemisphere Brain Area BA X Y Z ALE Vol/mm 
Symbolic and Nonsymbolic 
      
L Precuneus 19 -30 -66 36 0.022 3736 
L Precuneus 7 -22 -66 36 0.015 
 
L Superior Parietal Lobule 7 -26 -62 48 0.014 
 
L Superior Parietal Lobule 7 -32 -66 52 0.014 
 
L Middle Temporal Gyrus 39 -26 -52 34 0.014 
 
L Superior Parietal Lobule 7 -30 -54 44 0.012 
 
R Precuneus 7 24 -52 48 0.017 2128 
R Inferior Parietal Lobule 40 36 -48 48 0.013 
 
L Cingulate Gyrus 24 -8 6 46 0.015 640 
Symbolic 
       
L Precuneus 19 -30 -66 36 0.014 1016 
L Fusiform Gyrus 37 -46 -48 -12 0.014 560 
Nonsymbolic 
       
R Precuneus 7 26 -50 50 0.014 1272 
L Superior Parietal Lobule 7 -28 -54 44 0.011 688 
L Superior Parietal Lobule 7 -28 -62 48 0.010 
 
L Middle Occipital Gyrus 18 -24 -88 2 0.013 608 
X, Y and Z – x,y,z values of the location of the maximum ALE value  
ALE - maximum ALE value observed in the cluster 
Vol/mm3 - volume of cluster in mm3 
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Figure 2.5 Single dataset ALE map using only studies with a passive design (purple) 
overlaid on top of Figure 2.3. Activations of passive ALE map were identified using a 
cluster-level threshold of p<.05 with 1000 threshold permutations and an uncorrected 
p<.001 Brain slices are shown at coordinates (x, y, z) in Talairach space. 
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Figure 2.6 Single dataset ALE map of all studies (symbolic and nonsymbolic) that used a 
passive design (purple).  Single file ALE maps of studies using passive designs with 
symbolic stimuli (orange) and nonsymbolic stimuli (yellow) are overlaid.  Activations of 
passive ALE maps were identified using a cluster-level threshold of p<.05 with 1000 
threshold permutations and an uncorrected p<.001 Brain slices are shown at coordinates 
(x, y, z) in Talairach space. 
2.3.4 Split Half Reliability Analyses 
The contrast analyses between symbolic and nonsymbolic ALE maps of activation 
revealed significant differences between symbolic and nonsymbolic number processing at 
the meta-analytic level (Table 2.5, Figure 2.3).  Follow-up reliability analyses were 
conducted in order to determine the extent to which the noise in the data can account for 
some of the between symbolic versus nonsymbolic activations.  Specifically, the 
contrasts that comprise the symbolic and nonsymbolic number processing ALE maps 
were each split into two random halves (an ALE map of activation was created for each 
half). A contrast analysis was run in order to determine regions that were significantly 
more activated for half one>half two and for half two>half one. This analysis was 
repeated three times for each symbolic and nonsymbolic ALE map. These analyses 
revealed that for the symbolic ALE reliability analysis, only one of the six contrasts 
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showed a significant difference between half one and half two. However, for the 
nonsymbolic ALE reliability analysis, five of the six contrasts showed a significant 
difference between half one and half two (Table 2.8). See Table 2.9 for a description of 
which brain regions showed significant differences.  Table 2.9 reports the random regions 
that come out when contrasting half of the map against the other half.  The regions 
reported in this table are small and random.  The purpose of this table is to detail the 
regions that came out as significant in the reliability analyses in order to highlight that the 
regions that were different between the two halves are small and span many different 
regions across the brain.  
Table 2.8 Reliability Analyses: Number of Significant Regions 
Run Contrast Number of Regions 
Symbolic  
Run 1 Half 1 > Half 2 0 
 Half 2 > Half 1 1 
Run 2 Half 1 > Half 2 0 
 Half 2 > Half 1 0 
Run 3 Half 1 > Half 2 0 
 Half 2 > Half 1 0 
Nonsymbolic   
Run 1 Half 1 > Half 2 1 
 Half 2 > Half 1 1 
Run 2 Half 1 > Half 2 3 
 Half 2 > Half 1 1 
Run 3 Half 1 > Half 2 1 
  Half 2 > Half 1 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
73 
 
Table 2.9 Reliability Analyses: Location of Significant Clusters 
Hemisphere Brain Area BA X Y Z ALE Vol/mm 
Symbolic 
       
L Inferior Parietal Lobule 40 -39 -55 36 2.652 216 
L Inferior Parietal Lobule 40 -34 -56 36 2.501 
 
Nonsymbolic 
       
L Middle Occipital Gyrus 18 -36 -86 -2 2.794 464 
L Middle Occipital Gyrus 18 -35 -85 2 2.652 
 
L Middle Occipital Gyrus 18 -29 -85 2 2.605 
 
L Inferior Occipital Gyrus 18 -25 -89 1 2.382 
 
L Precuneus 31 -18 -48 39 3.156 504 
L Superior Parietal Lobule 7 -32 -52 52 2.652 512 
R Precuneus 7 28 -54 50 2.794 144 
R Superior Parietal Lobule 7 26 -52 42 2.468 
 
R Precuneus 7 20 -60 42 2.727 120 
L Cingulate Gyrus 32 1 16 39 3.719 640 
R Medial Frontal Gyrus 6 8 16 44 2.418 
 
L Superior Parietal Lobule 7 -26 -58 56 2.848 120 
X, Y and Z – x,y,z values of the location of the maximum ALE value  
ALE – conjunction analysis: maximum ALE value observed in the cluster, contrast 
analyses: maximum z-score observed in the cluster  
Vol/mm3 - volume of cluster in mm3  
 
2.4 Discussion 
The current meta-analysis examined the neural bases of the ability to process symbolic 
and nonsymbolic numbers. Quantitative meta-analytic techniques were used to address 
two important questions.  First, the study examined whether neural representations of 
numbers are represented abstractly or if the human brain hosts format-dependent 
representations for number. This question was addressed by identifying both overlapping 
and distinct brain regions that are activated by symbolic and nonsymbolic numbers.  
Second, the study examined whether these converging regions of activation were related 
to magnitude processing rather than top-down task demands.  
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The current study represents the first quantitative meta-analysis examining the neural 
correlates of symbolic and nonsymbolic magnitude processing. Specifically, two ALE 
meta-analyses were computed to identify the neural correlates of symbolic and 
nonsymbolic number processing. These meta-analyses revealed that brain regions in the 
frontoparietal network were associated with symbolic and nonsymbolic number 
processing across studies. Activation in regions within the bilateral parietal and frontal 
cortex was correlated with both symbolic and nonsymbolic number processing. The left 
middle occipital gyrus was activated during symbolic number processing and the bilateral 
middle occipital gyri were activated during nonsymbolic number processing. The spatial 
distributions of the single dataset quantitative ALE maps that were generated for 
symbolic and nonsymbolic numbers suggest that both overlapping and distinct brain 
regions are associated with symbolic and nonsymbolic numbers. 
2.4.1 Symbolic vs. Nonsymbolic 
In order to quantitatively address whether numbers are represented abstractly or if the 
human brain hosts format-dependent representations for number, conjunction and 
contrast analyses were conducted to compare symbolic and nonsymbolic ALE maps.  
Conjunction analyses revealed that regions along the bilateral inferior parietal lobules and 
precuneus, as well as the left superior parietal lobule, and right superior frontal gyrus, 
were specifically activated by the conjunction of symbolic and nonsymbolic numbers.  
Contrast analyses revealed that the right supramarginal gyrus and inferior parietal lobule, 
as well as the left angular gyrus, were specifically activated for symbolic compared to the 
nonsymbolic numbers. Notably, only the left inferior parietal lobule was significant 
specifically for Arabic digits compared to nonsymbolic numbers. A right-lateralized 
frontoparietal network including the right superior parietal lobule, inferior parietal lobule, 
precuneus, superior frontal gyrus and insula as well as the middle occipital gyrus were 
specifically activated for nonsymbolic compared to symbolic numbers. These findings 
are consistent with empirical research suggesting that symbolic and nonsymbolic 
numbers are processed using both overlapping and distinct neural mechanisms (e.g., 
Holloway et al., 2010; Lyons and Beilock, 2013; Piazza et al., 2007).   
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In addition to quantitatively replicating the finding that overlapping and distinct neural 
populations support different number formats, these conjunction and contrast analyses 
provide valuable insights into the highly debated question of whether number is 
processed abstractly (e.g., Ansari, 2007; Cohen Kadosh and Walsh, 2009; Cohen Kadosh 
et al., 2007; Dehaene et al., 1998; Nieder and Dehaene, 2009; Piazza et al., 2007).  The 
finding that several neural regions were activated by the conjunction of symbolic and 
nonsymbolic number maps supports the notion that the human brain represents numbers 
abstractly. This finding implicates the bilateral inferior parietal lobules and precuneus, as 
well as the left superior parietal lobule, and right superior frontal gyrus, as candidate 
regions that may support abstract number processing. However, the nature of the overlap 
between symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical maps is unclear because the statistical 
algorithms that underlie ALE do not evaluate patterns of activation within overlapping 
regions.  Therefore, while it is possible that the overlap could represent common 
semantic processing, the overlap could also represent common task demands such as 
attention or response-selection. In empirical studies, researchers addressed this limitation 
of coarse spatial resolution by implementing multi-voxel pattern analysis (MVPA) to 
examine patterns of activation for symbolic and nonsymbolic numbers in the intraparietal 
sulcus (Damarla & Just, 2013; Eger et al., 2009; Lyons et al., 2014) and at the whole-
brain level (Bulthé et al., 2014). These studies consistently reported a lack of association 
between patterns of activation for symbolic and nonsymbolic number processing. Such 
findings challenge the idea that overlapping activation for symbolic and nonsymbolic 
numerical processing implies that numbers are processed abstractly. It is important to 
interpret overlapping activation with caution until data-analysis techniques become 
available that can analyze patterns of activation across multiple studies.  
Meta-analytic contrast analyses revealed that distinct neural mechanisms are activated by 
symbolic compared to nonsymbolic numbers and supported the theory that numerical 
representations are dependent on format (Cohen Kadosh et al., 2011, 2007; Cohen 
Kadosh & Walsh, 2009). In particular, the contrast symbolic>nonsymbolic revealed 
activation in the right supramarginal gyrus and the inferior parietal lobule, as well as the 
left angular gyrus. Conversely, the contrast nonsymbolic>symbolic showed that 
nonsymbolic numbers correlate with activation in the right superior parietal lobule, 
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inferior parietal lobule, and precuneus (as well as right-lateralized regions not in the 
parietal cortex including the insula, superior frontal gyrus, and middle occipital gyrus). 
Interestingly, regions specifically activated by either symbolic or nonsymbolic stimulus 
formats seemed to be lateralized within the parietal cortex.  Specifically, the right parietal 
lobule supported both symbolic and nonsymbolic specific processing, while activation in 
the left parietal lobule was specific to symbolic number processing.  However, even 
though symbolic and nonsymbolic maps both show activation in the right parietal cortex, 
the localization in the right parietal lobe is different.  Specifically, activation 
nonsymbolic>symbolic activation is more superior, while symbolic>nonsymbolic 
activation more inferior. In other words, the contrast analyses comparing symbolic and 
nonsymbolic ALE maps suggest that within the right parietal cortex, symbolic and 
nonsymbolic number processing are associated with different spatial patterns of 
activation.  
The symbolic ALE map included several symbolic number formats: Arabic digits, written 
number words, and verbal number words. In contrast, the nonsymbolic ALE map 
included only visual displays of arrays of objects.  One potential explanation for the 
significant activation revealed by the contrast analyses is that the symbolic number map 
consists of not only of visual but also written and auditory stimuli.  To test this, a single 
file ALE map with only Arabic digits was created and compared to the nonsymbolic map.  
This contrast analysis revealed that the processing of Arabic digits correlated with 
activity in only the left inferior parietal lobule while processing nonsymbolic numbers 
correlated with activity in the right superior parietal lobule, insula and medial frontal 
gyrus.  Therefore, the left inferior parietal lobule may be specific to the processing of 
Arabic digits, while the right supramarginal gyrus and inferior parietal lobule may host 
more abstract symbolic number representations. The finding that the symbolic passive 
map reveals left-lateralized parietal activation provides converging evidence supporting 
the notion that the left inferior parietal lobe is important for symbolic number 
representations. 
Significantly, a majority of the papers that were included in the ALE meta-analyses used 
visual stimuli.  Analyzing overlapping and distinct activation for number processing 
77 
 
tasks, measured using different modalities at the meta-analytic level, would aid in 
evaluating abstract number representations. To date, there are not enough studies that 
measure number in the verbal, or tactile domains to form an ALE map that can be 
contrasted against a visual number processing map. Consequently, additional empirical 
research is necessary to investigate the neural correlates of number processing in non-
visual domains. 
In addition to these differences in brain activation, a reliability analyses revealed that the 
nonsymbolic ALE map has more variability than the symbolic ALE map.  More 
specifically, we examined the extent to which there were significant differences within 
formats, by randomly splitting the included contrasts in half and contrasting the two 
halves.  One would predict that if the activations are highly consistent, then no 
differences in such an analysis should be observed.  While we found this to be the case 
for symbolic number processing, the analyses of the nonsymbolic data revealed some 
significant variability. Specifically, the split half analysis of the nonsymbolic data 
revealed that in five out of the six contrasts revealed greater activation in one half of the 
nonsymbolic dataset compared to the other half.  Given that the data were randomly split, 
conclusions regarding the potential processing differences between the two halves of the 
data cannot be made.  However, it should be noted that the significant regions within the 
reliability analyses did not reveal systematic locations (i.e., there were regions across the 
frontal, parietal, and occipital lobes). This suggests that the lack of reliability in the 
nonsymbolic map was due to variable data across studies rather than systematic 
variability within specific brain regions. 
The finding from the reliability analyses indicate, that the symbolic ALE map is more 
reliable than the nonsymbolic ALE map when using equivalent numbers of papers, and 
the same thresholds suggest that this distinction is a predicament of the data in the field 
rather than the methodology of the meta-analyses. This finding of differences in the 
reliability of the symbolic and nonsymbolic map should be taken into account when 
considering the results of contrast analyses contrasting symbolic and nonsymbolic ALE 
maps. Specifically, regions that are more activated by nonsymbolic numbers compared to 
symbolic numbers should be interpreted with caution within the context of the current 
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meta-analysis. Additionally, this finding should be considered when evaluating brain 
regions that correlate with nonsymbolic number processing within empirical studies.  
Overall, these reliability data provide valuable insights into underlying differences 
between format-dependent neural responses and set the foundation for future empirical 
research which needed to disentangle the difference in variability between symbolic and 
nonsymbolic number processing at the meta-analytic level.  
The findings that symbolic numbers activated the bilateral inferior regions of the parietal 
lobe while nonsymbolic numbers activated right-lateralized superior regions of the 
parietal lobe conflicts with the notion that the brain processes numbers using only a 
number module that is indifferent to number format.  Instead, regions that are format-
specific may imply differential semantic processing of symbolic and nonsymbolic 
numbers. However, as meta-analyses do not include experimental manipulations, they 
cannot determine what brain regions sub-serve specific processes.  This is important to 
consider with respect to the current meta-analytic contrasts because these contrasts alone 
cannot confirm that the areas revealed are really engaging in format-specific semantic 
processing.  These regions of activation may reflect other processes that differ between 
formats.  Although it is possible that specific regions activated by symbolic>nonsymbolic 
and nonsymbolic>symbolic reflect something other than format-specific processing, there 
are several aspects of the analysis that speak against this.  First, all contrasts that were 
entered into the single file ALE maps contrast basic number processing against a control 
task that was matched in terms of perceptual and other non-semantic processing 
dimensions. Second, the symbolic and nonsymbolic passive ALE maps show similar 
differences.  This suggests that the regions that are specifically activated by symbolic and 
nonsymbolic number processing are likely related to semantic differences between 
symbolic and nonsymbolic number processing. Ultimately, this question of format 
specificity in the human brain calls for further experimental investigation in order to 
understand the process of how the brain represents symbols compared to nonsymbolic 
numbers. In this way, the present meta-analysis may pave the way for new investigations 
into the specific nature of format-specific processing in the parietal cortex.  
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The concept of format-specific hemispheric specialization within the parietal lobes has 
previously been supported by developmental studies (e.g., Holloway and Ansari 2010).  
For example, researchers revealed increasing specialization of the left intraparietal sulcus 
for processing of symbolic numbers across development (e.g., Vogel et al. 2014) but 
consistent activation across children and adults in the right intraparietal sulcus for 
nonsymbolic numbers (e.g., Cantlon et al., 2006).  The idea that this hemispheric 
asymmetry in the parietal cortex is a result of developmental specialization is further 
supported by a developmental quantitative meta-analysis that identified brain regions 
supporting symbolic and nonsymbolic number processing in children (Kaufmann et al. 
2011).  The results of this meta-analysis showed that the notation of the number 
(symbolic vs. nonsymbolic) influenced the location of neural activation patterns both 
within and outside the parietal lobes (Kaufmann et al. 2011).  In accordance with the 
current meta-analyses, Kaufmann et al., (2011) showed that symbolic number magnitude 
processing was correlated with bilateral parietal activation while activation during 
nonsymbolic number processing was lateralized to the right parietal lobe. Together, these 
findings challenge the notion that the parietal cortex hosts a single system that processes 
number abstractly. Instead, it is probable that hemispheric specialization for number 
formats in the parietal cortex emerges over the course of development.   
Beyond the parietal cortex, it has long been predicted that the ventral visual stream might 
house a number form area  (NFA, Dehaene and Cohen 1995). In support of this 
prediction, the ALE passive symbolic map revealed activation in the ventral stream. 
However, contrary to this prediction, the contrast of symbolic > nonsymbolic in the 
present meta-analysis did not reveal regions in the ventral visual stream that were more 
active for symbolic than nonsymbolic processing of number. Therefore, this meta-
analysis does not lend strong support to the NFA as no contrasts were able to reveal 
symbolic-specific activation. Recently, the existence of an NFA in the ventral stream was 
revealed using intracranial electrophysiological recording (Shum et al., 2013). This study 
also reported evidence to suggest that the region that was shown to exhibit category-
selectivity for numerals is located within or near a zone in which there is a drop-out of 
the fMRI signal due to the auditory canal and venous sinus artifacts. Indeed, a recent 
study in which this fMRI signal drop out was reduced revealed category selectivity for 
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numerals in bilateral regions of the inferior temporal gyri (Grotheer, Herrmann, & 
Kovacs, 2016). It is possible, therefore, that the absence of evidence for an NFA in the 
current meta-analysis stems from an fMRI signal drop out masking category-selective 
activation for numerals in the ventral stream. Having said that, the evidence for the 
existence of an NFA is, to date, sparse and there is a need for more evidence using 
methods that control for the fMRI signal drop out in the inferior temporal gyrus. Once 
sufficient evidence has been accumulated, a meta-analytic approach, such as the one used 
in the present paper could be employed to quantify the consistency of evidence for the 
existence of the NFA.  
2.4.2 The Three Parietal Circuits Model 
Several different theories of numerical cognition propose potential mechanisms that may 
underlie mathematical abilities (Campbell, 1994; Dehaene et al., 2003; McCloskey, 
1992). Among these theories is the three parietal circuits model (Dehaene et al., 2003) 
which is distinct from other theories because it makes specific predictions about the 
neuroanatomical underlying number processing. This is an influential, highly cited model 
that is often claimed to be predictive of empirical data (e.g., Neumärker 2000; 
Schmithorst and Brown 2004).  The current meta-analysis has the potential to further 
constrain existing theories, such as the three parietal circuits model, that propose potential 
mechanisms that underlie basic number processing. The three parietal circuits model 
(Dehaene et al., 2003), predicts that three distinct systems of representation are recruited 
for basic numerical processing and calculation tasks.  These systems include a quantity 
system (which processes abstract numerical representations that are not related to number 
format), a verbal system (which represents numbers as words) and a visual system (which 
encodes numbers as strings of Arabic digits).  Dehaene et al., (2003) used three-
dimensional visualization software to examine how parietal activation related to this 
model.  Using these qualitative meta-analytic data, they proposed that three distinct, but 
functionally related networks coexist in the parietal lobes and that these networks are 
used to support numerical processing. Briefly, the three parietal circuits model suggests 
that the bilateral horizontal segments of the intraparietal sulci are related to the quantity 
system, the left angular gyrus is related to the verbal system, and the posterior superior 
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parietal lobules are related to the visual system, and specifically, attention processes.  For 
over a decade, this model has driven researchers to examine the neural underpinnings of 
basic number processing and calculation. This influential model has been both supported 
and challenged by empirical research (Chassy & Grodd, 2012; Eger et al., 2003; Piazza et 
al., 2004, 2007; Price & Ansari, 2011). Results of the current quantitative meta-analysis 
challenge several aspects of the three parietal circuits model. First, the finding from the 
conjunction analysis that reveals that both symbolic and nonsymbolic number processing 
activate the regions in the bilateral inferior parietal lobules and precuneus, and left 
superior parietal lobule challenges the notion put forward by Dehaene et al., (2003) that 
“the horizontal segment of the intraparietal sulcus (HIPS) appears as a plausible 
candidate for domain specificity” (p.487). Second, the finding that the left angular gyrus 
was specifically activated for symbolic numbers supports the idea that the left angular 
gyrus is related to the verbal system.  This was supported by the contrast analysis from 
the current meta-analyses. However, the right supramarginal gyrus and inferior parietal 
lobule were also activated by symbolic>nonsymbolic number processing. Therefore, 
although it is possible that the activation in the left angular gyrus is related to the verbal 
system, which is likely used more by symbolic compared to nonsymbolic number 
processing, the activation in the right parietal lobe does not fit with this account.  An 
alternative explanation is that these bilateral parietal regions are part of a format-specific 
number-processing region for symbolic number processing. Specifically, perhaps the left 
angular gyrus supports the verbal aspects of number processing while the right 
supramarginal gyrus and inferior parietal lobule support other aspects of symbolic 
number processing. In lieu of these results, perhaps the left angular gyrus supports the 
verbal processing and reading of symbols whereas the right supramarginal gyrus and 
inferior parietal lobule support processes that use this verbal symbolic knowledge and 
attentional processes to perform higher-level tasks such as calculation.  This suggestion is 
consistent with results from the calculation meta-analysis (Arsalidou & Taylor, 2011), 
which report that the right angular gyrus is activated during calculation.  Third, findings 
from the current meta-analysis both support and challenge the idea that activation in the 
superior parietal lobules is a consequence of attending to visual dimensions of numbers. 
Evidence from the conjunction analyses of the current meta-analyses showed that the left 
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superior parietal lobule was activated for the conjunction of symbolic and nonsymbolic 
magnitude processing.  Therefore, based on these findings, the left superior parietal 
lobule is an equally plausible candidate for domain specificity of number processing. 
Although, this convergence of activation could be due to a visual attention orienting 
response as proposed by Dehaene et al., (2003), the left superior parietal lobule was also 
found in the passive meta-analysis.  Thus, there is superior parietal lobule activation even 
when the task demands, and therefore the attentional demands, are reduced. Importantly, 
the fact that nonsymbolic>symbolic was correlated with activation in the right superior 
parietal lobule conflicts with the idea that the superior parietal lobule supports only visual 
attention processes. Instead, these findings reveal hemispheric asymmetry in the bilateral 
superior parietal lobules that might suggest that the right superior parietal lobule hosts 
format-dependent representations of nonsymbolic numbers and the left superior parietal 
lobule hosts and abstract number processing region. One possible explanation for this 
finding is that the right superior parietal lobule is specifically correlated with visual 
attentional processes associated with nonsymbolic number tasks. Another possible 
explanation for the format-specific activation of the right intraparietal sulcus is that this 
region is associated with processes that are specific to nonsymbolic numerical magnitude 
processing. Using a computational model, Verguts and Fias (2004) trained a neural 
network to map a symbolic or nonsymbolic numerical visual input onto a place-coded 
representation. Place-coding is a way of representing the cardinal value of the total 
number of items in a set by representing the quantity of the set as a place on a number 
line.  In the computational model, symbolic inputs are mapped directly onto a place-
coding representation. However, nonsymbolic inputs undergo an intermediate step 
between the nonsymbolic visual input and a place-coding representation. This 
intermediate step is referred to as summation coding.  In summation coding, the size of 
the neural representation monotonically varies with the number of objects being 
presented. During this intermediate step, neurons accumulate proportionally to the 
number of objects that were visually processed. A large body of neuroscience evidence 
converges with these computational models suggesting that place-coded neurons exist 
within the primate brain (for review see, Nieder and Dehaene, 2009 or Nieder, 2013).  
These studies typically use single-cell recordings, monitoring individual neurons, while 
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non-human primates discriminate between nonsymbolic arrays (e.g., Nieder and Miller, 
2004; Nieder and Miller, 2003; Tudusciuc and Nieder, 2007).  Overwhelming evidence 
indicates that the primate brain place codes numerosity (Nieder & Miller, 2004; 
Okuyama, Kuki, & Mushiake, 2015) even in monkeys that were never trained to 
discriminate numbers (Viswanathan & Nieder, 2013). Converging evidence from human 
fMRI adaptation studies revealed that tuned number neurons respond to dot arrays (Jacob 
& Nieder, 2009; Piazza et al., 2004).  These tuned number neurons mirror place-coding 
neurons within the non-human primate brain (Jacob & Nieder, 2009). 
Additionally, the existence of this type of summation coding has been found in humans 
both behaviourally (Roggeman, Verguts, Fias, Vergutsa, & Fias, 2007) and at the 
neuronal level (Roggeman, Santens, Fias, & Verguts, 2011; Santens et al., 2010).  In 
particular, neuroimaging studies have identified the right superior parietal lobule as a 
potential region that might support the process of accumulation during summation coding 
(Roggeman et al., 2011; Santens et al., 2010). Therefore, one possible explanation for 
activation in the right superior parietal lobule relating specifically to nonsymbolic 
number processing is that this region supports summation coding. Ultimately, these meta-
analytic findings question the idea that the intraparietal sulcus hosts a system that 
processes numbers abstractly and the superior parietal lobule solely supports visual 
attentional processing.  
It has been over a decade since the initial proposal of the three parietal circuits model.  
The results of the current quantitative meta-analysis do not converge with the data that 
support the three parietal circuits model (Dehaene et al., 2003). On the basis of these 
discrepancies, it is recommended that the three parietal circuits model should be updated. 
The parietal lobules should be canvased in search of regions that support both format-
dependent and format-independent numerical representations. This will illuminate the 
extent to which format-specific regions reflect various components of format-specific 
processing including semantic, perceptual and decision-making processing. Furthermore, 
the examination of brain regions that support format-dependent and format-independent 
numerical representations will clarify which regions in the intraparietal sulcus, inferior 
parietal lobule and superior parietal lobule are associated with various aspects of basic 
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magnitude processing. This should ultimately illuminate the mechanism underlying 
magnitude processing in the parietal lobes.  
2.4.3 Frontal vs. Parietal 
During the last decade, there has been an intense focus on the parietal lobes as brain 
regions involved in number processing (e.g., Dehaene et al. 2003; Eger et al. 2003; Fias 
et al. 2003; Cohen Kadosh et al. 2007; Cohen Kadosh and Walsh 2009).  However, many 
neuroimaging studies reported activation in regions of the frontal cortex during number 
processing (e.g., Eger et al. 2003; Cohen Kadosh et al. 2007; Franklin and Jonides 2008; 
Cohen Kadosh and Walsh 2009; Dormal and Pesenti 2009; Dormal et al. 2012; Hayashi 
et al. 2013).  The importance of the frontal cortex in number processing was revealed in 
research that used single-cell recordings in animals as well as in pediatric neuroimaging 
studies. Specifically, invasive single-cell recordings in non-human primates identified 
putative ‘number neurons’ in the parietal as well as the prefrontal cortex; these neurons 
responded to specific quantities (such as two dots) while animals performed a numerical 
discrimination task (Nieder, 2013; Nieder et al., 2002).  These findings suggested that 
regions of the frontal cortex may host pure magnitude representations.  Similarly, 
pediatric neuroimaging studies showed that young children recruited the prefrontal cortex 
more than adults during number discrimination tasks. In contrast, intraparietal sulcus 
activation during number comparison increased across development (Ansari et al., 2005; 
Kaufmann et al., 2006). Researchers suggested that this frontal to parietal shift from 
childhood to adulthood may reflect a decrease in the need for domain-general cognitive 
resources such as working memory and attention as children begin to process number 
symbols automatically (Cantlon et al., 2006; Cantlon, Libertus, et al., 2009; Venkatraman 
et al., 2005). The notion that regions in the frontal cortex are still important for number 
and calculation tasks among adults is further supported by a quantitative meta-analysis 
that identified brain regions supporting number processing and calculation in adults 
(Arsalidou & Taylor, 2011). Unlike the current meta-analysis, Arsalidou and Taylor, 
(2011) focused on calculation tasks such as arithmetic and subtraction tasks.  Their meta-
analysis showed that prefrontal regions are essential for number and calculation.  
Moreover, they revealed that activation in regions along the prefrontal cortex was related 
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to the difficulty of the task.  Specifically, IFG was activated during the processing of 
simple numerical tasks while the MFG and superior frontal gyrus were involved in more 
complex calculation problems (Arsalidou & Taylor, 2011).   In view of this, Arsalidou 
and Taylor, (2011) suggested that this activation in the prefrontal cortex was a result of 
domain-general processes, such as working memory, that are essential for number and 
calculation tasks. A common explanation for the consistent activation reported in the 
frontal cortex during number and calculation tasks was that the frontal cortex is activated 
in response to general cognitive processes associated with the task (e.g., Cantlon et al. 
2006; Arsalidou and Taylor 2011). However, it has also been argued that frontal 
activation is supporting number representations rather than general cognitive processes 
(for a review see: Nieder and Dehaene, 2009).   
The current meta-analysis lends additional support to the idea that frontal activation is 
important for number processing during basic number tasks. Results revealed consistent 
activation in frontal regions during symbolic and nonsymbolic number processing.  
Moreover, results showed that neural activation in response to number processing is no 
less consistent in the frontal cortex than in the parietal cortex.  In particular, the single 
dataset ALE maps revealed that the superior frontal gyrus was consistently activated 
during symbolic magnitude processing and the right medial frontal gyrus and cingulate 
gyrus were activated during nonsymbolic magnitude processing.  The right superior 
frontal gyrus was also activated in the conjunction analysis of symbolic and nonsymbolic 
and specifically for nonsymbolic number processing the contrast analyses comparing 
nonsymbolic>symbolic. The current meta-analysis deliberately included only basic 
magnitude processing tasks in order to minimize the recruitment of additional cognitive 
resources typically needed for complex calculation tasks. Additionally, all contrasts 
included in the current meta-analysis were contrasted against control conditions. These 
attributes make it likely that the activation revealed in the current meta-analyses is 
related, at least in part, to magnitude representations. The superior frontal gyrus was also 
found to activate to complex calculation tasks (Arsalidou & Taylor, 2011), however the 
location of activity differs such that complex calculations elicit activity in anterior parts 
of the superior frontal gyrus (BA 10), whereas basic number tasks elicit activity in 
superior frontal gyrus (BA 6), a region often associated with the premotor cortex. Further 
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evidence for the idea that the frontal cortex may support magnitude representations 
comes from the contrast analyses, which revealed that the right superior frontal gyrus was 
specifically activated by nonsymbolic numbers but not by symbolic numbers. The 
specificity of frontal activation for nonsymbolic numbers suggests that this right-
lateralized frontal region may be essential for identifying the number of objects within a 
set. Therefore, similarly to activation in the parietal cortex, the activation patterns within 
the frontal cortex vary as a function of format (symbolic vs. nonsymbolic). Together, the 
data from the current meta-analysis offer no reason to think that the parietal cortex is 
more specialized for number than the frontal cortex.  
Although the pattern of frontal activation suggests that the superior frontal gyrus may 
support basic number processing, the fact that many of the studies included in the 
symbolic and nonsymbolic meta-analyses were active tasks, and therefore had general 
cognitive processes such as decision-making, precludes the conclusion that the superior 
frontal gyrus supports magnitude representations rather than general cognitive processes.  
To overcome this limitation, single file ALE meta-analyses were computed to examine 
converging activation of studies that used passive tasks.  These single file passive maps 
are essential to illuminate which brain regions are activated by responding to a task.  The 
brain activation that was associated with passive symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical 
tasks was consistent with activation revealed in the ALE contrast maps comparing 
symbolic and nonsymbolic maps of activation that included both passive and active tasks.  
Specifically, both the active and passive maps and passive only maps revealed bilateral 
activation in the left superior parietal lobule and precuneus and the right inferior parietal 
lobule and precuneus as well as the left cingulate gyrus for symbolic and nonsymbolic 
number processing.  Although the current study did not have enough power to 
statistically contrast the passive symbolic and passive nonsymbolic maps, the qualitative 
comparison of the passive symbolic and passive nonsymbolic single file ALE maps 
depicted in Figure 2.6 is consistent with the contrast analyses symbolic>nonsymbolic and 
nonsymbolic>symbolic.  Specifically, the passive symbolic map reveals activation in the 
left precuneus and the left fusiform gyrus and the passive nonsymbolic ALE map reveals 
activation in the right precuneus, left superior parietal lobule, and left middle occipital 
gyrus. The cluster of activation is larger in the right parietal lobule compared to the left 
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parietal lobule.  Therefore, similarly to the contrast analyses that included both passive 
and active conditions, a qualitative comparison of passive symbolic and passive 
nonsymbolic single file ALE maps reveals trends of lateralization. Specifically, passive 
single file ALE meta-analyses suggest that symbolic numbers activate the left parietal 
lobe and nonsymbolic numbers activate a larger region in the right parietal lobe.  
Therefore, the passive maps reflect similar patterns of activation to the active and passive 
single dataset maps as well as the contrasts for both symbolic and nonsymbolic number 
processing.  Together, these passive maps suggest that activation in the bilateral parietal 
cortex and the left cingulate gyrus may be related to format-dependent and independent 
magnitude processing, rather than task demands. 
Taken together, the present meta-analysis does not support the argument that frontal 
regions are involved in task demands while parietal regions are involved in semantic 
processing. Instead, these data indicate that both the frontal cortex and the parietal cortex 
may be involved in general cognitive processes associated with number tasks and 
magnitude representations. Ultimately, the field of numerical cognition needs to 
acknowledge that frontal regions are consistently engaged, even during basic number 
processing, and in accordance with this, reduce biases towards parietal activation.  
2.4.4 Limitations and Advantages of ALE 
As the present study used ALE methodology, it is important to note several specific 
limitations with ALE such as difficulty accounting for differences in statistical 
thresholding approaches across studies and difficulty determining the spatial extent and 
magnitude of the activation for each focus (for a more detailed discussion of these 
limitations: Ellison-Wright et al. 2008; Christ et al. 2009; Di Martino et al. 2009; 
Arsalidou and Taylor 2011). Additionally, as ALE uses data from fMRI and PET studies, 
it is important to consider that the blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) signal and the 
PET signal are indirect signals.  Specifically, the PET signal and BOLD response 
estimate brain activity by detecting changes associated with blood flow (Logothetis, 
2003). Moreover, these indirect signals are typically corrected for motion, smoothed, and 
averaged across participants.  Therefore, at best, these signals only reveal mass activation 
of a brain region, and not individual neuronal firing (see Scott and Wise, (2003) for a 
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more detailed critical appraisal of functional imaging).  Since fMRI and PET detect an 
indirect mass signal that is smoothed across a large number of neurons in the brain and 
averaged across subjects, it is likely that one region of activation within a single 
empirical study, represents several neural networks (Nieder, 2004).  This idea is 
supported by data in primates that revealed that less than 20% of neurons in the 
intraparietal sulcus responded to numbers (Nieder and Miller, 2004).  This is particularly 
important to consider when examining which brain regions support numbers abstractly 
versus a format-dependent manner.  Therefore, when interpreting the results of the 
current meta-analysis, it is perhaps more accurate to argue that regions which seem to 
process numbers abstractly contain a larger number of “abstract number-selective 
neurons,” whereas regions that are sensitive to number format have a larger number of 
“format-dependent number-selective neurons.” As the field of functioning imaging 
develops, future research will be needed to more precisely examine abstract and format-
dependent regions at the neuronal level in humans.  
Despite these limitations, ALE has several important advantages as a tool for 
synthesizing neuroimaging data. Particularly, the algorithms that underlie ALE allow for 
the quantification of foci among empirical papers with varying methodologies. For 
example, this method can account for differences in the number of runs, the duration of 
the presentation of the stimuli and the type of design (e.g., block vs. event-related). It is 
likely that this diversity in methodologies is one of the main drivers of conflicting 
findings often reported between studies. Additionally, because neuroimaging research is 
so costly, the majority of empirical studies have small sample sizes. ALE groups different 
studies with varying methodologies by domains in order to increase sample sizes and 
ultimately address broader theoretical questions. Overall, ALE is a valuable meta-analytic 
tool that can quantitatively integrate large amounts of neuroimaging data to reveal 
converging patterns of findings. 
2.4.5 Conclusions 
In conclusion, this meta-analysis has reaffirmed the body of research suggesting that the 
ability to process numbers relies on a large number of brain regions. This quantitative 
meta-analysis shows that overlapping and distinct regions in the frontal and parietal lobes 
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are activated by symbolic and nonsymbolic numbers, revealing the specific roles of 
parietal and frontal regions in supporting number processing. The finding that several 
neural regions were activated by the conjunction of symbolic and nonsymbolic number 
maps supports the notion that the human brain represents numbers abstractly. This study 
also illuminates the lateralization of symbolic compared to nonsymbolic number 
processing within the parietal lobes. Specifically, the left angular gyrus is potentially 
important for the mapping of symbols onto quantities (nonsymbolic numbers) while the 
right superior parietal lobule may be important for processing nonsymbolic sets of items. 
The lateralization of symbolic and nonsymbolic number is an intriguing avenue for future 
research. Additionally, this research highlights the consistency of activation within the 
frontal cortex during number processing. Ultimately, the current meta-analysis extends 
our understanding of the brain regions associated with basic number processing and 
initiates future research on the neural mechanisms that underlie our essential ability to 
comprehend numbers. 
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Chapter 3  
3 Symbols are Special: An fMRI Adaptation Study of 
Symbolic, Nonsymbolic and Non-numerical Magnitude 
Processing in the Human Brain 
3.1 Introduction 
Humans have the exceptional ability that emerged over the course of human cultural 
history, to represent numbers symbolically (e.g.,‘3’ or ‘three’). This capacity to represent 
numbers symbolically is necessary for mathematical thinking, which is a major pillar of 
contemporary civilization. The uniquely human ability to process these symbolic 
numerical magnitudes is thought to be supported by the same brain regions that are 
associated with a pre-existing, innate and evolutionarily ancient abstract number 
processing system used to process nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes (e.g., three dots 
‘•••’), in human adults (Brannon, 2006; Dehaene, 2007; Dehaene et al., 2003; Nieder & 
Dehaene, 2009). However, a growing body of recent evidence suggests that the neural 
systems used to process symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are more 
distinct than has been previously assumed (Ansari, 2007; Bulthé, De Smedt, & Op de 
Beeck, 2014; Cohen Kadosh & Walsh, 2009; Lyons, Ansari, & Beilock, 2012, 2014; 
Lyons & Beilock, 2013; Sokolowski & Ansari, 2016), thus conflicting with the notion 
that numbers are processed entirely abstractly. Despite years of research, and a recent 
meta-analysis of neuroimaging papers, presented in Chapter 2 of the current thesis 
(Sokolowski, Fias, Mousa, & Ansari, 2017), there remains no clear conclusion about 
whether symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are supported by the same or 
distinct brain regions.  
Research examining whether symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are 
represented in the same way in the adult human brain is further complicated by the fact 
that nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are inherently confounded by non-numerical 
magnitudes. For example, physical size is related to nonsymbolic magnitude processing 
because more objects take up more space.  More specifically, a set of six objects takes up 
more physical space than a set of five of the same sized objects (For review see: 
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Leibovich & Henik, 2013). Additionally, brain regions associated with numerical 
magnitude processing are also activated during the processing of non-numerical 
magnitudes such as physical size, duration, and luminance (Cantlon, Platt, & Brannon, 
2009; Cohen Kadosh, Lammertyn, & Izard, 2008; Sokolowski, Fias, Bosah Ononye, & 
Ansari, 2017; Walsh, 2003). This finding of common brain regions supporting numerical 
and non-numerical magnitude processing has been taken to suggest that the neural system 
that has been identified as an abstract number processing system (used to process both 
symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes) may, in fact, be a general system used 
to process both numerical and non-numerical magnitudes. However, it is clear that 
previous studies have not sufficiently controlled for continuous properties of the 
nonsymbolic stimuli.  Therefore, the question of whether symbolic and nonsymbolic 
numerical magnitudes are processed using the same system while controlling for brain 
regions associated with non-numerical magnitude processing, must still be addressed.  
More problematic still is the use of active tasks in the vast majority of studies that 
compare the neural correlates of symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical thinking.  In active 
tasks, it is notoriously difficult to discern whether neural activation is associated with 
processing the magnitude of the stimulus or with decision making and motor processing 
required to complete the active task (Göbel et al., 2004). Additionally, it is challenging to 
equate difficulty levels on active tasks, which means that a comparison of task effects of 
active tasks may reflect relative levels of difficulty rather than representational 
differences between the tasks.  To overcome these limitations of active tasks, a small 
subset of research has used functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging adaptation (fMR-A). 
fMR-A is a passive design that measures the neural correlates associated with stimuli of 
interest without requiring participants to make a decision or motor response.  This task 
relies on the principle that neural populations habituate (i.e., adapt) their activity 
following repeated presentations of the same stimulus (Grill-Spector et al., 2006).  In 
fMR-A paradigms, a particular stimulus (i.e., the habituation stimulus) is repeatedly 
presented to evoke adaptation of brain regions associated with encoding this stimulus. 
Following this period of adaptation, a stimulus that differs in some way from the 
habituation stimulus (i.e., a deviant stimulus) is presented. The presentation of the deviant 
stimulus results in a rebound of activation in regions that are associated with the 
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attributes of the particular deviant compared to the habituation stimulus. This rebound of 
activation in response to a deviant stimulus is referred to as the ‘neural rebound effect’. 
The extent of the neural rebound effect in response to a deviant is a function of the 
difference between the adapted stimulus and the deviant. For example, within the number 
domain, if a participant is adapted to symbolic number ‘6’ the neural rebound effect will 
be greater for a symbolic number deviant stimulus that is farther from the adapted 
stimulus (e.g.,‘9’) compared to a symbolic number that is closer to the adapted stimulus 
(e.g.,‘7’). The use of fMR-A is necessary to identify whether symbolic and nonsymbolic 
numerical magnitudes are sub-served by the same neural systems, in human adults. 
Using fMR-A, researchers have found that the left inferior parietal lobule responds to 
processing the magnitude of number symbols (Cohen Kadosh, Cohen Kadosh, Kaas, 
Henik, & Goebel, 2007; Damarla & Just, 2013; Holloway, Battista, Vogel, & Ansari, 
2013; Notebaert, Nelis, & Reynvoet, 2011; Piazza, Pinel, Le Bihan, & Dehaene, 2007; 
Vogel et al., 2017), whereas bilateral regions in the parietal lobes respond more to 
nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes (Damarla & Just, 2013; Demeyere, Rotshtein, & 
Humphreys, 2014; Piazza et al., 2004; Roggeman et al., 2007).  Problematically, most 
previous research only includes a symbolic or a nonsymbolic condition, but not both 
conditions.  In the few studies that examined the passive processing of both symbolic and 
a nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes using fMR-A (Damarla & Just, 2013; Piazza et al., 
2007; Roggeman et al., 2007), participants were adapted to either symbolic numbers and 
then presented with nonsymbolic deviants, or were adapted to nonsymbolic numbers and 
then presented with symbolic deviants. This cross-format adaptation can allow 
researchers to make inferences about whether representations of one format is 
generalizable to another.  For example, the finding that the neural distance effect of one 
format is also activated by a cross-format deviant might suggest a reliance on the same 
underlying representations. However, this cross-notation adaptation paradigm cannot 
reveal whether similar brain regions are adapted to symbolic and nonsymbolic stimuli. 
This is because in the two conditions compared (symbolic vs. nonsymbolic), the stimuli 
to which the participant is adapted to are different. Consequently, the finding of 
overlapping representations using cross-format effects may be driven by a common 
representation or by the activation of a mechanism that allows for the translation of 
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representations. To directly compare the passive processing of symbolic and nonsymbolic 
numerical magnitudes using an fMR-A paradigm, it is necessary to adapt the brain to 
both symbolic and nonsymbolic stimuli, simultaneously. To do this, the habituation 
stimuli for symbolic and nonsymbolic number processing must be identical. 
In this study, we address the fundamental question of whether the culturally acquired, 
uniquely human, ability to process numbers symbolically is underpinned by the same 
brain regions that are activated during the processing of nonsymbolic quantities and 
physical size. This will identify whether different number formats are processed 
abstractly, using a single system, or in a format-dependent way in the human adult brain.  
In the present preregistered study 
(https://osf.io/jrmpf/register/5771ca429ad5a1020de2872e), we develop and implement 
parallel fMR-A to isolate and directly compare the neural representations of symbols, 
quantities, and physical size. Importantly, our design controls for brain activations 
associated with other conditions in the paradigm, as well as inherent confounds 
associated with active tasks (Grill-Spector et al., 2006).  Specifically, in our parallel 
fMR-A design, participants are repeatedly presented with a specific quantity of the same 
symbolic number in a white coloured font of a specific size. This set of symbols will be 
referred to as an ‘array’. Following this, one aspect of the array is changed (either the 
symbol, the quantity, or the size) while the other aspects remain constant.  This design 
allows us to identify whether the culturally acquired ability to process symbolic 
numerical magnitudes activates the same brain regions that are activated during the 
processing of nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes and/or non-numerical magnitudes, in 
the adult brain.  
3.2 Methods 
3.2.1 Participants 
Fifty-two healthy adult participants from London, Ontario, Canada participated in the 
fMR-A experiment. Our final sample included 45 participants (MeanAge = 23.6, Standard 
DeviationAge = 4.3, Age Range = 18-39; 30 women and 22 men), all of whom did not 
exceed our motion cut-offs (i.e., no overall deviation greater than 3 mm from the 1st 
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volume acquired within a run, and no deviation greater than 1.5 mm between subsequent 
volumes) and our accuracy cut-offs (Vogel et al., 2015).  Accuracy was determined by 
asking participants to press a predefined button with their right index finger when the 
numbers appeared in blue font.  These trials are referred to as “catch trials”.  The scanner 
runs where the participant did not “catch” at least five out of seven trials were excluded 
from analyses. Participants with fewer than two out of three usable runs were excluded 
from the study.  All included participants were right-handed, spoke fluent English, 
reported no known history of psychiatric or neurological disorders, and had normal or 
corrected to normal vision. The procedures of this study were approved by the Health 
Sciences Research Ethics Board for human subjects at the University of Western Ontario 
(See Appendix A and https://osf.io/ru4xb/).  
3.2.2 Stimuli 
Stimuli were created using MATLAB (Figure 3.1A). The code to create the stimuli is 
available on the OSF at (https://osf.io/9gfj4/).  Habituation stimuli contained white ‘6’s in 
the font size 60 on a grey background (see Fig 3.1A for example of a habituation array). 
Participants were simultaneously adapted to three aspects of the array: the numerical 
symbol, the quantity, and the physical size of the digits. Deviant stimuli (i.e., stimuli that 
differed from the habituation stimuli in a particular way) were variations of an array of 
white Arabic digits randomly positioned on a grey background. Catch trials (i.e., trials for 
which participants were instructed to press a button) contained Arabic digits printed in 
blue on the same grey background. As previously stated, to meet our accuracy cut-offs, 
participants were required to “catch” at least 5 out of the 7 trials per run (Vogel et al., 
2015). Multiple versions of the array for each condition were generated to ensure that 
participants did not learn the position of the Arabic digits within the array. E-prime 2.0 
presentation software (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002) was used to project the 
stimuli onto a computer screen (resolution=800x600 pixels; colour bit depth = 16). The 
paradigm is available at (https://osf.io/gx63r/). The participants viewed the computer 
screen using a mirror system that was attached to the magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) 
head-coil.   
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3.2.3 Experimental Procedure 
The fMR-A task was modelled after previous adaptation studies ( Holloway et al., 2013; 
Vogel et al., 2015, 2017). Participants were instructed to attend to the screen and press a 
button when the digits on the screen turned blue (i.e., catch trials).  The experiment 
included three fMR-A runs, each consisting of a stream of arrays of Arabic digits in 
Helvetica font punctuated by blank grey screens that were the same colour as the 
background of the arrays. The arrays were presented for 200 milliseconds and the blank 
grey screen for 1200 milliseconds (Figure 3.1A). During habituation, participants were 
presented with the digit '6' in four random locations of the screen in size 60 font between 
5 and 9 times (average of 7 repeats).  This allowed for a natural oversampling of the 
hemodynamic response function as the presentation of one trial (1400ms) was not 
synchronized with the scan repetition time (TR=1000ms).  At jittered intervals (i.e., after 
5-9 habituation trials), participants were presented with either a deviant trial (48 total 
trials across 6 conditions), a null trial (9 total), or a catch trial (7 total). In deviant trials, 
one aspect of the array of sixes was changed a small amount or a large amount.  There 
were six conditions of deviant trial types (8 trials per deviant).  Specifically, there were 
three types of deviants (symbolic, nonsymbolic, physical size), and each type changed a 
large amount or a small amount (small change, large change).  In the symbolic condition, 
the numerical symbols changed from ‘6’s to '7's (small change), or to '2's (large change), 
while the quantity and physical size were held constant. In the nonsymbolic condition, 
the quantity changed from four to three (small change) or eight (large change) ‘6’s, but 
the symbol and physical size were held constant. For symbolic and nonsymbolic deviant 
conditions, the small change was a distance of 1 and the large change was a distance of 4.  
In the physical size condition, the size of the symbols decreased to font size 51 (small 
change) or increased to font size 86 (large change), but the symbol and quantity (i.e., four 
‘6’s) remained unchanged.  Critically, for the physical size condition, the area of the four 
digits was matched to the area taken up by the three digits in the quantity small change 
condition or the eight digits in the quantity large change condition.  Specifically, the 
number of white pixels in the physical size condition was matched to the corresponding 
nonsymbolic deviant conditions using MATLAB.  The code is available at 
(https://osf.io/rncv7/).  In null trials, the participant was presented with another 
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habituation trial array (i.e., four ‘6’s in size 60 font). In the catch trials, participants were 
presented with one of the 6 deviant trials, or a null trial in blue font. Participants pressed 
a button with the index finger of their right hand when the digits on the screen turned 
blue (i.e., catch trials).  Catch trials were pseudo-randomly dispersed throughout each 
run. Participants had to push the button for at least five of the seven catch trials for the 
run to be included in the statistical analyses. See Figure 3.1B for an illustration of the 
adaptation, deviant, null, and catch trials.  
 
 
Figure 3.1 A) Example of the parallel adaptation paradigm: including the continuous 
presentation of the adapted stimulus (habituation period) followed by a deviant stimulus 
(in this case a symbolic deviant). B) Illustrations of examples of the adaptation stimulus, 
six deviant stimuli types (symbolic distance 1, symbolic distance 4, nonsymbolic distance 
1, nonsymbolic distance 4, physical size small change, and physical size large change), 
and catch trial types (i.e., trials for which participants were instructed to press a button, to 
assure a minimum degree of attentiveness towards the stimuli presentation in the 
scanner). 
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3.2.4 fMRI Data Acquisition 
Structural and functional images were acquired using a 3T Siemens Prisma Fit whole-
body MRI scanner, using a 32-channel receive-only head-coil (Siemens, Erlangen 
Germany).  A whole-brain high resolution T1-weighted anatomical scan was collected 
using an MPRAGE sequence with 192 slices, and a scan duration of 5 minutes and 21 
seconds (isovoxel resolution = 1 × 1 × 1; TR = 2300 ms; TE 2.98 = ms; TI = 900 ms; 
FOV = 256 mm; flip angle = 9).  Functional MRI data were acquired using a blood 
oxygen level dependent (BOLD) sensitive T2* echo-planar (EPI) sequence.  Forty-eight 
slices were acquired in a sequential multi-slice interleaved series with a multi-band 
accelerator factor of 4 (slice thickness = 2.5 mm; TR = 1000 ms; TE 30.00 = ms; FOV = 
208 mm; flip angle = 40).  All data are publicly available at 
(https://openneuro.org/datasets/ds001848/versions/1.0.1). 
3.2.5 fMRI Data Preprocessing 
Structural and functional data were pre-processed and analyzed in Brain Voyager 20.6 
(Brain Innovation, Maastricht, The Netherlands) using the software’s preprocessing 
workflow (For workflow see: https://osf.io/3hr2g/). The structural brain data was 
extracted from the head tissue and intensity inhomogeneities were corrected to reduce the 
spatial intensity of the 3D volumes. Functional data were corrected for slice-scan time 
acquisition (cubic-spline interpolation algorithm), high-pass filtered (Fourier; cut off 
value of 2 sines/cosines cycles) and corrected for in-scanner head motion (Trilinear/sinc 
interpolation).  A Gaussian smoothing kernel of 6-mm Full-Width-of-Half Maximum 
(FWHM) was applied to smooth the images.  Structural and functional images were co-
registered using a header-based initial alignment followed by a gradient-driven fine-
tuning adjustment and normalized to MNI-152 space.  A two gamma hemodynamic 
response function was used to model the expected bold signal (Friston, Josephs, Rees, & 
Turner, 1998). Baseline was calculated using the adaptation period as well as the between 
trial fixation periods. Catch trials were modelled as a predictor of no interest.  
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3.2.6 Data Analysis 
3.2.6.1 Statistical Threshold 
All of the statistical maps reported in the current study were first thresholded with an 
uncorrected p-value of .005. This statistical threshold was chosen based on reports from 
recent symbolic fMR-A studies (Vogel et al., 2015, 2017).  The statistical whole-brain 
maps were corrected then for multiple comparisons at a statistical level of p<.05 using the 
cluster-level correction plugin in BrainVoyager (for review of this approach see Forman 
et al., 1995). The full width at half maximum (FWHM) in units of functional voxels (i.e., 
the smoothness) as well as the minimum cluster size (p=.05) based on the log-linear 
intra/extrapolation in millimeters (i.e., the cluster extent) are reported for each contrast 
with clusters of activation that reached a minimum threshold of p < 0.005, uncorrected 
and p < 0.05 cluster corrected at on whole-brain level.  
3.2.6.2 Whole-brain Analyses 
Whole-brain random-effects analyses were conducted using a general linear model 
(GLM) to examine overlapping and distinct BOLD responses to symbolic numerical 
magnitudes, nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes and the magnitude of physical size.  All 
primary analyses were preregistered on the open science framework (OSF) (see 
https://osf.io/jrmpf/register/5771ca429ad5a1020de2872e for preregistration).   
3.3 Results  
3.3.1 Preplanned Analyses 
3.3.1.1 Change Detection 
Preliminary contrast analyses were run to examine what brain regions responded to 
changes in different stimulus dimensions. Regions that were associated with stimulus 
change detection were identified as regions associated with the change of one stimulus 
type (at both distances) over the change of the other two stimulus types (at both 
distances) (e.g., the symbolic change effect is calculated as [(symbolic distance 1 + 
symbolic distance 4) > (nonsymbolic distance 1 + nonsymbolic distance 4 + physical size 
distance 1 + physical size distance 4)]).  
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Results revealed that symbolic change detection (Cluster-Level: smoothing = 2.49; extent 
= 920 mm) was associated with activation in a widespread frontal-parietal-occipital 
network (Table 3.1, Figure 3.2).  There were no brain regions that were activated above 
threshold in response to nonsymbolic change detection (Table 3.1, Figure 3.2).  Physical 
size change detection (Cluster-Level: smoothing = 2.25; extent = 688 mm) was 
associated with activation in the right premotor cortex, right superior temporal gyrus, and 
left occipital region (Table 3.1, Figure 3.2).  Critically, although these preliminary 
analyses highlight regions that are associated with the passive perception of change 
detection, these brain regions are not specifically associated with magnitude processing 
of symbols, quantities, and physical size. 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Change detection signal recovery from adaptation in the three deviant 
conditions (green = symbolic change detection, blue = nonsymbolic change detection, red 
= physical size change detection). 
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Table 3.1 Brain Regions Associated with Change Detection Signal Recovery from 
Adaptation 
Hemi-
sphere 
Brain Region   
Peak 
Coordinate 
t p 
Cluster 
Size  
  
Juelich 
Histological 
Atlas 
Harvard-Oxford 
Structural Atlas 
x y z     
(Number 
of 
Voxels) 
    
Symbolic Change 
Detection 
          
R 
Anterior 
Intraparietal 
Sulcus 
Superior Parietal 
Lobule, Angular 
Gyrus 
33 -52 43 5.46 0.000002 9264 
R  
Frontal Pole, 
Middle Frontal 
Gyrus 
42 38 25 3.70 0.0006 1286 
R 
Lateral Occipital 
Cortex 
Visual Cortex 42 -88 -2 4.69 0.00003 1095 
R Thalamus 
Corticospinal 
Tract 
12 -10 4 4.80 0.00002 1563 
R  
Paracingulate 
Gyrus, Cingulate 
Gyrus 
6 32 31 4.36 0.00008 2060 
R 
Callosal Body, 
Cingulum 
Cingulate Gyrus 3 -34 28 4.46 0.00006 2754 
R 
Premotor 
Cortex 
Superior Frontal 
Gyrus, 
Paracingulate 
Gyrus 
0 26 52 4.37 0.00008 2573 
L  Cerebellum -6 -89 -32 4.45 0.00006 2322 
L 
Visual Cortex 
V4 
Lateral Occipital 
Cortex, Occipital 
Fusiform Gyrus 
-45 -76 -17 5.80 0.000001 6928 
L 
Anterior 
Intraparietal 
Sulcus, 
Lateral Occipital 
Cortex, Superior 
Parietal Lobule, 
Angular Gyrus 
-30 -61 46 4.44 0.00006 5670 
111 
 
Superior 
Parietal Lobule 
L  Frontal Pole -42 53 4 3.97 0.0003 1298 
    
Nonsymbolic Change 
Detection 
        
- - - - - - - - - 
    
Physical Size Change 
Detection 
        
R 
Inferior Parietal 
Lobule 
Supramarginal 
Gyrus 
60 -37 22 4.46 0.00006 3008 
R 
Inferior Parietal 
Lobule 
Angular Gyrus 
and Middle 
Temporal Gyrus 
48 -49 13 4.27 0.0001 1098 
L Visual Cortex 
Lateral Occipital 
Cortex, Occipital 
Pole 
-30 -88 -2 4.51 0.00005 2538 
 
3.3.1.2 Neural Distance Effects 
We examined neural distance effects (i.e., distance 4>distance 1) to isolate brain regions 
associated with magnitude processing, of each deviant stimulus type (symbolic, 
nonsymbolic, physical size). To reveal neural correlates of the distance effects for each 
condition, we statistically compared distance four to distance one for the symbolic 
condition (symbolic distance 4 > symbolic distance 1), the nonsymbolic condition 
(nonsymbolic distance 4 > nonsymbolic distance 1) and the physical size condition 
(physical size large change > physical size small change). This analysis revealed that 
symbolic magnitude processing (Cluster-Level: smoothing = 2.10; extent = 571 mm) was 
associated with activation in the left inferior parietal lobule (Peak MNI Coordinate: -57, -
64, 22; Cluster Size = 878 voxels) and the left orbitofrontal cortex (Peak MNI 
Coordinate: -36, 35, -14; Cluster Size = 944 voxels) (Figure 3.3A).  Distinct from this, 
nonsymbolic magnitude processing (Cluster-Level: smoothing = 2.26; extent = 693 mm) 
was associated with activation in the right intraparietal sulcus (Peak MNI Coordinate: 27, 
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-67, 49; Cluster Size = 2381 voxels) (Figure 3.3B).  Finally, physical size magnitude 
processing (Cluster-Level: smoothing = 2.45; extent = 836 mm) correlated with 
widespread activation spanning right parietal and occipital lobes (Peak MNI Coordinate: 
42, -61, -11; Cluster Size = 25418 voxels), and a smaller region in the left occipital cortex 
(Peak MNI Coordinate: -45, -67, -11; Cluster Size = 5086 voxels) (Figure 3.3C).  These 
results demonstrate that the processing of symbolic numerical magnitudes is left-
lateralized, whereas the processing of nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes and physical 
size is right-lateralized. These data demonstrate that the brain regions that support 
symbolic and nonsymbolic number processing are potentially quite distinct. Furthermore, 
nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing may actually be supported by brain regions 
used to process non-numerical magnitudes, such as physical size.  
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Figure 3.3 The neural rebound effects for: A) symbolic numerical magnitude processing 
defined as the degree of neural rebound for symbolic distance 4 deviant > symbolic 
distance 1 deviant, shown in green, B) nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing, 
defined as the degree of neural rebound for nonsymbolic distance 4 deviant > 
nonsymbolic distance 1 deviant, shown in blue, C) physical size magnitude processing, 
defined as the degree of neural rebound for physical size large change deviant > physical 
size small change deviant, shown in red. This reveals that symbolic numerical 
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magnitudes are represented using distinct brain regions from those that support 
nonsymbolic and nonnumerical magnitude processing. 
Following our pre-registered analysis plan, we next used a conjunction () analysis to 
assess whether the brain regions associated with symbolic, nonsymbolic and physical size 
magnitude processing overlapped.  This analysis [(Symbolic Distance 4 > Symbolic 
Distance 1)  (Nonsymbolic Distance 4 > Nonsymbolic Distance 1)   (Physical Size 
Large Change > Physical Size Small Change)] revealed that there are no brain regions 
commonly activated by symbolic, nonsymbolic and physical size magnitude processing.   
To identify which brain regions support numerical magnitude processing specifically, the 
conjunction of the symbolic and nonsymbolic distance effects was contrasted against the 
physical size distance effect [((Symbolic Distance 4 > Symbolic Distance 1)  
(Nonsymbolic Distance 4 > Nonsymbolic Distance 1)) > (Physical Size Large Change > 
Physical Size Small Change)].  No brain regions that were significantly activated for 
numerical magnitude processing (symbolic and nonsymbolic) over and above brain 
regions associated with physical size processing were found.   
The final set of preplanned analyses were included to identify whether the brain regions 
associated with symbolic, nonsymbolic and physical size magnitudes were format-
specific.  To do this, the neural distance effect of each format-specific magnitude was 
contrasted against the other two distance effects.  The contrast examining symbolic 
specific activation [(Symbolic Distance 4 > Symbolic Distance 1) > ((Nonsymbolic 
Distance 4 > Nonsymbolic Distance 1)  (Physical Size Large Change > Physical Size 
Small Change))] (Cluster-Level: smoothing = 2.21; extent = 654 mm) revealed that the 
left inferior parietal lobule supports symbolic magnitude processing over and above 
nonsymbolic and physical size (Peak MNI Coordinate: -57, -64, 22; Cluster Size = 1195 
voxels) (Figure 3.4). In contrast, no brain region was specifically activated by 
nonsymbolic magnitude processing (i.e., the contrast [(Nonsymbolic Distance 4 > 
Nonsymbolic Distance 1) > ((Symbolic Distance 4 > Symbolic Distance 1)  (Physical 
Size Large Change > Physical Size Small Change))]).  The contrast examining which 
brain regions were specifically associated with physical size over and above numerical 
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magnitude processing [(Physical Size Large Change > Physical Size Small Change) > 
((Symbolic Distance 4 > Symbolic Distance 1)  (Nonsymbolic Distance 4 > 
Nonsymbolic Distance 1))] (Cluster-Level: smoothing = 1.98; extent = 510 mm) 
implicated the right fusiform gyrus (Peak MNI Coordinate: 42, -67, -17; Cluster Size = 
687 voxels). Together these analyses provide further evidence to support our key finding 
that the symbolic numerical magnitudes are processed using brain regions that are distinct 
from the regions that support the processing of nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes and 
physical size. In other words, the brain regions used to process culturally acquired 
symbols seem to be spatially distinct from the evolutionarily ancient systems that support 
nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing and non-numerical magnitude processing, 
in human adults.   
3.3.2 Post-Hoc Analyses 
The findings from the pre-registered contrasts reveal that the neural correlates associated 
with the magnitude processing of symbolic numbers are spatially distinct from brain 
regions that support nonsymbolic and non-numerical magnitude processing. Critically, 
these pre-registered contrasts revealed that nonsymbolic magnitude processing and 
physical size magnitude processing both activated the right intraparietal sulcus, a region 
typically associated with number processing. Furthermore, although symbolic magnitude 
processing was specifically associated with activation in the left parietal lobe, no region 
in the parietal or frontal cortex was specifically activated by nonsymbolic or physical size 
processing.  In view of this, a post-hoc conjunction analysis was run examining 
overlapping activation between nonsymbolic magnitude processing and physical size 
magnitude processing [(Nonsymbolic Distance 4 > Nonsymbolic Distance 1)  (Physical 
Size Large Change > Physical Size Small Change)], (Cluster-Level: smoothing = 2.06; 
extent = 565 mm).  Results revealed that one cluster in the right intraparietal sulcus was 
activated by the conjunction of nonsymbolic and physical size magnitude processing 
(Peak MNI Coordinate: 30, -67, 40; Cluster Size = 1412 voxels) (Figure 3.4). This post-
hoc analysis suggests the right-lateralized parietal region is used to process both 
nonsymbolic and non-numerical magnitudes. Therefore, the brain regions that support 
nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing may reflect a general magnitude system 
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that processes both numerical and non-numerical, nonsymbolic information, rather than 
an abstract number processing system, that specifically supports the processing of 
numerical magnitudes. 
To identify whether the brain region related to the conjunction of nonsymbolic and 
physical size processing was significant over and above symbolic number processing, the 
conjunction of the nonsymbolic and physical size distance effects was contrasted against 
the symbolic distance effect [(Nonsymbolic Distance 4 > Nonsymbolic Distance 1)  
(Physical Size Large Change > Physical Size Small Change) > (Symbolic Distance 4 > 
Symbolic Distance 1)].  There were no brain regions that were significantly activated for 
nonsymbolic numerical and non-numerical magnitude processing over and above brain 
regions supported by symbolic numerical magnitude processing. This post-hoc analysis 
indicates that while there is evidence that symbolic numerical magnitude processing is 
spatially distinct from nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing and the processing 
of physical size, there is no strong spatial evidence for unique representations of 
nonsymbolic and physical size when contrasted to symbolic. 
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Figure 3.4 Symbolic specific rebound effect depicted in green. The conjunction between 
the rebound effects for nonsymbolic deviants and physical size deviants is depicted in 
purple. 
Together, the preplanned combined with post-hoc univariate analyses indicate that 
nonsymbolic magnitudes are processed in the same brain region that is used to process 
physical size magnitude, namely the right intraparietal sulcus.  In contrast, symbolic 
numerical magnitude processing is specifically associated with activation in the left 
inferior parietal lobule.  However, though these univariate analyses suggest some spatial 
distinction between symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing, the 
conjunction of nonsymbolic and physical size processing was not significant over and 
above symbolic numerical magnitude processing.  This suggests that while symbolic and 
nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing seems to be lateralized in the parietal 
cortex both formats may still activate overlapping regions.  Additionally, univariate 
analyses do not allow us to conclude that the underlying representations are unrelated. To 
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address this outstanding issue, we used a multivariate approach to identify similarities 
and differences in the spatial patterns of neural activity for symbolic numerical 
magnitude processing, nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing and the processing 
of physical size. More specifically, we used the multivariate method representational 
similarity analysis (RSA), to extract information about distributed patterns of 
representations within regions of interest in the brain.  This method is valuable in 
advancing our understanding of similarities and differences in the underlying 
representations of symbolic, nonsymbolic and non-numerical magnitudes, rather than 
coarsely estimating spatial overlap. 
3.3.2.1 Representational Similarity Analyses 
We implemented RSA using Brain Voyager 20.6 (Brain Innovation, Maastricht, The 
Netherlands), to analyze the similarity between evoked fMRI responses for the symbolic 
distance effect, the nonsymbolic distance effect and the physical size distance effect in 
select regions-of-interest (ROIs).  The ROIs were constructed by creating a sphere with a 
radius of 10mm around the weighted centre of the bilateral parietal clusters in the 
numerical passive viewing map from chapter 2 (Sokolowski, Fias, Mousa, & Ansari, 
2017). The coordinates for the weighted centre of the parietal clusters are: 1) right 
hemisphere: MNI coordinates (x, y, z): 26, -55, 53) 2) left hemisphere: MNI coordinates 
(x, y, z): -28, -67, 43).  For each ROI, a representational distance (or dissimilarity) matrix 
(RDM) was computed to assess the dissimilarity between the symbolic distance effect, 
the nonsymbolic distance effect, and the physical size distance effect (Figure 3.5). Note 
that the correlation calculated between patterns is a reflection of the similarity of the 
spatial patterns since this measure abstracts from the mean (and standard deviation) of the 
original values. The RDM contains a cell for each pair of experimental conditions. The 
colour of each cell represents a number that reflects the dissimilarities between the 
activity patterns associated with the two experimental conditions. Specifically, a Pearson 
correlation coefficient was calculated and subsequently transformed to a distance 
measure using the equation: d = 1 – r. These calculated d values, thus, range from 0.0 
(minimum distance) to 2.0 (maximum distance) with value 1.0 in the middle representing 
no correlation. This data is further visualized using a multi-dimensional scaling (MDS) 
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plot, which depicts the similarity between the conditions in a two-dimensional 
representation (Figure 3.5).  Specifically, the conditions that are positioned closer 
together on the MDS plot have more similar neural activation patterns. Notably, results 
from this multivariate analysis revealed that nonsymbolic magnitude processing and 
physical size processing correlate more strongly at the multivariate level than either does 
with symbolic magnitude processing in both the right and the left hemispheres. Notably, 
this pattern of greater similarity between nonsymbolic and physical size compared to 
symbols is especially strong in the right hemisphere.  In sum, these multivariate results 
revealed a dissimilar normalized pattern of activation for symbolic compared to 
nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing in both the left and right parietal lobes. 
Together the converging evidence from the univariate and multivariate analyses show 
that, in the adult human brain, symbols are processed using distinct brain regions, and 
distinct patterns of activation, compared to nonsymbolic and non-numerical magnitudes. 
 
 
Figure 3.5 The left side of this figure illustrates the representational distance matrices 
(RDM) between the symbolic distance effect, the nonsymbolic distance effect, and the 
physical size distance effect in the left (top) and right (bottom) hemispheres.  The 
numerical values that correspond to colours in the RDM refer to the distance measure 
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calculated using the equation: d = 1 – r. Therefore, the values can range from 0.0 
(minimum distance) to 2.0 (maximum distance) with value 1.0 in the middle representing 
no correlation. The right side of this figure depicts the multi-dimensional scaling (MDS) 
plots, which are visualizations of the similarity between the three distance effects 
(symbolic, nonsymbolic, physical size) in two-dimensional space. The MDS plot is a 
visualization of the distances between conditions in a two-dimensional space that 
maximally satisfies the pairwise distances to all other conditions. 
3.4 Discussion 
The goal of the current study was to examine whether the uniquely human capacity to 
process symbolic numerical magnitudes relies on the same brain regions that support the 
processing of nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes (i.e., quantities).  Parallel fMRI 
adaptation was developed and used to isolate and directly compare the semantic 
representations of symbols, quantities, and physical size while controlling for neural 
activation associated with other conditions, as well as inherent confounds of active tasks 
(Grill-Spector et al., 2006). Results revealed that the neural correlates of symbolic 
numerical magnitude processing are more distinct from nonsymbolic magnitude 
processing than has been assumed, at both the univariate and multivariate levels. At the 
univariate level, symbolic numerical magnitudes are represented in the left inferior 
parietal lobule, whereas both nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes and non-numerical 
magnitudes (i.e., physical size) are represented in the right intraparietal sulcus. These 
findings align with previous research indicating that different number formats (symbolic 
and nonsymbolic) are lateralized within the parietal cortex (For review see: Sokolowski 
& Ansari, 2016). Specifically, activation in the left parietal lobule is specific to symbolic 
number processing, whereas the right parietal lobule is more activated during 
nonsymbolic magnitude processing (Sokolowski, Fias, Mousa, et al., 2017). At the 
multivariate level, normalized patterns of activation for symbolic numerical magnitude 
processing in both the left and right parietal lobes were different compared to patterns of 
activation for nonsymbolic magnitude processing; this also converges with previous 
research (Bulthé et al., 2014; Eger et al., 2009; Lyons et al., 2014). This suggests that in 
the adult human brain, symbolic numerical magnitudes are processed in a way that is 
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spatially and representationally distinct from the processing of nonsymbolic numerical 
magnitudes. 
The findings from the current study suggest that adult humans possess two distinct 
systems to support magnitudes: 1) a symbolic system used specifically to represent 
symbolic numerical magnitudes, and 2) a general magnitude system used to represent 
both discrete and continuous magnitudes. These findings directly contrast the findings 
from Chapter 2 of this thesis, as well as the predominant view in the field of numerical 
cognition, namely that symbolic and nonsymbolic numbers are processed using both 
overlapping as well as distinct neural mechanisms (For review see: Cohen Kadosh, 2008; 
Sokolowski, Fias, Mousa, et al., 2017; Sokolowski & Ansari, 2016). The parallel 
adaptation paradigm developed and employed in the present study overcomes major 
confounds of previous research that use active tasks such as decision making, and motor 
processing for these active tasks (Grill-Spector et al., 2006). Indeed, previously reported 
overlapping activation during the processing of symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical 
magnitudes likely resulted from overlapping task demands, or the effortful process of 
mapping symbols onto quantities in the case of cross-format designs. Using our parallel 
adaptation approach, we discovered that the underlying brain regions supporting 
symbolic number processing are quite distinct from the regions that correlate with 
processing nonsymbolic magnitude processing in human adults.  
Results from the current study also show that the neural representations of nonsymbolic 
numerical magnitudes are nearly indistinguishable from the neural correlates that support 
the processing of non-numerical magnitudes, specifically physical size. This aligns with 
the growing body of research highlighting that nonsymbolic numbers are inherently 
confounded by non-numerical magnitudes, such as physical size (Leibovich & Henik, 
2013).  Additionally, our finding that nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes and non-
numerical magnitudes are supported by the same neural substrates directly contradicts the 
dominant view in numerical cognition, that symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical 
magnitudes are supported using an abstract number processing system that is specifically 
attuned to the processing of discrete quantities (Brannon, 2006; Cantlon, 2012; Dehaene 
et al., 1998, 2003; Nieder & Dehaene, 2009). Our findings also show that the system used 
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to process nonsymbolic numbers may, in fact, be part of a general magnitude processing 
system used to process both discrete as well as continuous magnitudes (Cohen Kadosh et 
al., 2008; Lyons et al., 2012, 2014; Sokolowski, Fias, Bosah Ononye, et al., 2017; Walsh, 
2003).   
A key finding from our study, that symbols are processed using different brain regions 
and produce different patterns of activation compared to nonsymbolic and non-numerical 
magnitudes, highlights the need to consider what is actually special about symbols. One 
key way in which symbols differ from the quantities that they represent is that symbols 
are processed exactly rather than approximately, regardless of magnitude (Hyde, 2011; 
Negen & Sarnecka, 2015; Núñez, 2017; Pica, Lemer, Izard, & Dehaene, 2004). This 
means that to understand the meaning of a large symbolic number, an adult does not need 
to map that symbol onto a pre-existing representation for the corresponding nonsymbolic 
numerical magnitude. Instead, learning counting principles that underlie symbolic 
numbers is a sufficient condition for understanding any symbolic number (Gallistel & 
Gelman, 1992; Gelman & Gallistel, 1978; Le Corre & Carey, 2014).  The idea that 
symbols can be represented exactly, whereas nonsymbolic and non-numerical magnitudes 
can only be processed approximately, provides a potential explanation for why the 
passive processing of symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are associated 
with separate brain regions. 
The multivariate results of this study provide very clear evidence for representational 
dissimilarity between symbolic numerical magnitude processing compared to 
nonsymbolic and non-numerical magnitude processing.  However, the univariate results 
indicate that the neural correlates of symbolic number processing are spatially distinct, 
but the brain region associated with the conjunction between nonsymbolic and non-
numerical magnitude processing is not significantly activated over and above symbolic 
numerical magnitude processing.  This suggests that although there is evidence that 
symbolic number processing is spatially distinct from nonsymbolic and non-numerical 
magnitude processing, there is no strong spatial evidence for unique representations of 
nonsymbolic and physical size. In other words, the brain region that supports 
nonsymbolic and non-numerical magnitude processing is also at least partially activated 
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by symbolic number processing. Therefore, the data from the current study provides 
some evidence that the brain regions that are activated during the passive processing of 
nonsymbolic and non-numerical magnitudes are also activated by symbolic numerical 
magnitudes. However, the neural correlates the support the uniquely human, culturally 
acquired, ability to represent numbers symbolically is supported by a set of brain regions 
that is quite distinct from the brain regions that support nonsymbolic numerical 
magnitude processing and non-numerical magnitude processing. 
3.4.1 Limitations 
There are several important limitations to the current study.  First, as the stimuli consist 
of arrays that include both symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes, the 
possibility that these different formats automatically influence each other during 
processing (e.g., Morton, 1969; Naparstek & Henik, 2010; Pansky & Algom, 2002) 
cannot be ruled out.  However, the fact that a neural distance effect was found for both 
symbolic and nonsymbolic deviants, in distinct brain regions, suggests that the paradigm 
captured elements of magnitude processing that were specific to each format.  In chapter 
4, of the current thesis, I address this question by empirically evaluating the automatic 
influence of symbols and quantities on each other at the behavioural level.  A second 
limitation of the current study is that, due to attentional time constraints of the 
participants, it was not possible to include multiple numerical values for the habituation 
stimulus and within deviant categories. In other words, only one symbolic and 
nonsymbolic numerical magnitude was included for the habituation array and each 
change condition.  In view of this, the results from this study are specific to the particular 
magnitudes we included and should not be generalized to all numerical magnitudes. 
Future research is needed to examine whether these effects hold across multiple different 
symbols and quantities for both habituation and deviant stimuli.  
3.4.2 Conclusions 
This study provides evidence in support of the notion that the human adult brain 
processes symbolic numerical magnitudes and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes using 
regions that are more distinct than has been assumed. Indeed, these findings directly 
124 
 
conflict with the dominant view in the field that symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical 
magnitudes are supported by a single abstract number processing system (Cantlon, 2012; 
Dehaene, 2007; Dehaene et al., 1998; Nieder & Dehaene, 2009).  Instead, data from the 
current study suggest that in human adults, culturally acquired symbolic representations 
and evolutionarily ancient nonsymbolic representations may be represented by two 
distinct systems. Our data highlight the need for the field of numerical cognition to move 
away conducting research with the goal of canvassing the brain in search of an abstract 
number processing system. Instead, efforts should be shifted towards uncovering the 
multifaceted behavioural and neural consequences of learning the complex, uniquely 
human skill of symbolic abstraction. 
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Chapter 4  
4 Number Symbols are Processed More Automatically 
than Nonsymbolic Numerical Magnitudes: Findings 
from a Symbolic-Nonsymbolic Stroop Task  
4.1 Introduction 
Basic number processing is a cognitive foundation that supports mathematical thinking.  
Basic number processing is defined as the ability to understand, estimate, and/or 
discriminate between numerical magnitudes.  From very early in development humans 
have the ability to process nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes (often referred to as 
quantities) (e.g.,‘•••’  vs. ‘••’) (Brannon, 2006).  This capacity to process nonsymbolic 
numerical magnitudes is shared with non-human primates as well as other species (For 
reviews see: Cantlon, 2012; Dehaene, 2007). This suggests that the ability to process 
nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes has a long evolutionary history. Critically, unlike 
non-human species and infants, human adults, in cultures that teach math symbolically, 
have the unique, culturally acquired ability to process numbers symbolically (e.g.,‘3’).  
The dominant assumption in the field of numerical cognition has been that this culturally 
acquired ability to represent numbers symbolically is linked to an evolutionarily ancient 
system used to process nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes (Brannon, 2006; Dehaene, 
2007; Dehaene, Piazza, Pinel, & Cohen, 2003; Halberda, Mazzocco, & Feigenson, 2008; 
Nieder & Dehaene, 2009).  However, a growing body of research, including data from 
Chapter 2 and 3 of this thesis, has revealed that symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical 
magnitudes are processed more distinctly than has been assumed (Cohen Kadosh et al., 
2011; Cohen Kadosh, Kaas, Henik, & Goebel, 2007; Cohen Kadosh & Walsh, 2009; De 
Smedt et al., 2013; Holloway et al., 2010; Lyons, Ansari, Beilock, 2012; Sokolowski et 
al., 2016).  Previous research has used effortful number processing tasks (e.g., Ansari, 
2008; Dehaene, Dehaene-Lambertz, & Cohen, 1998; Fias, Lammertyn, Reynvoet, 
Dupont, & Orban, 2003; Fulbright, Manson, Skudlarski, Lacadie, & Gore, 2003; 
Holloway & Ansari, 2008, 2009; Moyer & Landauer, 1967) and automatic number 
processing tasks (e.g., Furman & Rubinsten, 2012; Naparstek & Henik, 2010, 2012; 
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Naparstek, Safadi, Lichtenstein-Vidne, & Henik, 2015; Pansky & Algom, 2002; Pavese 
& Umiltà, 1998, 1999; Windes, 1968) to attempt to unravel how human adults process 
symbols and quantities. Effortful processing tasks require participants to actively attend 
to the presented stimuli and typically, make a decision based on these stimuli. For 
example, a number comparison task where participants are presented with two numerical 
magnitudes and asked to indicate which of the two numerical magnitudes has more items 
is an example of an effortful number processing task (e.g., Buckley & Gillman, 1974; 
Holloway & Ansari, 2009; Moyer & Landauer, 1967). Automatic processing refers to 
information processing that occurs in situations where the information is not task-
relevant. An example of an automatic number processing task is the Numerical Stroop 
Task. In a Numerical Stroop Task a participant is presented with two digits that differ 
both in numerical magnitude and in physical size (e.g., 3 and 4) and are asked to indicate 
which digit is numerically or physically larger (Henik & Tzelgov, 1982; Leibovich, 
Diesendruck, Rubinsten, & Henik, 2013). When participants complete this task a so-
called size congruity effect (SCE) is obtained. The SCE reflects the finding that the 
dimension to which the participant does not need to attend automatically influences speed 
and accuracy on the comparison task. For example, when making a physical size 
judgment, on a Numerical Stroop task that includes two different Arabic numerals in 
different size fonts, the numerical magnitude of the symbols being compared 
automatically influences judgments of the physical size. This finding, that the semantic 
meaning of a symbols affects physical size judgments, despite the fact that the 
participants do not need to process the semantic meaning of the number to succeed at the 
task, has been taken to suggest that the system used to process the physical size of an 
Arabic numeral is overlapping with the system used to process the semantic meaning of 
the Arabic numeral. Critically, although this task is useful in revealing the way humans 
automatically process symbolic numerical magnitudes in relation to the non-numerical 
magnitude, physical size, this paradigm cannot be used to address questions pertaining to 
the difference and similarities in processing symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical 
magnitudes.  
An important way to advance our understanding of how (or whether) symbolic and 
nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are connected is to study the degree to which one 
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automatically influences the other during processing. Currently, there is a limited 
understanding of the connection between symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical 
magnitudes at different levels of processing. An automatic processing (i.e., Stroop-like) 
task is an ideal way to explore the link between symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical 
magnitudes. If symbols and quantities are processed using the same system, then they 
should automatically activate each other, but if they are not closely connected then the 
processing of one format (i.e., symbol or quantity) should not activate or influence the 
processing of the other format.  Notably, in line with research suggesting that symbols 
and quantities are not as connected as has been assumed (including chapter 2 and 3 from 
the current thesis and reviewed here: Cohen Kadosh & Walsh, 2009; Sokolowski & 
Ansari, 2016), it is possible that there will be an asymmetry in activation, namely that 
only one of the formats will automatically activate the other.  Despite years of research, 
the question of whether symbolic (i.e., Arabic digits) and nonsymbolic numerical 
magnitudes (i.e., quantities) influence each other in the same or an asymmetrical way has 
not been examined. The current study will identify whether symbols and quantities are 
processed similarly during effortful and automatic, processing.   
Amongst the most frequently cited evidence to support the notion that symbols are 
fundamentally linked to nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes is the finding that human 
adults produce a ‘distance effect’ when making comparative judgements of both 
symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes (e.g., Dehaene, Dehaene-Lambertz, & 
Cohen, 1998; Holloway & Ansari, 2008, 2009; Krajcsi, Lengyel, & Kojouharova, 2016; 
Moyer & Landauer, 1967; Pavese & Umiltà, 1998; van Opstal & Verguts, 2011).  The 
distance effect is the highly replicable finding that humans are faster and more accurate at 
judging which of two numerical magnitudes is numerically greater when those 
magnitudes are numerically close together, rather than far apart.  There have been many 
reports of similar distance effects during the processing of symbolic and nonsymbolic 
numerical magnitudes that have been replicated across many studies (Buckley & 
Gillman, 1974; Holloway & Ansari, 2008; Holloway, Price, & Ansari, 2010; Krajcsi, 
Lengyel, & Kojouharova, 2016; Moyer & Landauer, 1967) and taken as evidence that 
symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are represented using a shared 
analogue magnitude system (Dehaene, 2007; Dehaene et al., 1998).  Numerical distance 
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has been shown to affect effortful (Buckley & Gillman, 1974; Holloway & Ansari, 2009; 
Moyer & Landauer, 1967) as well as the automatic processing of symbols and quantities 
(Henik & Tzelgov, 1982; Pavese & Umiltà, 1998, 1999).  The finding that numerical 
distance influences automatic processing of numerical magnitudes has been taken to 
suggest that the presence of a numerical distance effect is a general property of activating 
a numerical magnitude, rather than a consequence of attention when processing 
magnitudes. More generally, the effect of numerical distance has been used to assess the 
degree to which the underlying representations that support the processing of numerical 
magnitudes are overlapping and thus have been interpreted to be a measure of 
representational precision (Nieder & Dehaene, 2009; Verguts & Fias, 2004).  Therefore, 
assessing the whether the influence of symbols and quantities on each other is modulated 
by numerical distance will add to the current understanding of the connection between 
symbols and quantities by identifying not only whether symbols and quantities are 
processed in parallel, but also whether the representational precision of this influence is 
symmetrical.  In other words, we will explore whether numerical distance influences 
symbols and quantities differently during effortful and automatic processing to 
understand whether the representational structures supporting symbolic and nonsymbolic 
numerical magnitude processing are the same or distinct. 
In the current study, we assess whether symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes 
are processed similarly by examining whether the processing of one format activates the 
processing of the other format. We will conclude that symbols and quantities are 
processed in parallel if the automatic processing of both symbols and quantities do indeed 
influence the effortful processing each other.  Additionally, we will conclude that 
symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are processed using the same 
representational structure if the automatic influence of symbols and quantities on each 
other are modulated by numerical distance in the same way. However, finding that 
symbols and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes do not influence each other will be 
taken to suggest that symbols and quantities are processed by distinct systems. Moreover, 
the finding of an asymmetry between the processing of symbols and quantities, namely 
that only one of the two dimensions automatically influences the other, or that the 
automatic influence of symbols and quantities are differentially modulated by numerical 
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distance will be taken as support for the idea that similar but ultimately distinct 
representational systems support the processing of symbols and quantities. In the 
following experiments, we examine the effortful and automatic processing of symbolic 
and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes (i.e., symbols vs. quantities).  Additionally, we 
examine how numerical distance influences the effortful and automatic processing of 
symbols compared to quantities. This study will reveal whether there is an asymmetry in 
the automaticity of the processing magnitudes of different number formats. 
. 
4.2 Experiment 1 
4.2.1 Experiment 1: Introduction  
In the current study, we adapt the famous colour Stroop paradigm (Stroop, 1935), to 
measure both the effortful and automatic processing of symbolic and nonsymbolic 
numerical magnitudes within the same task.  Stroop paradigms have been widely used in 
psychology to examine the degree to which an irrelevant stimulus influences the 
processing of a relevant stimulus. The original Stroop effect revealed that participants are 
slower and less accurate at naming a font colour of a printed word if the meaning of the 
word and font colour conflict (Stroop, 1935). For example, participants were slower and 
less accurate at identifying that the font colour of a word if the font colour is different 
from the semantic meaning of the printed word (i.e., red).   
Previous research studies have used Stroop-like tasks to assess the automatic processing 
of symbolic numbers (Henik & Tzelgov, 1982; Naparstek et al., 2015; Pansky & Algom, 
2002). As discussed above, the Numerical Stroop Task, a task that requires participants to 
judge which of two digits (e.g., 3 vs 5) was larger either in physical size or in numerical 
magnitude, is the most widely used assessment of the automatic processing of symbolic 
numerical magnitudes (Henik & Tzelgov, 1982). Results revealed that judgments of 
physical size were faster than judgments of symbolic magnitude, suggesting that 
participants are more efficient at effortfully processing size compared to the numerical 
magnitude represented symbolically. However, physical size judgments were affected by 
the numerical magnitude of the digit. Moreover, the degree to which the numerical 
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magnitude of the symbol influenced the processing of the physical size was associated 
with numerical distance. Specifically, physical size judgments were more influenced by 
Arabic numeral pairs with relatively larger numerical distances. Therefore, in the same 
way that larger numerical magnitude is more obvious when comparing two magnitudes 
with a large numerical distance, larger numerical distances between two irrelevant 
numerical magnitudes make the automatic influence of the irrelevant dimension more 
salient. This indicates that numerical distance is automatically processed even when it is 
irrelevant to form the judgment of which of two symbols is physically larger. This 
finding, that numerical distance of the symbols is automatically computed during the 
effortful processing of physical size, has been taken to suggest that physical size and 
semantic meaning of the numerals are processed in parallel.  Other research that has 
examined the automatic processing of symbols and quantities presented participants with 
a single array containing a quantity of symbolic digits (e.g., a single array containing six 
of the Arabic digit ‘7’). Participants were instructed to compare either the symbolic or 
nonsymbolic numerical magnitude in the array to the number five (comparison task), or 
to indicate if the numerical quantity was an even or odd number (parity task) (Naparstek 
& Henik, 2010). Results revealed that symbols influenced the processing of quantities for 
both the comparison and parity tasks, whereas quantities only influenced the processing 
of symbols on the comparison task. This suggests that symbols may be processed more 
automatically than quantities. Critically, Naparstek and colleagues included a single array 
of symbols (e.g., six of the symbol ‘7’), and asked participants to compare either the 
symbol or the quantity to the number five.  Therefore, in these tasks, both symbols and 
quantities were being compared to a symbolic referent held in mind. Consequently, it is 
possible that the asymmetry between the symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical 
magnitudes is due to the fact that, for the nonsymbolic task, the participants were 
comparing between formats (i.e., nonsymbolic to symbolic), whereas in the symbolic 
task, participants were comparing a symbol to a symbolic referent.  Consequently, in the 
current study, we create a Symbolic-Nonsymbolic Stroop paradigm which allows us to 
examine how symbols and quantities influence each other, without requiring a 
transformation between formats, and also assess whether the influence of symbols and 
quantities on each other is symmetrically modulated by numerical distance. Findings 
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from the current study will illuminate whether the influence of symbols and quantities on 
each other is symmetrical and will, therefore, allow us to identify whether symbols and 
quantities processed separately or in parallel, and with the similar to distinct 
representational precision. These findings are important to identify whether symbols are 
processed using the ancient system that evolved to process nonsymbolic numerical 
magnitudes, or if symbols are supported by a similar but ultimately distinct 
representational system. 
4.2.1.1 The Symbolic-Nonsymbolic Stroop Paradigm 
In the current study, we examined whether the effortful and automatic processing of 
symbolic numerical magnitudes (e.g., 3) is distinct from effortful and automatic 
processing of the nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes they represent (e.g., •••) using a 
Symbolic-Nonsymbolic Stroop paradigm.  Critically, the stimuli in this paradigm 
consisted of two quantities of symbols (e.g., 3333 vs. 444). The inclusion of two sets of 
symbols and quantities in all stimuli meant that we were able to not only assess effortful 
and automatic processing of symbols and quantities independently but also the influence 
that symbols and quantities have on each other.  During this paradigm, participants were 
asked to compare adjacent arrays of number symbols (e.g., 4444 vs 333) and indicate the 
side containing either the greater quantity of symbols (nonsymbolic task) or the side 
containing the numerically larger symbol (symbolic task). This means that symbolic and 
nonsymbolic numerical magnitude acted as both the relevant dimension (i.e., the 
dimension that the participant was instructed to attend to) and the irrelevant dimension 
(i.e., the dimension that the participant needed to ignore). There were congruent trials, 
where the larger symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude appeared on the same 
side of the screen (e.g., 333 vs. 4444), incongruent trials, where the larger symbolic and 
nonsymbolic numerical magnitude appeared on opposite sides of the screen (e.g., 3333 
vs. 444), and neutral trials, where the irrelevant dimension was the same across both sides 
of the screen (e.g., 3333 vs. 333 for nonsymbolic; 333 vs. 444 for symbolic). In this task, 
the numerical distance between the numerical magnitudes being compared was 
systematically varied across trials. The use of the Symbolic-Nonsymbolic Stroop 
paradigm is optimal to test the following predictions and ultimately assess whether 
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symbolic numerical magnitudes are processed in the same way as the nonsymbolic 
numerical magnitudes under different attentional conditions. 
We anticipate several possible outcomes for the effortful and automatic processing of 
symbols compared to quantities. The first of these is that symbolic and nonsymbolic 
numerical magnitudes will be processed in the same way both effortfully and 
automatically. Specifically, this would mean that no difference will be observed in 
participants ability to compare symbols and quantities, and symbols and quantities will 
automatically influence each other in the same way.  This idea is supported by research 
suggesting that symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are processed by the 
same analogue magnitude processing system (e.g., Cantlon et al., 2009; Dehaene, 2007; 
Dehaene et al., 1998; Nieder & Dehaene, 2009; Piazza et al., 2007).  In view of research 
that reports an asymmetry of the processing of symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical 
magnitudes, including chapter 2 and 3 of the current thesis, (Krajcsi et al., 2016; Krajcsi, 
Lengyel, & Kojouharova, 2018; Lyons et al., 2012; Lyons, Nuerk, & Ansari, 2015; 
Sokolowski, Fias, Mousa, & Ansari, 2017; Vogel, Grabner, Schneider, Siegler, & Ansari, 
2013) we also predict a second possible outcome.  The second possible outcome is that 
results will reveal an asymmetry in the processing of symbols and quantities either during 
effortful processing, automatic processing, or both. For this potential outcome, we predict 
that symbols will be processed more efficiently than quantities during effortful 
processing and automatic processing. This prediction runs in contrast to the finding that 
symbols are processed less automatically than physical size (Henik & Tzelgov, 1982). 
However, we argue that enumerating a large set of discrete objects (rather than focussing 
on the size of a single object) requires a greater degree of processing, and therefore will 
be less efficient and less automatic.  In view of this, we also predict that if there is an 
asymmetry between the processing of symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes 
it will be due to the fact that symbols influence the processing of quantities more than 
quantities will influence the processing of symbols. Finally, based on research reporting 
an asymmetry in the distance effects of symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes 
(Buckley & Gillman, 1974; Furman & Rubinsten, 2012; Holloway et al., 2010; Moyer & 
Landauer, 1967; Rubinsten, Henik, Berger, & Shahar-Shalev, 2002) we predict that the 
effortful processing of quantities will produce a larger distance effect than the effortful 
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processing of symbols.  In summary, this study uses a novel task to compare the effortful 
and automatic processing of symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes.  
4.2.2 Experiment 1: Method 
4.2.2.1 Participants 
Eighty healthy adult participants (Mage=21.4, SDage=3.01; 31 males, 49 females) were 
recruited at the University of Western Ontario in London, Ontario.  Participants provided 
written consent before participating in the study. The session took approximately two 
hours and participants were compensated $5 CAD per half-hour (average $20 CAD 
total).  All procedures were approved by the University of Western Ontario Non-medical 
Research Ethics Board (See Appendix A).  
4.2.2.2 Materials 
4.2.2.2.1 Symbolic-Nonsymbolic Stroop Task. 
Each participant performed two kinds of magnitude comparisons on the same set of 
stimuli.  Stimuli were composed of two arrays of Arabic numerals (numbers 1 to 9) in a 
four by four array (see Fig 1).  An array contained a certain quantity of Arabic numerals 
(e.g., six “6’s).  The remaining spaces in the array were filled with the star symbol (*) as 
has been done in previous research (Naparstek et al., 2015; Pansky & Algom, 2002), to 
control for continuous properties such as area (Leibovich & Henik, 2013).  Specifically, 
including ‘*’ in all spaces that did not contain a symbol allowed us to keep the total area 
of the numerical displays constant throughout all trials.  Although this does not remove 
all associations between continuous properties and quantities (i.e., the proportion of spots 
filled by digits still changes based on quantity) it does control for salient continuous 
magnitudes that have been reported to significantly influence the processing of 
nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes, such as area, density, and convex hull (For review 
see: Henik, Gliksman, Kallai, & Leibovich, 2017; Henik, Leibovich, Naparstek, 
Diesendruck, & Rubinsten, 2011; Leibovich & Henik, 2013; Leibovich, Katzin, Harel, & 
Henik, 2016). Twenty different versions of each array were generated using MATLAB to 
ensure that participants did not learn the position of the Arabic digits within the arrays. 
See figure 4.1 for an example of two arrays.  The stimuli were presented using 
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OpenSesame (Mathôt, Schreij, & Theeuwes, 2012), with a resolution of 800 x 600. The 
stimuli, code to create the stimuli, and the OpenSesame experiments (which include trial 
lists), are publicly available at on the Open Science Framework (OSF) at 
https://osf.io/qyczk/. 
 
Figure 4.1 An example of two arrays presented to participants the contain quantities of 
Arabic numerals.  The array on the left contains six of the Arabic numeral ‘6’, and the 
array on the right contains two of the Arabic numeral ‘2’. 
The participant performed both a symbolic comparison task and a nonsymbolic 
comparison task on all pairs of arrays.  In the symbolic task, the participant had to 
indicate which array contained the numerical symbol with the larger magnitude.  In the 
nonsymbolic task, the participant had to indicate which array contained the greater 
quantity of numerical symbols (five ‘3’s vs. two ‘2’s). In the congruent condition, the 
larger symbol and the greater quantity appeared on the same side of the screen. In the 
incongruent condition, the side with larger symbol appeared opposite to the side with the 
greater quantity. Importantly, the participant was presented with the same set of stimuli 
for the symbolic task and the nonsymbolic task for both the congruent and incongruent 
conditions.  In the neutral condition, the irrelevant dimension was the same across both 
sides of the screen and depended on the condition. In the symbolic neutral condition, the 
two arrays contained different symbolic numbers, but the quantity of symbolic numbers 
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was held constant between the stimuli and matched one of the two symbolic numbers.  In 
the nonsymbolic neutral condition, the quantity of the symbolic numbers in the two 
arrays was different, but both arrays contained the same symbolic numbers that were the 
same as one of the two quantities. In the congruent and incongruent conditions, the 
distance between the relevant dimension (i.e., what the participant is told to compare) and 
the irrelevant dimension (i.e., what the participant must ignore) was the same and ranged 
from 1-6, with 12 trials per distance. The distance between the relevant dimension in 
neutral condition was matched to the congruent and incongruent conditions, and the 
irrelevant dimension in the neutral condition was always 0. See Figure 4.2 for examples 
of stimuli for congruent, incongruent, and neutral conditions for both the symbolic and 
nonsymbolic comparison task.  
Participants were randomly presented with two blocks of 216 trials (432 total trials) on 
the symbolic task and on the nonsymbolic task. Of the 216 trials, 72 stimulus pairs were 
congruent, 72 were incongruent, and the remaining 72 trials were neutral. Each of the 72 
trials consisted of 12 trials at each of distance 1-6. Notably, only 108 of the 216 trials had 
unique number pairs.  The other 108 trials had the same numbers as the original 108 
trials, but the numbers appeared on opposite sides of the screen. The stimuli in the 
congruent and incongruent conditions were identical for the symbolic and the 
nonsymbolic comparison tasks. The stimuli for the neutral conditions differed between 
tasks because in the neutral condition, the irrelevant dimension was controlled to have a 
distance of zero. Within a single trial, participants were presented with a fixation for 500 
milliseconds (ms), then a blank screen for 300 ms. Following this, participants were 
presented with two arrays (Figure 4.1) for 2000 ms or until a key response was made.  
Once the participant either made a key response or the 2000 ms was up a blank screen 
was presented for 500 ms.  See the OSF page at https://osf.io/qyczk/.F for a list of the 
trials. 
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Figure 4.2 Examples of types of stimuli presented. For congruent and incongruent, the 
same stimuli were used for both the symbolic and the nonsymbolic comparisons. The 
stimuli for the neutral condition differed for the symbolic and the nonsymbolic 
comparison conditions. 
4.2.2.3 Procedure 
All included measures were obtained during a single session that took approximately two 
hours. During the session, participants completed a series of cognitive tasks including the 
Symbolic-Nonsymbolic Stroop tasks. The symbolic-nonsymbolic Stroop tasks were 
always given at the beginning of the session. Only the results from the Symbolic-
Nonsymbolic Stroop task are reported here. Participants viewed the stimuli on one of two 
identical Dell desktop machines that run Windows 8.1. Participants were seated roughly 
60-70 cm from the screen, which was an 18.6 by 12.1 inch flat-screen LCD monitor with 
1680 x 1050 resolution. All participants first completed both the symbolic and 
nonsymbolic comparison task, but the order that the participant completed the task was 
counterbalanced between participants. Each task (symbolic and nonsymbolic) began with 
a practice block that randomly presented 5 of the 216 stimuli. Feedback was given at the 
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end of the practice block.  Participants continued to the actual experiment if they 
correctly answered 4 out of 5 practice trials (i.e., 80% correct).  If the participant did not 
get at least 80% of the practice block correct the participant redid the practice block. The 
actual experiment for each task was composed of two blocks.  In each block, all 216 
stimuli were randomly presented once.  The participants got one break between the two 
blocks.  
4.2.3 Experiment 1: Results 
Trials with an RT that were + or – 3SD from the mean of the trial type within an 
individual were considered outliers and removed. This resulted in less than 1% of the RT 
data being removed. Following this, the RTs for each trial were adjusted to reflect both 
the speed and accuracy of performance.  RTs and error rates were combined to produce 
an efficiency score using the following formula. 
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 =  
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒
1 − 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑠
 
An efficiency score allows for the RTs to remain unchanged on correct trials and increase 
proportionally with the number of errors. Efficiency scores are often used in the literature 
(e.g., Sasanguie, Van den Bussche, & Reynvoet, 2012; Simon et al., 2008) as they 
account for both speed and accuracy. Recently, it has been noted that although efficiency 
scores do provide a better summary of the findings, these scores increase the variance of 
the measure, and therefore, it is necessary to further check the data to ensure that the 
pattern of results for the RT and accuracy is the same (Bruyer & Brysbaert, 2011). In the 
current study, each of the RT and accuracy produce the same pattern of results as the 
efficiency score. Consequently, all results will be reported as efficiency scores. The raw 
data files are publicly available on the Open Science Framework (OSF) at 
https://osf.io/qyczk/. 
A three-way repeated-measures analyses of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to 
examine the influence of three independent variables (task, congruency, distance) on 
efficiency scores from the Symbolic-Nonsymbolic Stroop task. Task included two levels 
(symbolic, nonsymbolic), congruity included three levels (congruent, neutral, 
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incongruent), and distance included six levels (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6).  All statistical tests were 
carried out using a two-tailed test with an alpha of .05.  Effect sizes were estimated using 
partial 2. Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity was significant for all main effects and 
interactions.  Therefore, the Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used for all analyses.  
4.2.3.1 Effortful Processing 
The main effect of task and the interaction between task and distance was used to assess 
similarities and differences in the effortful processing of symbolic and nonsymbolic 
numerical magnitudes. These results assess effortful processing because these effects 
collapse across conditions of congruity, functionally controlling for variability that is 
attributable to the automatic processing of the irrelevant dimension. Results revealed a 
significant main effect of task, F(1, 79) = 49.97, p <.001, η² = 0.39.  Specifically, 
participants were more efficient on the symbolic compared to the nonsymbolic task. 
There was also a significant two-way interaction between task and distance F(2, 172) = 
373.66, p <.001, η² = 0.83 (Figure 4.3). Post-hoc pairwise comparisons with a Bonferroni 
correction for multiple comparisons with a critical p-value <.05 revealed that distance 
had a stronger effect on performance on the nonsymbolic task compared to the symbolic 
task.  Specifically, in the nonsymbolic task, all distances were significantly different from 
each other (p<.001).  In the symbolic task, distances 1, 2 and 3 were significantly 
different from all other distances (p<.001), distance 4 differed from distance 5 at a 
threshold of p<.05 and from distance 6 at a threshold of p<.01.  However, in the symbolic 
task, distance 5 and distance 6 were not significantly different. Notably, there was a 
significant main effect of numerical distance F(2, 190) = 1006.90, p<.001, η² = 0.93, 
indicating that participants were more efficient at comparing trials with large distances 
across tasks.  However, this main effect should be interpreted with caution due to the 
significant interaction effects. In sum, these results suggest that the effortful processing of 
symbols is more efficient and less influenced by numerical distance than the effortful 
processing on nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes.  
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Figure 4.3 This figure depicts the effortful processing of symbols compared to quantities 
across six numerical distances. Efficiency scores for the symbolic (orange) and 
nonsymbolic (blue) tasks, collapsing across congruent, neutral and incongruent trials are 
plotted at all six distances. Error bars represent standard error. This figure highlights the 
task by distance interaction, which indicates participants are more efficient and less 
influenced by numerical distance when processing symbolic compared to nonsymbolic 
numerical magnitudes. 
4.2.3.2 Automatic Processing 
The main effect of congruity was used to assess whether symbols and quantities 
influenced each other across tasks. By collapsing across conditions of task and distance, 
we are controlling for differences in the effortful processing of the relevant dimension 
and consequently, evaluating only the automatic influence of the irrelevant dimension. 
Results revealed a significant main effect of congruity F(1, 106) = 297.64, p <.001, η² = 
0.79. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons with a Bonferroni correction for multiple 
comparisons with a critical p-value <.05 showed that congruent, neutral, and incongruent 
trials all differed significantly from one another. Specifically, participant’s performance 
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was strongest on congruent trials and weakest on incongruent trials. This main effect 
reveals that, regardless of condition (i.e., making symbolic or nonsymbolic comparisons), 
participants were more efficient at making comparisons when the relevant and irrelevant 
stimulus dimensions were congruent compared to when they were incongruent with each 
other.  The fact that participants were fastest on the congruent trials suggests that the 
alignment of magnitude between the relevant and irrelevant dimension improved or 
facilitated performance. In contrast, the magnitude irrelevant dimension conflicting with 
the magnitude of the relevant dimension was related to weaker performance. This is 
evidence of an interference effect. Therefore, it follows to consider whether symbolic and 
nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes influence each other in the same or distinct ways.   
The two-way interaction between task and congruity, and the three-way interaction 
between task, congruity, and distance were used to examine whether there were 
differences in the congruity effects between tasks and whether this was modulated by 
numerical distance.  Results revealed that the two-way interaction between task and 
congruity was not significant, F(1, 107) = 0.19, ns, η² = 0.002. However, there was a 
significant three-way interaction between task, congruity, and distance, F(5, 357) = 
34.51, p <.001, η² = 0.30 (Figure 4.4). Descriptive statistics for the three-way interaction 
are reported in Table 4.1.  These results suggest that there is a distance-dependent 
asymmetry in the automatic influence of symbols and quantities. Post-hoc pairwise 
comparisons with a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons with a critical p-
value <.05 revealed that at symbols interfered with quantities across all distances, but 
nonsymbolic interference was distance-dependent. Specifically, nonsymbolic interference 
was significant for distances 2-6, but not for distance 1 (Figure 4.4, Table 4.2).  Related 
post-hoc pairwise comparisons examining the difference between distances for each 
condition revealed that in the nonsymbolic task all six distances were significantly 
different from each other at all congruity levels (p<.001).  In contrast, for the symbolic 
task the distance 5 and 6, did not significantly differ in the congruent condition, distance 
4 and 5, as well as 5 and 6, did not significantly differ from each other in the neutral 
condition, and distance 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 did not significantly differ from each other in the 
incongruent condition.  All other conditions differed significantly from each other at a 
threshold of p<.05.  This reveals that in addition to the nonsymbolic distance effect being 
146 
 
stronger than the symbolic distance effect across congruity conditions, the symbolic 
distance effects were weakest for the incongruent condition, followed by the neutral 
condition, and strongest for the congruent. This suggests that the subtle distance effect in 
the symbolic condition may actually be driven by the automatic influence of quantities.  
Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics for each Condition in Experiment 1. 
  Nonsymbolic Task Symbolic Task 
Congruity Distance Mean SD Mean SD 
Congruent 
1 928.0 195.8 715.8 153.3 
2 761.6 164.9 651.6 132.7 
3 676.7 136.5 618.0 141.9 
4 620.8 128.4 590.8 136.5 
5 597.4 122.1 569.8 124.0 
6 575.9 104.1 561.6 123.5 
Neutral 
1 1004.2 196.9 739.3 152.0 
2 815.8 161.5 680.1 140.6 
3 707.0 145.2 655.3 143.3 
4 650.6 125.0 627.4 134.8 
5 618.7 106.7 614.1 138.5 
6 594.9 109.3 603.9 126.0 
Incongruent 
1 1174.3 264.3 762.5 155.1 
2 881.5 156.2 731.8 160.6 
3 777.5 140.0 718.6 151.7 
4 694.8 129.2 712.6 171.2 
5 662.1 127.8 699.4 164.8 
6 628.5 115.9 705.4 177.8 
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Figure 4.4 This figure depicts efficiency scores for symbolic (orange) and nonsymbolic 
(blue) tasks at each congruity condition (congruent (darkest), neutral (medium) and 
incongruent (lightest) across all six distances. Error bars represent standard error of the 
mean. This figure highlights that at large distances, efficiency scores for congruent, 
neutral and incongruent conditions differ significantly for both the symbolic and 
nonsymbolic tasks.  However, at small distances, participants have higher efficiency 
scores (i.e., poorer performance) on the nonsymbolic task than the symbolic task and the 
difference between congruent, neutral, and incongruent is larger on the nonsymbolic than 
the symbolic task. 
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Table 4.2 Bonferroni Corrected Post-hoc Pairwise Comparisons for 3-way 
Interaction (Task*Congruity*Distance) for Experiment 1. 
Task Distance Congruity Mean Dif SE P-Value 
N
o
n
s
y
m
b
o
lic
 
1 
Neutral vs Congruent 76.21* 15.28 <.001 
Incongruent vs Congruent 246.39* 27.24 <.001 
Incongruent vs Neutral 170.18* 26.47 <.001 
2 
Neutral vs Congruent 54.18* 9.70 <.001 
Incongruent vs Congruent 119.90* 13.55 <.001 
Incongruent vs Neutral 65.71* 12.64 <.001 
3 
Neutral vs Congruent 30.27* 5.98 <.001 
Incongruent vs Congruent 100.83* 9.91 <.001 
Incongruent vs Neutral 70.56* 10.57 <.001 
4 
Neutral vs Congruent 29.83* 5.87 <.001 
Incongruent vs Congruent 73.98* 8.46 <.001 
Incongruent vs Neutral 44.15* 6.74 <.001 
5 
Neutral vs Congruent 21.37* 5.44 <.001 
Incongruent vs Congruent 64.70* 7.57 <.001 
Incongruent vs Neutral 43.33* 7.26 <.001 
6 
Neutral vs Congruent 18.99* 3.59 <.001 
Incongruent vs Congruent 52.66* 5.08 <.001 
Incongruent vs Neutral 33.67* 4.33 <.001 
S
y
m
b
o
lic
 
1 
Neutral vs Congruent 23.50 10.61 0.089 
Incongruent vs Congruent 46.70* 9.60 <.001 
Incongruent vs Neutral 23.20 10.16 0.075 
2 
Neutral vs Congruent 28.49* 6.27 <.001 
Incongruent vs Congruent 80.21* 7.89 <.001 
Incongruent vs Neutral 51.72* 9.81 <.001 
3 
Neutral vs Congruent 37.33* 4.86 <.001 
Incongruent vs Congruent 100.61* 8.50 <.001 
Incongruent vs Neutral 63.28* 7.90 <.001 
4 
Neutral vs Congruent 36.62* 6.30 <.001 
Incongruent vs Congruent 121.81* 10.95 <.001 
Incongruent vs Neutral 85.19* 9.03 <.001 
5 Neutral vs Congruent 44.33* 5.31 <.001 
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Incongruent vs Congruent 129.60* 13.18 <.001 
Incongruent vs Neutral 85.27* 12.25 <.001 
6 
Neutral vs Congruent 42.29* 5.61 <.001 
Incongruent vs Congruent 143.79* 14.30 <.001 
Incongruent vs Neutral 101.50* 12.43 <.001 
 
Notably, the two-way interaction between congruity and distance from Experiment 1 was 
also significant, F(4, 333) = 4.12, p <.01, η² = 0.05. However, these findings are not 
informative as they collapse across symbolic and nonsymbolic number processing, 
thereby combining effects of the relevant and irrelevant dimensions for this interaction.  
In summary, the results from experiment 1 produce several key findings.  First, findings 
reveal that the effortful processing of symbolic numerical magnitudes is more efficient 
and less affected by numerical distance compared to the effortful processing of 
nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes. Second, the results from experiment 1 reveal that 
symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are both processed automatically.  
Moreover, the automatic processing of symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes 
influence each other.  However, this automatic influence is not symmetrical.  Indeed, we 
find that symbolic numerical magnitudes are processed more automatically than 
nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes.  Specifically, irrelevant symbols influence the 
processing of quantities more than irrelevant quantities influence the processing of 
symbols.  Additionally, in the nonsymbolic task, numerical distance affects the 
processing of quantities across all levels of congruity. However, in the symbolic task, the 
distance effect is greatest for congruent conditions, followed by neutral conditions, and 
there is barely an effect of distance on incongruent trials.  Together, these findings 
provide evidence to suggest that the systems used to process symbols and quantities are 
overlapping, as there is evidence that the automatic processing of one format 
asymmetrically influences the effortful processing of the other format.   
The findings from this study included numbers from 1-9.  While this is helpful to 
understand these effects across the full range of single-digit numbers, small and large 
nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are thought to be processed using distinct systems 
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(Hyde, 2011), with small nonsymbolic numerical quantities being processed more 
similarly to symbols.  In view of this, it is necessary to examine whether these results can 
be replicated when including only large nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes, that the 
visual system cannot process exactly. 
4.3 Experiment 2 
4.3.1 Experiment 2: Introduction  
Subitizing is a cognitive ability that allows for the fast, automatic, and accurate 
identification of the quantity of a small set of items (i.e., sets containing 1-4 items) 
(Mandler & Shebo, 1982; Trick & Pylyshyn, 1994).  Large sets (i.e., sets containing 5 or 
more items) are considered to be in the ‘counting range,’ as these sets are evaluated 
through the effortful process of counting, or approximate estimation. The quantity of a set 
of items in the subitizing range is named more quickly and accurately than the quantity of 
a set of items in the counting range (Kaufman, Lord, Reese, & Volkmann, 1949; Trick & 
Pylyshyn, 1993).  Prior research has refuted the idea that there is a single estimation 
system used to process quantities in both the subitizing and counting range and instead 
supported the notion that humans possess a dedicated mechanism for processing small 
subitizable quantities (Revkin, Piazza, Izard, Cohen, & Dehaene, 2008).  Research has 
revealed that the processing of small quantities (i.e., 1-4) is supported by a parallel 
individuation system, used to track objects in order to identify the exact number of items 
in small sets.  In contrast, research suggests that an analogue magnitude system (often 
referred to as an approximate number system (ANS)) supports the processing of 
quantities with five or more objects. The analogue magnitude system uses approximate 
estimation to process larger quantities (For review see: Hyde, 2011).  We predict that 
quantities in the subitizing range, that are processed using the PI system are processed in 
a way that is more similar to symbols.  Consequently, we predict that the differences 
between the effortful automatic processing of symbols and quantities will be more 
extreme for quantities in counting range, processed using analogue magnitude system.  
In view of the fact that humans automatically perceive the exact quantity of a set in the 
subitizing range, it is conceivable that nonsymbolic quantities in the subitizing range are 
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more likely to activate exact representations of symbolic numerical magnitudes compared 
to nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes in the counting range. The stimuli in experiment 1 
included all single-digit numerical magnitudes (i.e., quantities one to nine). 
Consequently, results from experiment 1, suggesting that symbolic and nonsymbolic 
numerical magnitudes influence each other during the Stroop task, could be driven by 
quantities in the subitizing range. In order to confirm that the Stroop effect (i.e., the 
finding that symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes influence each other) is not 
simply due to the fact that quantities in the subitizing range are activating exact symbolic 
representations it is critical to replicate this paradigm using only numbers in the counting 
range. Therefore, in experiment 2, an independent sample of participants completed a 
modified version of the Symbolic-Nonsymbolic Stroop task that included only numbers 
in the counting range (i.e., 5-9). 
4.3.2 Experiment 2: Method 
4.3.2.1 Participants 
Sixty-three healthy adult participants were recruited at the University of Western Ontario 
in London, Ontario. Four participants were excluded from analyses due to poor accuracy 
(< 70% on at least one trial type).  Therefore, all analyses for experiment two include 59 
participants (Mage=23.86, SDage=3.79; 20 males, 39 females). Participants provided 
written consent before participating in the study. The session took approximately one 
hour and participants were compensated $5 CAD per half-hour (average $10 CAD total).  
All procedures were approved by the University of Western Ontario Non-medical 
Research Ethics Board (See Appendix A).  
4.3.2.2 Materials 
4.3.2.2.1 Symbolic-Nonsymbolic Stroop Task 
Each participant completed both the symbolic and nonsymbolic version of the Symbolic-
Nonsymbolic Stroop task with all the same parameters described in experiment one.  The 
trial list for experiment two differed from experiment one. Namely, the task only 
included both symbols and quantities in the counting range (5-9). As with experiment 1, 
the stimuli, code to create the stimuli, and the OpenSesame experiments, which include 
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the trial lists, are available at on the Open Science Framework (OSF) at 
https://osf.io/qyczk/. 
Participants were randomly presented with two blocks of 36 trials repeated twice each 
(144 total trials) on the symbolic task and on the nonsymbolic task. Of the 36 trials, 12 
stimulus pairs were congruent, 12 were incongruent, and the remaining 12 trials were 
neutral. Each of the 12 trials consisted of 4 trials at each of distance 1-3. Notably, half of 
the 36 trials, had the same numbers as the other half, but the numbers appeared on 
opposite sides of the screen. The stimuli in the congruent and incongruent conditions 
were identical for the symbolic and the nonsymbolic tasks. The stimuli for the neutral 
conditions differed between tasks because in the neural condition, the irrelevant 
dimension was controlled to have a distance of zero. There were two versions of the task 
that used different magnitudes for the trials.  The versions were counterbalanced between 
participants. Notably, both version A and version B of the paradigm are available on the 
Open Science Framework (OSF) at https://osf.io/qyczk/. 
4.3.2.3 Procedure 
All included measures were obtained during a single session that took approximately one 
hour, where participants completed a series of basic number processing tasks including 
the Symbolic-Nonsymbolic Stroop tasks with numbers only on the counting range. Only 
the results from the counting Symbolic-Nonsymbolic Stroop task are reported here. The 
procedure is the same as for experiment one with the exception that participants were 
randomly presented with two blocks containing the same 36 trials for each task.  The 
participants got one break between the two blocks.  
4.3.3 Experiment 2: Results 
As reported in experiment 1, the RT and accuracy produce the same pattern of results as 
the efficiency score for experiment 2. Consequently, all results will be reported as 
efficiency scores. As with experiment 1, the raw data files for experiment 2 are publicly 
available on the Open Science Framework (OSF) at https://osf.io/qyczk/. 
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A three-way repeated-measures analyses of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to 
examine the influence of three independent variables (task, congruency, distance) on 
efficiency scores from the Symbolic-Nonsymbolic Stroop task. Task included two levels 
(symbolic, nonsymbolic), and congruity included two levels (congruent, neutral, 
incongruent), and distance included three levels (1, 2, 3).  Descriptive statistics for each 
condition are reported in Table 4.3. All statistical tests were carried out using a two-tailed 
test with an alpha of .05.  Effect sizes were estimated using partial 2. Mauchly’s Test of 
Sphericity was significant for the main effect of distance, and the following interactions: 
task*distance, congruity*distance, task*congruity*distance. The Greenhouse-Geisser 
correction was used for all analyses that violated the assumption of sphericity.  As with 
experiment 1, the main effect of task and interaction between task and distance was used 
as a measure of effortful processing, as these analyses collapse across congruity 
conditions, therefore controlling for the effect of the irrelevant dimension.  The main 
effect of congruity was used to assess the automatic effect of processing, as this effect 
collapses across variability associated with effortful processing and distance. Finally, the 
two-way interaction between congruity and task, and the three-way interaction between 
congruity, task and distance were used to assess whether there are asymmetries in the 
automatic processing of symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes. 
Table 4.3 Descriptive Statistics for each Condition in Experiment 2 
  Nonsymbolic Task Symbolic Task 
Congruity Distance Mean SD Mean SD 
Congruent 
1 1324.8 336.5 666.0 144.9 
2 1000.8 243.6 619.1 136.0 
3 880.8 170.9 606.8 113.7 
Neutral 
1 1421.7 441.5 689.4 149.1 
2 1054.4 212.7 642.2 133.8 
3 932.2 181.3 620.3 126.0 
Incongruent 
1 1604.1 406.6 699.7 152.0 
2 1159.7 258.7 663.8 186.5 
3 1031.1 176.0 649.8 135.1 
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4.3.3.1 Effortful Processing 
The main effect of task and the interaction between task and distance was used to assess 
similarities and differences in the effortful processing of symbols and quantities. The 
significant main effect of task indicated that participants were more efficient on the 
symbolic compared to the nonsymbolic task F(1, 58) = 553.52, p <.001, η² = 0.91. There 
was also significant two-way interaction between task and distance, F(1, 84) = 213.72, p 
<.001, η² = 0.79 (Figure 4.5). Post-hoc pairwise comparisons with a Bonferroni 
correction for multiple comparisons with a critical p-value <.05 revealed that distance 
had a stronger effect on performance on the nonsymbolic task compared to the symbolic 
task, as discovered in experiment 1.  Specifically, the distances in the nonsymbolic task 
were all significantly different from each other with at a p<.001. In the symbolic task, 
distance 1 was significantly different from distance 2 and distance 3 (p<.001), but there 
was no significant difference between distance 2 and distance 3. Notably, the main effect 
of numerical distance was also significant F(2, 94) = 297.73, p <.001, η² = 0.84, with 
participants most efficient at distance 3 and least efficient at distance 1 across tasks, but 
this main effect should be interpreted with caution in view of the significant interactions. 
Together, these results converge with results from experiment 1 to suggest that symbolic 
numerical magnitudes are processed more efficiently and are less affected by numerical 
distance, compared to nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes.  
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Figure 4.5 This figure depicts the effortful processing of symbols compared to quantities 
in the counting range across three numerical distances. Efficiency scores for symbolic 
(orange) and nonsymbolic (blue) task, collapsing across congruent, neutral and 
incongruent trials are plotted across all three distances. Error bars represent standard 
error. This figure highlights the task by distance interaction, which indicates that 
participants are more efficient and less influenced by numerical distance when processing 
symbolic compared to nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes. 
4.3.3.2 Automatic Processing 
The main effect of congruity was analyzed to examine whether symbols and quantities 
influenced each other across tasks.  The significant main effect of congruity revealed that 
congruent, neutral, and incongruent trials differed significantly from one another, F(2, 
116) = 59.18, p <.001, η² = 0.51. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons with a Bonferroni 
correction for multiple comparisons and a critical p-value <.05 showed that congruent, 
neutral, and incongruent trials all differed significantly from one another. Specifically, 
participant’s performance was strongest on congruent trials and weakest on incongruent 
trials. This main effect indicates that at some level of processing symbolic and 
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nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes influence each other, even when only including 
numbers in the counting range. Therefore, we examine whether this influence of 
symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes on each other is symmetrical for 
numbers in the counting range.   
The two-way interaction between task and congruity, and the three-way interaction 
between task, congruity, and distance were used to examine whether there were 
differences in the congruity effects between tasks and whether these differences were 
modulated by numerical distance. In experiment 2, the two-way interaction between task 
and congruity was significant, F(2, 116) = 26.09, p = <.001, η² = 0.31. Post-hoc pairwise 
comparisons with a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons with a critical p-
value <.05 revealed that symbols influence the processing of quantities more than 
quantities influence processing of symbols, across all distances (Figure 4.6, Table 4.4).  
Unlike the results from experiment 1, the three-way interaction between task, congruity, 
and distance, was not significant in experiment 2 F(2, 136) = 2.36, ns, η² = 0.04.  
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Figure 4.6 This figure depicts efficiency scores for symbolic (orange) and nonsymbolic 
(blue) Stroop tasks when the symbolic and nonsymbolic stimuli are congruent (darkest), 
neutral (medium) and incongruent (lightest) across all three distances. Error bars 
represent standard error. This figure highlights that participants have higher efficiency 
scores (i.e., poorer performance) on the nonsymbolic task than the symbolic task and the 
difference between congruent, neutral, and incongruent is larger on the nonsymbolic than 
the symbolic task, across all numerical distances. 
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Table 4.4 Bonferroni Corrected Post-hoc Pairwise Comparisons with a 2-way 
Interaction between Task and Congruity for Experiment 2 
Task Congruity Mean Dif SE P-Value 
Nonsymbolic 
Neutral vs Congruent 67.267* 19.35 <.01 
Incongruent vs Congruent 196.158* 23.35 <.001 
Incongruent vs Neutral 128.891* 21.40 <.001 
Symbolic 
Neutral vs Congruent 20.012* 4.06 <.001 
Incongruent vs Congruent 40.455* 5.95 <.001 
Incongruent vs Neutral 20.442* 5.38 <.01 
 
The two-way interaction between congruity and distance was not significant in 
experiment 2, F(2, 135) = 1.33, ns, η² = 0.02. Critically, as with experiment 1, these 
findings are not informative as they collapse across symbolic and nonsymbolic number 
processing and congruity, thereby combining effects of the relevant and irrelevant 
dimensions. 
4.4 Discussion  
A fundamental question in the field of numerical cognition is: are symbolic numbers 
processed in the same way as nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes? To address this 
question, we developed and used a Symbolic-Nonsymbolic Stroop paradigm to assess 
effortful and automatic processing of symbolic and nonsymbolic numbers. By examining 
whether nonsymbolic and symbolic representations automatically influence one another 
we can probe how strongly they are linked. If they are strongly linked, then processing 
one should activate the other. If, however, they are disconnected then they should not 
influence each other, or the influence should be asymmetrical. In the Symbolic-
Nonsymbolic Stroop paradigm we used to probe these possibilities, participants were 
asked to compare adjacent arrays of symbols (e.g., 4444 vs 333) and instructed to 
indicate the side containing either the greater quantity of symbols (nonsymbolic task) or 
the side containing the symbol with the greater numerical magnitude (symbolic task). 
This paradigm evaluates both processing of the relevant dimension (i.e., the dimension 
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the participant is instructed to attend to) as well as the degree to which the irrelevant 
stimulus condition influences judgments being made on the relevant condition. For 
example, when comparing which side contains the numerically larger symbol (i.e., the 
relevant dimension), does the actual number of symbols present (i.e., the irrelevant 
dimension) influence performance? Using this approach, we found that symbolic 
numerical magnitudes were processed more automatically than nonsymbolic numerical 
magnitudes as both the relevant and the irrelevant dimensions.  
Indeed, across conditions, participants performed better (i.e., responded faster and more 
accurately) on the symbolic task compared to the nonsymbolic task. This suggests that as 
the relevant dimension, symbols are processed more automatically. Additional 
asymmetries were observed through much stronger distance effects during nonsymbolic 
judgments compared to symbolic judgments, especially when comparisons were made in 
the counting range. Critically, unlike other paradigms, this task has the capacity to 
examine automaticity of processing symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes 
when these number formats act as the irrelevant dimensions. By including a neutral 
condition in our task, we were able to measure the extent to which the irrelevant 
dimension either helped (facilitated) or hindered (interfered) task performance on the 
relevant dimension. Our findings revealed an asymmetry in the interference and 
facilitation patterns of symbolic compared to nonsymbolic numerical judgments. 
Symbols, as compared to nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes, led to both greater 
facilitation and interference effects. Notably, when including trials in both the subitizing 
and counting range, as was the case in experiment 1, this asymmetry in the congruity 
effects between the symbolic and nonsymbolic task is stronger for trials with small 
distances.  Taken together, our findings demonstrate that symbolic numerical magnitudes 
are processed more automatically than nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes as both the 
relevant and irrelevant dimensions. In what follows, we discuss how this finding indicates 
asymmetric processing of symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes and suggest 
differences in the ways in which each format is processed and potentially represented.  
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4.4.1 Congruity Effects 
Regardless of condition (i.e., making symbolic or nonsymbolic comparisons), 
participants were more efficient at making comparisons when the two stimulus 
dimensions were congruent compared to when they were incongruent with each other. 
Furthermore, in the neutral condition, participants’ performance was in between that 
obtained from the other two conditions, suggesting that congruent conditions facilitate 
performance and incongruent conditions interfere with performance. These findings are 
noteworthy in that they show the powerful effect of the irrelevant stimulus on one’s 
ability to make basic numerical judgments. One interpretation of these findings is that 
symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are processed in parallel and 
potentially under the same regulatory system (e.g., see Henik & Tzelgov, 1982). 
Applying this line of reasoning to the current study, if symbolic and nonsymbolic 
numerical magnitudes bore no relation to one another and were processed by independent 
systems entirely, one would not expect to find evidence of facilitation or interference 
effects.  In other words, if symbolic and nonsymbolic numbers were processed using two 
entirely distinct systems there would not be a Stroop-effect. Therefore, our findings 
provide some evidence of parallel or simultaneous processing of symbolic and 
nonsymbolic magnitudes. However, these findings should be interpreted with caution in 
light of the many significant interactions discussed below.  Nonetheless, these findings 
align with a large body of theory and empirical findings demonstrating a close relation 
between number symbols and the nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes they represent 
(e.g., Cantlon et al., 2009; Dehaene, 2007; Dehaene et al., 1998; Nieder & Dehaene, 
2009; Piazza et al., 2007).  
However, our findings also challenge this line of research and instead suggest that 
perhaps there are key differences in the ways symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical 
magnitudes are processed. Indeed, our results revealed that in comparison to nonsymbolic 
numerical magnitudes, number symbols (i) were processed more efficiently (i.e., faster 
and more accurately) as the relevant dimension, (ii) had a greater influence on task 
performance as the irrelevant dimension, and (ii) were less influenced by numerical 
distance between magnitudes as the relevant and irrelevant dimension. Notably, distance 
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only moderated the relationship between task and congruity when including all numbers 
from 1-9, but not when only examining numbers in the counting range. We now address 
each one of these points in turn and discuss the findings in terms of evidence of 
asymmetrical processing of symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes.   
4.4.2 Effortful processing: Effects of the Relevant Dimension 
Overall, participants performed better (i.e., were more efficient) comparing symbolic 
compared to nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes. Although other researchers have 
reported similar findings (e.g., see Buckley & Gillman, 1974; Lyons & Beilock, 2009), 
this is the first study to do so within the context of a Symbolic-Nonsymbolic Stroop 
paradigm, where the task-irrelevant influence of one dimension on the other (e.g., 
symbolic on nonsymbolic) can be measured. In fact, our results run counter to findings 
from the standard Numerical Stroop paradigm produces a size-congruity effect. Recall 
that the standard paradigm has participants compare Hindu-Arabic digits based on either 
the physical size of the numerals (e.g., 3 vs. 5) or the numerical value. Results from this 
paradigm show that participants are faster at judging physical size and are less influenced 
by the symbolic value of the digits than the size. The most straightforward explanation 
for the discrepancy in findings is that in our task the nonsymbolic condition involves 
serial processing of discrete units (i.e., the total number of number symbols present). 
Conversely, the symbolic task can be approached by attending to a single unit (i.e., any 
given symbol present). Thus, both the physical size and symbolic task within the 
traditional Numerical Stroop paradigm is more akin to our symbolic task in which 
comparisons can be made by attending to a single stimulus.  This discrepancy between 
the current study and previous Numerical Stroop paradigms that produce a size congruity 
effect provides evidence in support of the notion that the quantity discrimination task in 
the Symbolic-Nonsymbolic Stroop paradigm is capturing more than processing of 
continuous magnitudes (e.g., area), an inherent confound of nonsymbolic number 
comparison tasks (For review see, Leibovich & Henik, 2013). If participants were solving 
the nonsymbolic task in the current study using purely a physical size strategy, one would 
predict that the results would closely mirror the Size Congruity Effect, namely that like 
participants are better at processing size than symbols, participants would be more 
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efficient at processing nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes compared to symbols. Instead, 
we find the reverse pattern of results, namely that as the relevant dimension, symbols are 
processed more efficiently than nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes.  Although the 
finding that humans are better at effortfully processing symbols compared to quantities is 
neither new (e.g, Buckley & Gillman, 1974; Lyons & Ansari, 2009), nor surprising, it 
highlights the general efficiency and cultural utility of symbols and number symbols 
more specifically (see Núñez, 2017).  
4.4.3 Automatic Processing: Effects of the Irrelevant Dimension  
As previously discussed, results revealed a congruity effect (i.e., greater efficiency in 
processing congruent compared to incongruent trials) in both the symbolic and 
nonsymbolic comparison conditions.  Indeed, participant’s performance on comparisons 
in both the symbolic task and the nonsymbolic task was most efficient when the two 
stimulus dimensions were congruent, followed by when they were neutral, and 
participants performance was worst on incongruent conditions. Therefore, both symbols 
and the nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes that they represent are processed as the 
irrelevant dimension and influence number processing of the relevant dimension. A 
discussed above, the finding that the irrelevant stimulus influences the relevant stimulus 
provides support for the idea that there is some parallel processing of symbols and 
quantities, as there would be no effect of the irrelevant stimulus on the relevant stimulus 
(i.e., no Symbolic-Nonsymbolic Stroop effect) if symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical 
magnitudes were processed in serial or using two entirely distinct systems. Therefore, the 
presence of a Stroop effect in the current study supports the idea that symbolic and 
nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are processed simultaneously at some stage of 
processing.  
Critically, however, our results also revealed important differences in how symbols 
influenced and interfered with judgments of nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes 
compared to the way that nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes influenced and interfered 
with symbolic judgments. That is, irrelevant number symbols were found to have a much 
larger impact on performance compared to when nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes 
acted as the irrelevant dimension. Although many studies have reported that symbols 
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influence the processing of quantities (Bush et al., 1998; Francolini & Egeth, 1980; 
Morton, 1969; Pavese & Umiltà, 1998, 1999; Windes, 1968), relatively few have 
examined whether quantities interfere with symbolic processing (Flowers, Warner, & 
Polanski, 1979; Furman & Rubinsten, 2012; Naparstek & Henik, 2010, 2012; Naparstek 
et al., 2015; Pansky & Algom, 2002). The only other study to quantify both symbolic and 
nonsymbolic interference required participants to compare a quantity to a symbolic 
referent (Naparstek & Henik, 2010). This study revealed that symbols interfered with 
quantity processing regardless of task demands, whereas the interference of quantity 
depended on the task.  Results from the current study extend finding this to reveal that 
this asymmetry in the automatic processing of symbols and quantities is present even in a 
task that does not require participants to compare the nonsymbolic numerical magnitude 
to a symbolic referent. Therefore, findings from the current study align with previous 
research to suggest that while there is some overlap in the way that symbolic and 
nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are processed, symbols seem to more consistently 
influence the processing of nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes.   
4.4.4 Influence of Numerical Distance 
As discussed above, participants perform better on comparative judgments of symbolic 
compared to nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes across all distances. However, results 
from the current study also highlight that in addition to symbols being processed more 
efficiently than nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes, the effortful processing of symbols 
is less influenced by numerical distance.  This finding from the current study, namely, 
that nonsymbolic processing is more influenced by distance than symbolic number 
processing is has been previously reported in the literature in both adults and children 
(e.g., Buckley & Gillman, 1974; Butterworth, 2005; Furman & Rubinsten, 2012; 
Holloway & Ansari, 2010; Holloway & Ansari, 2008, 2009; Holloway et al., 2010; 
Moyer & Landauer, 1967; Rubinsten, Henik, Berger, & Shahar-Shalev, 2002).   
Several models for this discrepancy of the effect of numerical distance on effortful 
symbolic and nonsymbolic number processing have been proposed.  A seminal 
computational model was put forward that suggests that symbolic and nonsymbolic 
numerical magnitudes are transformed into cardinal representation (i.e., place-coded) by 
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different pathways (Verguts & Fias, 2004).  Specifically, nonsymbolic numbers are 
transformed into cardinal representations through a noisy process referred to as 
‘summation coding.’ The noise in this process proportionally relates to the number of 
inputs being “summed.”   In contrast, the summation step of this model is not required for 
processing symbolic numbers, leading to sharper representations for symbolic numbers 
(Verguts & Fias, 2004). This computational model, which has been supported with 
empirical neuroimaging data (Holloway et al., 2010; Lyons et al., 2014; Piazza et al., 
2007; Roggeman et al., 2007), provides a compelling explanation for the discrepancies 
found in the current data between the way that distance modulates the effortful 
processing of symbolic compared to nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes. Notably, there 
are other explanations for the differences between the processing of symbolic and 
nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes. Converging recent behavioural data has indicated 
that the similar behavioural effects observed in different formats of numerical magnitudes 
(i.e., symbolic and nonsymbolic) do not correlate with each other (Holloway & Ansari, 
2009; Krajcsi et al., 2016; Lyons, Nuerk, & Ansari, 2015), and may, in fact, be supported 
by two similar, but distinct representational systems. Indeed, while nonsymbolic 
numerical magnitudes are likely processed using an evolutionarily ancient analogue 
magnitude system, where the ratio of the stimuli’s intensity affects performance (Weber’s 
law) (Moyer & Landauer, 1967) the processing of symbols is likely supported by a 
different more exact system.  A proposed system that may support symbolic numerical 
magnitudes is the discrete semantic system (DSS) (Krajcsi et al., 2016). In a DSS, 
symbolic numerical magnitudes are stored within a large semantic network, with each 
symbolic numerical magnitude acting as a node within that network.  A DSS would 
produce a ‘distance effect’ because the strength of the associations between symbolic 
numerical magnitudes (i.e., nodes) would correlate with the strength of the semantic 
relations between the numbers (Krajcsi, 2017; Krajcsi et al., 2016). Evidence that 
symbolic numerical magnitudes may be supported by a DSS rather than an approximate 
magnitude system has accumulated both behaviourally (Krajcsi et al., 2016, 2018) and at 
the neural level of analysis (Lyons & Beilock, 2018). Data from the current study cannot 
discern between various theories predicting what representations might underpin 
symbolic compared to nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes. However, these data do 
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provide support for the growing body of evidence indicating that there are striking 
differences in the way that symbols and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are 
effortfully processed. 
The results from the current study provide some evidence to suggest that there may be an 
asymmetry between symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes in the way that 
distance modulates the influence of the irrelevant dimension. In experiment 1, distance 
affects the influence of irrelevant quantities during the symbolic comparison more than 
distance modulates the influence of irrelevant symbols during the nonsymbolic 
comparison task. More specifically, numerical distance most strongly affects the 
processing of symbolic numerical magnitudes when the magnitude of the symbol and the 
quantity are congruent, suggesting that the influence of the congruent quantity may, in 
fact, be responsible for the distance effect.  Interestingly, previous research that has 
examined whether distance influences the performance on nonsymbolic naming tasks and 
tasks that require participant to refer to a symbolic referent revealed that when the 
symbols were numerically close to the quantity that the participants had to verbally name, 
there was a larger interference effect (Furman & Rubinsten, 2012; Naparstek & Henik, 
2010, 2012; Pavese & Umiltà, 1998, 1999).  Critically, in experiment 2, where only 
numbers in the counting range were included, distance does not significantly modulate 
the automatic processing of symbols or nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes. Instead, 
symbols influenced the processing of quantities more than quantities influenced the 
processing of symbols across all distances.  In view of this, the current data suggest that 
numerical distance does not influence the automatic processing of magnitude, for 
numbers in the counting range. This null effect of distance on the automatic processing of 
magnitude in the counting range may be due to the fact that by reducing the range of 
numbers included, we removed conditions where the effect of distance on the automatic 
processing of symbols and quantities diverged. Indeed, the three-way interaction from 
experiment 1 was driven by the difference between automatic processing of symbols and 
quantities at distance 4, 5 and 6. This suggests that distance may differentially relate to 
automatic processing of symbols compared to quantities, but only in conditions where the 
two numbers being compared have a large numerical distance and include magnitudes 
both in the subitizing and counting range.  This finding, that distance did not modulate 
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the degree to which quantities influence the processing of symbols, in the counting range, 
provides further evidence that nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes do not influence the 
processing of numerical symbols. Indeed, even quantities with the strongest salience (i.e., 
quantities with large distances), in the counting range, do not influence effortful symbolic 
number processing. Together, this research provides compelling evidence that symbols 
and quantities are processed using similar, but ultimately distinct processing systems. 
4.4.5 Interpretations and Future Directions 
Taken together, our results provide strong evidence for asymmetrical processing of 
symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes. Specifically, when we process 
nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes, symbolic representations have an influence. 
However, when we process symbolic magnitudes, nonsymbolic representations of 
numerical magnitudes have a negligible effect.   A predominant view in the field of 
numerical cognition has been that symbolic number representations are formed by simply 
attaching symbols to analogue nonsymbolic quantity representations (e.g., Cantlon, 2012; 
Dehaene, 2007, 2008; Feigenson, 2007; Lyons & Ansari, 2009; Nieder & Dehaene, 2009; 
Piazza, Pinel, Le Bihan, & Dehaene, 2007).  In recent years, it has been suggested that 
number symbols constitute a separate system in which processing symbols can be done 
independently from accessing nonsymbolic representations of the quantities the symbols 
represent.  Instead, symbols may be understood based on their associations with other 
symbols (For a comprehensive review see, Núñez, 2017).  This view has been supported 
by recent behavioural and neuroimaging research, including chapters 2 and 3 of the 
current thesis, that reports that processing of symbolic numbers is at least somewhat 
distinct from processing quantities (Bulthé et al., 2014; Cohen Kadosh, 2008; Lyons et 
al., 2012, 2014; Lyons & Beilock, 2018). The finding from the current study, that 
symbols are processed more automatically than the quantities that they represent provides 
evidence that supports the notion that symbols may not simply be labels for pre-existing 
representations of quantities.  Indeed, the findings from the current study suggest that the 
human mind does not need to access a representation of a nonsymbolic numerical 
magnitude to automatically process the semantic meaning of a number symbol.  Instead, 
data from the current study provides evidence in support of the theory that symbols may 
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themselves be supported by culturally acquired automatic semantic representations 
(Lyons & Beilock, 2018; Núñez, 2017).  This convergent body of evidence that suggests 
that adults process symbols more automatically than nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes, 
introduces an important developmental question.  Namely, it is of great importance to 
learn how symbols are learned, and when in development symbols become automatic.  A 
longstanding question in the field of numerical cognition has been, ‘how do symbols 
acquire meaning?’ However, based on this data, an equally important follow-up question 
is ‘when does the symbolic system become independent?’ The use of the Symbolic-
Nonsymbolic Stroop task in a developmental sample is ideally suited to answer this 
question, as it can be used to illuminate how the representational precision (i.e., distance 
effects) of symbols and quantities at different levels of processing (i.e., effortful and 
automatic) change, and likely diverge, across developmental time.  
4.4.6 Conclusions 
In order to further our understanding of the association between evolutionary ancient, 
nonsymbolic representations of numerical magnitudes and culturally constructed 
symbolic representations, the current study examined whether the effortful and the 
automatic processing of symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are the same 
or distinct using a Symbolic-Nonsymbolic Stroop paradigm. Results revealed that 
regardless of the task, participants were more efficient at making comparisons when the 
two stimulus dimensions were congruent compared to incongruent. This is could be taken 
to suggest that at some stage of processing symbolic and nonsymbolic numbers are 
processed in parallel; however, due to the fact that the interaction terms are significant, 
this finding should be interpreted with caution. Interaction effects from the current study 
revealed asymmetries in both the automatic and effortful processing of symbolic and 
nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes. The key finding from the current study is that 
symbols influenced nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing more than 
nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes influenced the processing of numerical symbols.  
This highlights that there is an asymmetry in the way that the human mind processes 
symbols and quantities. Further support for this idea that symbols and quantities are 
processed distinctly is that the effortful processing of symbols was more efficient and less 
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affected by numerical distance than quantities. Additionally, numerical distance 
modulated nonsymbolic interference more than it modulated symbolic interference when 
including all numbers (1-9). However, numerical distance did not influence the automatic 
interference of symbols or quantities for numbers in the counting range. These data 
provide support for the idea that there is an asymmetry in the way that humans process 
symbolic compared to nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes, even during non-effortful, 
automatic processing. Together, these findings, that symbols are processed more 
automatically than numerically equivalent nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes, suggests 
that processing symbols do not require accessing a representation of quantity. Instead, it 
seems that the human mind has the capacity to automatically process the semantic 
meaning of a number symbol.  These findings contribute to efforts to forge a deeper 
understanding of how the mind forms a symbolic number processing system that is 
independent of the approximate, analogue magnitudes that the symbols represent.  
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Chapter 5  
5 Children’s Verbal Number Knowledge Influences Their 
Attention to Numerical Quantity 
5.1 Introduction 
5.1.1 Learning Verbal Number Words 
The ability to count a set of objects is a foundational skill that supports many 
mathematical concepts and procedures. The process of learning to count involves 
learning the number words sequence (Fuson, Richards, & Briars, 1982) and acquiring 
several key principles of counting (Gelman & Gallistel, 1978). It typically takes children 
several years to master counting skills. At roughly two years of age, children have 
learned the count sequence by rote, but do not yet understand the meaning of these verbal 
number words (Wynn, 1990; Wynn, 1992). It typically takes children two to three years 
from the time they master the count list to acquire the cardinal principle, namely the 
understanding that the last number counted when counting a set, refers to the total 
number of objects within that set (Gelman & Gallistel, 1978). Children who do not know 
the cardinal meaning of any number words are referred to as “pre-knowers.” Following 
this, children learn the exact number word meanings of small numbers (i.e., numbers 1-4) 
in predictable stages before they acquire the cardinal principle (Wynn, 1992).  Children 
who know the meaning of the word one are referred to as “one-knowers.” Several months 
later, children progress to being “two-knowers”.  Over time, children become “three-
knowers” and some studies report the presence of “four-knowers.” Children who know 
the meaning of the verbal number words one to four, but not the cardinal principle, are 
collectively referred to as “subset-knowers”. Cardinal Principle knowers (CP-knowers) 
are qualitatively different from subset knowers in that they can generate cardinality for all 
numbers using their knowledge of the cardinal principle (Le Corre & Carey, 2007). It is 
only once children have acquired the cardinal principle that they are considered to 
understand the meaning of number words. The acquisition of the cardinal principle is a 
major milestone in forming numerical understanding and predicts later mathematical 
abilities (Geary et al., 2018). 
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5.1.2 Linking Number Words to Quantities 
It has been heavily debated whether acquiring the cardinal principle is a cause or a 
consequence of the ability to process nonsymbolic quantities (e.g., Batchelor, Keeble, & 
Gilmore, 2015; Dehaene, 2007; Gunderson et al., 2015; Le Corre & Carey, 2007; Mix, 
1999, 2008; Mussolin, Nys, Leybaert, & Content, 2014; Negen & Sarnecka, 2015; 
Shusterman et al., 2016, 2017; Slusser & Sarnecka, 2011; Slusser, Ditta, & Sarnecka, 
2013; Wagner & Johnson, 2011). Previous studies have shown that children who have 
acquired the cardinal principle are more successful than pre-knowers and subset-knowers 
in several nonsymbolic number tasks (Abreu-Mendoza, Soto-Alba, & Arias-Trejo, 2013; 
Mussolin, Nys, Content, Leybaert, & Leybaert, 2014; Shusterman et al., 2016; Wagner & 
Johnson, 2011).  For example, pre-school aged children’s knowledge of the cardinal 
principle related to their ability to discriminate between arrays of quantities (Wagner & 
Johnson, 2011). Similarly, when asked to sort cards based on colour, shape and 
quantities, all children could sort based on colour and shape, but only CP-knowers were 
able to sort based on quantity (Slusser & Sarnecka, 2011). Critically, other research has 
hinted at the idea that some children are able to link verbal number words onto small sets, 
even before they have acquired the cardinal principle (Le Corre & Carey, 2007). 
Specifically, some children are able to map between nonsymbolic quantities and the 
number words that they stood for, even if they do not yet grasp the cardinal principle 
more generally (Batchelor, Keeble, et al., 2015; Mix, 1999, 2008). Notably, due to small 
sample sizes, the majority of studies that assess the relation between verbal number 
knowledge and nonsymbolic quantity processing collapse across knower-level groups 
(Batchelor et al., 2015; Le Corre & Carey, 2007; Mix, 2008; Negen & Sarnecka, 2015; 
Sarnecka & Wright, 2013; Shusterman et al., 2017; Slusser et al., 2013). This solution 
may mask important differences within a heterogeneous group. Despite this, researchers 
have concluded that there is indeed a link between verbal number knowledge and 
nonsymbolic quantity processing, but it remains unknown whether it is learning 
individual verbal number words or acquiring knowledge of the cardinal principle that 
drives this link.  
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Regardless, the existence of the link between verbal number knowledge and nonsymbolic 
quantity processing has recently been questioned.  Tightly controlled experimental 
studies indicate that verbal number word knowledge and nonsymbolic numerical abilities 
may be correlated because some experimental designs inadvertently allow children to 
correctly identify which of two arrays of two dots is more numerous by estimating the 
amount of surface area the dots take up rather than identifying the quantity of dots 
(Negen & Sarnecka, 2015; Rousselle, 2004). Indeed, the correlation between verbal 
number knowledge and nonsymbolic quantity processing disappears when the task 
includes a control that does not allow children to rely on cues from non-numerical 
magnitudes (such as the amount of surface area taken up by the dots) (Negen & Sarnecka, 
2015). An example of a task that controls for non-numerical magnitudes in a task with 
nonsymbolic stimuli that includes conditions where a relatively smaller quantity of dots 
occupies a greater amount of surface area. In view of this, it is conceivable that non-
numerical magnitudes, such as physical size, may be more salient features of sets than 
quantity for young children. In the current study, we aim to address the questions: ‘do 
young children attend to quantity or size?’ and ‘does children’s learning of number words 
affect whether children attend to number or size?’ 
Importantly, this finding, that forcing children to compare dots using quantity (rather than 
non-numerical cues) leads to chance performance across knower-levels, suggests that 
preschool-aged children may not yet have a clear concept of what ‘quantity’ is, and 
therefore may not understand the instruction to ‘choose the side with more dots’.  This is 
concerning because the vast majority of studies that have examined the link between 
verbal number knowledge and nonsymbolic number processing in young children have 
used tasks in which children are explicitly asked to compare quantities (e.g., Abreu-
Mendoza et al., 2013; Batchelor et al., 2015; Dehaene, 2007; Gunderson et al., 2015; Le 
Corre & Carey, 2007; Mix, 1999, 2008; Mussolin, Nys, Leybaert, et al., 2014; Negen & 
Sarnecka, 2015; Shusterman et al., 2016, 2017; Slusser & Sarnecka, 2011; Slusser et al., 
2013; Wagner & Johnson, 2011).  A relatively smaller body of research has developed 
and used non-directive number tasks to assess individual differences in the degree to 
which children spontaneously focus their attention on quantities (SFON) (Baroody & Li, 
2016; Baroody, Li, & Lai, 2008; Hannula & Lehtinen, 2005; Hannula, Räsänen, & 
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Lehtinen, 2007). In these studies, the term “spontaneous” refers to the idea that the 
process of focusing on quantity is un-cued by an experimenter and therefore self-
initiated. The use of SFON-like paradigms overcomes a key limitation within this large 
body of literature, namely that experimenters cannot know for certain whether a child 
understands the instruction to choose the array with the greater numerosity. Additionally, 
SFON-style tasks have the advantage that it is possible to compare the degree to which 
children attend to quantity, to related dimensions (such as physical size). Consequently, 
the use of a SFON-like paradigm is ideal to assess 1) whether children spontaneously 
attend to quantity or physical size, and 2) evaluate whether verbal number knowledge 
affects the degree to which children attend to quantity vs. physical size. 
5.1.3 The Current Study 
Recent theories predict that acquiring verbal number knowledge may change the way 
children attend to discrete quantities in their environment (Barner, 2017; Merkley & 
Ansari, 2016), but this has not yet been tested empirically. Therefore, the goal of the 
current study is to investigate how number word knowledge relates to the way children 
spontaneously attend to number and size. To do so, we developed the train task, a task 
that can be used to investigate whether preschool-aged children attend to discrete quantity 
or physical size, without being cued to either. The train task is a SFON-like paradigm that 
requires a child to build a train that is the “same” as a train built by the experimenter. In 
the train task, the child and the experimenter have sets of blocks that differ in length. 
These blocks are used to build trains with varied numbers of cars. Therefore, the child is 
only able to make a train that matches the experimenter’s train based on either the 
number of cars or the length of the train, but not both. The train task was developed and 
used to measure whether children use a number strategy or a physical size strategy on a 
matching task when they are not explicitly cued to either strategy. The second question 
that the current study examines is how verbal number word knowledge relates to the use 
of number and size strategies on the train task. Examining the relation between verbal 
number knowledge and use of a number, compared to a size strategy on the train task, 
addresses the key question of whether having a symbolic referent in a child’s mind 
affects the degree to which he or she attends to number. 
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We anticipated four distinct possible outcomes for the way that children may respond to 
the train task. The first is that all children will use a number strategy, regardless of verbal 
number knowledge. This idea is supported by research suggesting that children are born 
with an innate number sense and automatically perceive discrete numerosity (Dehaene, 
2007).  In direct contrast is the prediction that all children will use a size strategy 
regardless of verbal number knowledge. This is supported by the notion that non-
numerical magnitudes may be more salient to young children than discrete quantities 
(Henik, Leibovich, Naparstek, Diesendruck, & Rubinsten, 2011; Leibovich et al., 2017; 
Merkley, Thompson, & Scerif, 2016; Negen & Sarnecka, 2015; Szűcs, Nobes, Devine, 
Gabriel, & Gebuis, 2013). The third potential outcome is that CP-knowers will attend to 
number, whereas subset-knowers will attend either to size or neither number nor size. 
This is supported by research suggesting that the acquisition of the cardinal principle 
fundamentally changes the way that children process quantities (Abreu-Mendoza et al., 
2013; Mussolin, Nys, Content, et al., 2014; Wagner & Johnson, 2011). Finally, it is 
possible that acquiring knowledge of each individual number word changes the way that 
children process that particular quantity. For example, a child who knows the meaning of 
the verbal number words one and two might use a number strategy for trains that have 
one or two cars, but not trains with three or more cars. This hypothesis is supported by 
data that suggests that knowing individual symbolic numbers relates to children’s ability 
to attend to those numbers (Batchelor et al., 2015; Slusser & Sarnecka, 2011). In 
summary, this study uses a novel task to investigate the degree that children use number 
and size strategies during an un-cued matching task, and how the acquisition of verbal 
number words affect the degree to which children used these strategies. 
5.2 Methods 
5.2.1 Participants 
One hundred forty children between the ages of 2-2 and 6-0 (years-months) were 
recruited to participate in this study. Of the 140 children whose parents consented for 
their child to participate, three children were excluded because they refused to participate, 
thirteen children were excluded due to failing at least one out of the two practice trials on 
the train task, four children were excluded because their parent or teacher explicitly told 
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them to “count” or “use numbers” while completing the train task, and one child was 
excluded due to being the only pre-knower remaining in the sample. The final dataset 
consisted of 119 children (Meanage = 4.05, SDevage = 0.84; Females = 51, Males = 68; 
Age Range = 2-2-6-0 years).  The non-medical research ethics board at the University of 
Western Ontario approved all procedures (See Appendix A). Written consent and assent 
were obtained from all legal guardians and children. 
This sample size was based on an a priori power analysis, calculated using G*Power 3.1, 
for a split-plot three-way ANOVA examining the effect of knower-level, train length, and 
strategy type on the proportion of strategy use. The parameters used to calculate the 
required sample size include an effect size of 0.25, an alpha error probability of .05, and a 
power of 0.99. This a priori power analysis revealed that the required sample size was 
n=50 with a minimum of 10 participants per knower-level group (1-knower, 2-knower, 3-
knower, 4-knower, CP-knower). One hundred and nineteen participants were collected as 
this was how many children were needed to ensure the smallest group (1-knowers) had 
ten usable participants. 
5.2.2 Materials 
5.2.2.1 The Train Task 
The train task is a novel paradigm that measures whether children choose to use a number 
or a size strategy on a matching task when it is not possible to match on both. This task 
required a child to build a train that “matches” a train built by an experimenter. The task 
was played on a premade board, with a premade engine block leading the row of blocks 
for every example. The board contained two parallel train tracks with an engine at the 
front (see Figure 5.1A). There were three sizes of blocks for this task; small (3cm x 3cm 
x 4cm), medium (3cm x 3cm x 6cm) and large (3cm x 3cm x 9cm). All three block sizes 
were the same height and width. The small blocks were two thirds the length of the 
medium blocks and the medium blocks were two thirds the length of the large blocks (see 
Figure 5.1B). During the experiment, the child was given nine medium-sized blocks, and 
the experimenter had two medium-sized blocks, five small blocks, and five large blocks.  
184 
 
 
Figure 5.1 A) Dimensions of the board used for the train task. B) Dimensions of the three 
sizes of blocks used for the train task. 
To begin the task, the experimenter built a train using two medium blocks on his or her 
own side of the board. The experimenter then said “I want you to make your train the 
same as mine. I will show you using your blocks.” The experimenter used two of the 
child’s medium blocks to build the same train (with two blocks behind the engine) on the 
child’s side of the board. The child was then asked, “is your train the same as my train”? 
Once the child acknowledged that the experimenter’s train and their train were the same, 
the experimenter conducted two practice trials. In the first practice trial, the experimenter 
built a train using a single medium block and said, “make your train the same as mine”. 
The child then used his or her blocks to build a train with one block. If the child did not 
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understand the instructions, the experimenter tried one or both of the phrases “make your 
train match mine,” or “make your train just like mine.” In the second practice trial, this 
was repeated using two medium blocks. Subsequently, the experimenter began 
experimental trials. Children who failed one or both practice trials (i.e., did not put one 
block down for the first practice trial and two blocks down for the second practice trial) 
completed the experimental trials but were excluded from analyses.  
The experiment included 20 experimental trials. In each trial, the experimenter made a 
train using one to five blocks that were either all small blocks or all large blocks. The 
experimenter said, “make your train the same as mine.” The child tried to match their 
train to the experimenter’s, using their medium-sized blocks. The child completed the 
task by 1) making his or her train have the same number of blocks as the experimenter’s 
train (i.e., number strategy), 2) making his or her train the same length as the 
experimenter’s train (i.e., size strategy), or 3) making his or her train in a way that does 
not match on number or on length (i.e., incorrect). Once a child finished building each 
train, the experimenter confirmed that the child believed that the trains matched. The 
experimenter did not provide feedback and then began the next trial. 
The 20 trials in the experiment were grouped into four blocks of five trials. Within a 
single block, the five trials included the experimenter building each of five different train 
lengths (one-five). Therefore, there were four trials (one in each block) for each of the 
five train lengths, meaning that a trial with each train length was built once in a block for 
a total of four times in the task. For train length one (i.e., building a train with a single 
block), the experimenter always used the large block. However, trials that include trains 
with a single block (i.e., train length 1) were excluded from analyses because it is not 
possible to tell whether a child is matching based on number or size for this train length.  
For all other train lengths (two-five), experimenters presented two trials using small 
blocks and two trials using large blocks. For example, a train made of four blocks was 
built twice using the small blocks and twice using the large blocks in a completed data 
set. There were four versions of the trial lists in which the order of blocks and the trials 
within the blocks were randomized. Children who completed fewer than 10 trials were 
excluded from analyses. 
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The following formula was used to compute a score to determine the normalized 
frequency of trials a child used a number strategy, and a size strategy for each train length 
(two to five).  
1) 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦 =
 ( 
𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦 𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑑
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑑
) ×
(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡)  
2) 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦 = (
𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦 𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑑
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑑
 ) ×
(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡) 
Below is an example of a calculation to compute the proportion that a child used a 
number strategy for train length of two if he or she completed all four trials and used a 
number strategy on two of the trials. 
=  (
𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦 𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ 2
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ 2
 )
× (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ 2 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡)
=  (
2
4
) ×  4 = 2 
Critically, if a child uses a number strategy for half of the trials, it does not mean that the 
child was at chance. For each trial, children have nine blocks with which to build their 
train. Therefore, the probability of a child using a number strategy by chance for a single 
trial is 1/9.  
5.2.2.2 Give-a-Number Task 
The give-a-number task (Give-N) is a widely used instrument that measures verbal 
symbolic number knowledge (Wynn, 1990). In the current study, the child was presented 
with 10 blocks and was asked to feed some number of these blocks to a finger puppet 
named Dino (who likes to eat blocks), by placing them on a plate. Typically, the 
experimenter says to the child, “can you feed Dino n blocks?” After the child finished 
placing the blocks on the plate the experimenter asked the child a single question: “is that 
n blocks?” If the child said no, the experimenter responded, “Dino really wants n blocks, 
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can you make it n?” This is continued until the child confirmed that he or she believed n 
blocks to be on the plate. The experimenter initiated the trials by asking for one block. If 
the child was successful in feeding Dino one block, then the experimenter asked for three 
blocks. If the child was successful, the experimenter asked for one more block.  If the 
child was unsuccessful, the experimenter asked for one fewer block. The experimenter 
increased or decreased the number of blocks in this way until the child correctly gave a 
certain number of blocks (n blocks) twice, and incorrectly n + 1 blocks twice. The 
knower-level of the child was inferred as the highest number that the child correctly gave 
twice. For example, a child who correctly fed Dino three blocks twice and incorrectly fed 
Dino when asked for four blocks twice was considered a three-knower. Children who 
correctly gave five or more blocks at least twice were considered cardinal-principle 
knowers.  
5.2.3 Procedure   
All participants were recruited through preschools, daycares, schools and family care 
centres in London, Ontario. The participants worked individually with an experimenter to 
complete the tasks. All participants first completed the train task to avoid any potential 
biases or priming of numbers that were present in the Give-N task. Participants were 
randomly assigned the trial order version for the train task. Following the completion of 
the train task, experimenters performed the Give-N task with the participant to assess 
knower-level of a child. The participants completed an additional two short assessments 
that were not analyzed for the current study. These two tasks included 1) children were 
asked to count as high as they could, and 2) children completed a basic instruction 
following task where the experimenter asked the children to touch their head or their toes 
eight times in a random order. The entire session took approximately 30 minutes. All 
participants received a certificate and stickers at the end of the testing session.  
5.3 Results 
The present study examined whether verbal symbolic number knowledge is related to the 
type of strategy used in the train task across four of the five different train lengths. 
Notably, for train length one, responding with a single block means that the participant 
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and experimenter’s trains matched in both size and number. Therefore, trials with train 
length “one” were excluded from all analyses. The give-N task was used to determine 
each participant’s verbal symbolic number knowledge (i.e., knower-level). Of the 119 
children who participated in the study, 10 children were one-knowers, 14 were two-
knowers, 19 were three-knowers, 13 were four-knowers, and 63 were cardinal principle 
knowers (CP-knowers). The train task was used to determine the degree to which 
children spontaneously used a number strategy and size strategy. Each participant had 10 
scores from the train task.  Specifically, five scores were given for the proportion of a 
number strategy used for each of five train lengths, and five scores were given for the 
proportion of a size strategy used for each of five train lengths.  
A three-way split-plot analysis of variance (ANOVA) was computed to examine how the 
proportion of number and size strategies used at different train lengths relates to knower-
level. The within-subject variables were strategy (number vs. size) and train length (2 
blocks, 3 blocks, 4 blocks, 5 blocks). The between-subject variable was knower-level (1-
knower, 2-knower, 3-knower, 4-knower, CP-knower).  
Levene’s test of homogeneity of variance was performed on each level of the between-
subjects factor to assess the equality of variances between the means of the groups. The 
Levene’s test for the proportion of number used at train length three F(4, 114) = 3.96, p = 
.005, and four F(4, 114) = 3.74, p = .007 and proportion of size used at train length two 
F(4, 114) = 4.44, p = .002, were significant. The Levene’s test of equality of variance for 
the proportion of number used at train lengths 2, and 5, and for the proportion of size 
used at train lengths 3, 4, and 5, were not significant. Mauchly’s test of sphericity 
revealed that the current data violated the assumption of sphericity for both train-length, 
W = .79, X2 = 26.09, p = <001, Greenhouse-Geisser = .89, and the interaction between 
strategy and train-length W = .79, X2 =26.73, p = <.001, Greenhouse-Geisser = .86. 
Therefore, all subsequent analyses are reported using Greenhouse-Geisser adjusted 
values. 
An examination of the main effect of strategy is used to distinguish between hypothesis 1 
and 2, namely whether children are more likely to use a number strategy or a size strategy 
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across train lengths and knower-levels. Results revealed a significant main effect of 
strategy, F(1, 114) = 4.87, p = 0.03, partial η2 = 0.04, that indicated that children of all 
knower-levels used a number strategy (Mean = 1.53, Standard Error = 1.08) more often 
than they used a size strategy (Mean = 1.10, Standard Error = 0.10) across all train 
length trials (Figure 5.2). This supports the idea that in general children are more likely to 
use a number strategy over a size strategy.   
 
Figure 5.2 A) Main effect of strategy.  Children use a number strategy significantly more 
than a size strategy *p<.05. 
The two-way interaction examining whether the use of a number strategy over a size 
strategy is modulated by knower-level was used to measure whether verbal number 
knowledge related to strategy use (hypothesis 3).  Results revealed that the interaction 
between strategy and knower-level was not significant F(4, 114) = 1.55, ns. This suggests 
that across train lengths, there is no effect of knower-level on strategy use.   
Therefore, an examination of the three-way interaction was used to assess whether the 
use of a number strategy over a size strategy at different train lengths differs as a function 
of knowledge of each individual number word (hypothesis 3).  The 3-way interaction 
*
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between strategy, train length and knower-level was significant F(10, 293) = 4.56, p = 
<.001, η2 = 0.138, (Figure 5.3). This finding reveals that train length influenced whether 
children were more likely to use a number strategy or a size strategy differently at each 
knower-level. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons with a Bonferroni correction for multiple 
comparisons were included to examine simple main effects. For one-knowers, there was 
no significant difference between the use of a number strategy and length strategy at any 
train length. Two-knowers used a number strategy more than a size strategy for train 
length two (p = .001), but there was no significant difference for train lengths three, or 
four. Two-knowers used a size strategy more than a number strategy for train length five 
(p = 0.018). Three-knowers used a number strategy more than a size strategy at train 
lengths two (p <.001), and three (p = .008) but there was no significant difference in 
strategy use for train length four or five. Four-knowers also used a number strategy more 
than a size strategy at train lengths two (p <.001), and three (p = .024), but not train 
length four. Four-knowers used a size strategy significantly more than a number strategy 
for train length five (p < .001). CP-knowers used a number strategy more than a size 
strategy at train lengths two (p < .001), and three (p < .001). There was no significant 
difference in strategy use for CP-knowers on train length four. CP-knowers used a size 
strategy significantly more than a number strategy for train length five (p < .001). These 
results suggest that children who are one-knowers, two-knowers and three-knowers were 
more likely to use a number strategy for train lengths within their knower-level. 
Additionally, all children except 1-knowers and 3-knowers used a size strategy 
significantly more than a number strategy for train length five. Notably, four-knowers 
and CP-knowers displayed similar patterns of strategy use to three-knowers in that they 
were more likely to use a number strategy than a size strategy for train lengths two and 
three.  
Therefore, this significant three-way interaction indicates that acquiring knowledge of 
each individual number word changes the way that a child processes that particular 
number, particularly for small numbers (two and three).  For example, two-knowers are 
more likely to use a number strategy for trains that have two blocks but not trains with 
three or more blocks.  
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Figure 5.3 Three-way interaction of strategy by knower-level by train-length. Children 
are more likely to use a number strategy when building a train where the length of the 
train is within their knower-level.  *p<.05, **p<.001.  
There were several main effects and two-way interactions that did not correspond to the 
hypotheses presented in the introduction but are reported here for completeness. 
Specifically, there was a significant main effect of knower-level, F(4, 114) = 29.30, p = 
0
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<.001, partial η2 = 0.51, which showed that use of a strategy (number or size) increased 
as knower-level increased. The main effect for the length of train was also significant 
F(3, 305) = 28.24, p <.001, partial η2 = 0.20, revealing that the use of any strategy 
(number and size) decreased as train lengths increased. The two-way interaction between 
train length and knower-level was not significant F(11, 275) = 1.33, ns, indicating that 
there is no difference in the degree to which children use either strategy (number or size) 
across train lengths and between knower-levels.  Finally, the two-way interaction 
between strategy and train length was significant F(3, 293) = 68.29, p <.001, partial η2 = 
0.38, revealing that the use of a number strategy compared to a size strategy differed 
depending on the length of the train being built across all children. Post-hoc pairwise 
comparisons with a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons revealed that children 
used a number strategy significantly more than a size strategy for train length 2 (p <.001), 
and 3 (p = .001). There was no difference in the use of a number vs. a size strategy for 
train length 4. Children used a size strategy significantly more than a number strategy for 
train length 5 (p <.001) (Figure 5.4). This finding suggests that children’s strategy use is 
dependent on the length of the train they are matching, across all knower-levels. 
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Figure 5.4 Two-way interaction of strategy by train-length. Children are more likely to 
use a number strategy when building a train with a length of two or three blocks. 
Children and are more likely to use a size strategy when building a train with a length of 
five blocks.  *p<.05, **p<.001. 
As knower-level is often correlated with age, an additional control analysis was 
computed to determine whether the effects from the previous analysis were driven by 
knower-level and not by age. A three-way split-plot analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) 
was computed to examine how the proportion of number and size strategies used at 
different train lengths relates to knower-level while controlling for age. The within and 
between-subject variables were the same as the ANOVA reported above for strategy 
(number vs. size), train length (2 blocks, 3 blocks, 4 blocks, 5 blocks), and knower-level 
(1-knower, 2-knower, 3-knower, 4-knower, CP-knower). The covariate was age. Results 
from this control analysis revealed that all effects from the original three-way split-plot 
ANOVA were unchanged when age was included as a covariate.  
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In sum, the results from experiment 1 support those proposed in outcome four, namely 
that learning verbal number words changes the way that children engage with numerical 
quantities in the environment, but only for small quantities (i.e., train length two and 
three).  For trains with five cars, most participants used a size strategy more than a 
number strategy.  
5.4 Discussion 
The current study examined a) whether children attend to number or physical size when 
not explicitly cued to either and b) whether verbal number knowledge influences strategy 
choice on a novel matching task. In view of previous research, we anticipated four 
distinct potential outcomes for how children would respond to the train task. First, as 
supported by research suggesting that children are born with an innate number sense 
(e.g., Dehaene, 2007), it was possible that all children would use a number strategy, 
regardless of verbal number knowledge. In direct contrast, research highlighting the 
salience of continuous magnitudes to young children (e.g., Leibovich et al., 2017) 
supports the outcome that all children would use a size strategy, regardless of verbal 
number knowledge. It was also possible that children who have acquired the cardinal 
principle would attend to number, whereas children who have not yet acquired the 
cardinal principle would attend either to size or neither number nor size.  Indeed, this 
prediction was supported by the replicable finding that the acquisition of the cardinal 
principle fundamentally changes the way that children process quantities (Abreu-
Mendoza et al., 2013; Mussolin, Nys, Content, et al., 2014; Wagner & Johnson, 2011). 
Our fourth and final anticipated outcome was that verbal number knowledge of each 
individual number word would change how a child processed that particular quantity.  
Results broadly aligned with outcome one, namely, that children used a number strategy 
more than a size strategy (with the exception of trains with five cars, where children used 
a size strategy more than a number strategy). However, the degree to which children used 
a number strategy more than a size strategy increased as a function of children’s 
knowledge of the cardinality of the count word that corresponded to the number of blocks 
in the train that they were instructed to match, specifically for small quantities. This 
suggests that, as proposed in outcome four, learning verbal number words that correspond 
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to small quantities changes the way that children engage with numerical quantities in the 
environment. Specifically, number symbols may be a tool for guiding children’s 
behaviour on a task in which number and size are in conflict.  
5.4.1 Learning Verbal Number Words Changes Attention and 
Behaviour 
 Although there is a main effect demonstrating that children use a number strategy 
more than a size strategy to complete the train task, this effect is further modulated by the 
individual child’s number word knowledge. In particular, children’s use of a number 
strategy over a size strategy increased as knower-level increased, particularly for small 
numbers (i.e., quantities two and three). This highlights that greater knowledge of verbal 
number words corresponds to greater use of a number strategy, particularly for small 
numbers. The current study uses a SFON-like task to examine the effect of verbal number 
knowledge on spontaneously attending to numerical quantities. Previous research has 
shown that children’s verbal number knowledge relates to explicit nonsymbolic number 
processing abilities (e.g., Le Corre & Carey, 2007; Mix, 1999, 2008). Indeed, when 
explicitly cued, subset-knowers (i.e., children with some verbal number word knowledge, 
but who have not yet learned the cardinal principle), can map small numbers (e.g., 1-4) to 
quantities (Le Corre & Carey, 2007). Relatedly, subset-knowers were able to make 
magnitude comparisons between dot arrays and verbal number words if they understood 
the meaning of those verbal number words (Batchelor, Keeble, et al., 2015). Subset-
knowers can also successfully judge numerical equivalence of small quantities (Mix, 
1999, 2008), and have some basic understanding that number words pertain to discrete, 
but not continuous quantities (Slusser et al., 2013). This research suggests that children 
can link small number words to the quantities before they have acquired the cardinal 
principle. The present findings build on this research, to evaluate whether children who 
can link verbal number words to quantities actually use this knowledge in a non-directed 
task.  
Findings from the SFON literature reveal that spontaneously attending to quantities 
correlates with symbolic number abilities. Specifically, individual differences in SFON 
predict counting ability (Hannula et al., 2007) as well as subsequent mathematical 
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knowledge (Batchelor, Inglis, & Gilmore, 2015; Hannula & Lehtinen, 2005; Nanu, 
McMullen, Munck, Hannula-Sormunen, & Hannula-Sormunen, 2018).  Critically, 
previous SFON research has assessed counting using measures of procedural abilities.  
Moreover, while previous SFON studies include dimensions aside from number (such as 
colour or shape), these dimensions are not inherently correlated with quantity processing 
like size.  By using a SFON-like task where participants can use number or size, and 
including a measure of conceptual verbal number knowledge, rather than procedural 
verbal number knowledge, we discovered that children who have verbal number 
knowledge, choose to use a strategy that relies on this knowledge for small numbers. This 
finding suggests that children use their number word knowledge even when they have not 
been cued to use it and when there is another strategy (size) available to solve the 
problem. Specifically, the findings revealed that one-knowers, two-knowers and three-
knowers are more likely to use a number strategy than a size strategy if the child knows 
the verbal number word that corresponds to the number of blocks in the train. For 
example, a two-knower was more likely to use a number strategy than a size strategy for 
trains with one block or two blocks, but not for trains with three, four or five blocks. 
However, This finding significantly extends previous research that has highlighted that 
children can link quantities to verbal number words for which they have learned the 
meaning (Batchelor, Keeble, et al., 2015). Specifically, the present data reveal that 
children are more likely to use a number strategy when building a train where the length 
of the train is within their knower level.   
 As previously discussed, the null finding that children do not use a number 
strategy for trains with quantities above their knower-level does not necessarily mean that 
children are unable to process quantities for which they do not yet know the label. In 
other words, the current data cannot speak to whether children perceive number. Indeed, 
it has been reported that infants have the ability to track one to three objects using the 
parallel individuation (PI) system (Feigenson & Carey, 2003, 2005; Xu, 2003). This data 
suggests that preschool-aged children who do not yet know their number words could 
complete the task by matching quantity using the PI system, but they do not do so. The 
current study measured children’s behaviour, and specifically, the frequency with which 
children use number to guide their behaviour. Consequently, the term ‘attends’, in this 
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context, refers to the degree to which children use a number strategy. Therefore, the 
results from the current study align with outcome four to suggest that the acquisition of a 
semantic label (i.e., a verbal number word) strengthens the degree to which a child 
accesses and uses their conceptual knowledge of exact quantity to guide their behaviour 
in a situation that does not explicitly require them to integrate that knowledge into their 
behaviour. 
5.4.2 Acquisition of the Cardinal Principle 
The third potential outcome predicted for the current study was that children who have 
acquired the cardinal principle would attend to number, whereas children who have not 
yet acquired the cardinal principle would attend either to size or neither number nor size. 
This hypothesis is supported by research suggesting that the acquisition of the cardinal 
principle fundamentally changes the way that children process quantities (Abreu-
Mendoza et al., 2013; Mussolin, Nys, Content, et al., 2014; Slusser & Sarnecka, 2011; 
Wagner & Johnson, 2011). For example, ability to approximately estimate which of two 
quantities has more dots on an ‘approximate number task’ has been linked to the 
acquisition of the cardinal principle (Mussolin, Nys, Content, et al., 2014; Wagner & 
Johnson, 2011). Knowledge of the cardinal principle has also been associated with 
children’s ability to be fair (i.e., share equally) (Chernyak, Harris, & Cordes, 2018) and 
successfully extend number words from one set to another based on quantity.  This body 
of research suggests that the acquisition of the cardinal principle fundamentally changes 
the way children conceptualize quantities. Results from the current study conflict with 
this conclusion. Indeed, our findings suggest that it is not becoming a cardinal principle-
knower that changes the way children attend to quantity, but instead, learning individual 
numbers (i.e., shifting from a 1-knower to a 2-knower) relates to changes in the way 
children approach the train task. Moreover, children who know some numbers (e.g., four-
knowers) but have not yet acquired the cardinal principle, produce a pattern of results that 
aligns more closely with CP-knowers than children who are just beginning to learn 
number words (i.e., one-knowers). Thus, the current study indicates that it is the process 
of acquiring labels for representations of quantities (i.e., verbal number words), rather 
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than acquiring knowledge of the cardinal principle, that relates to changes the way that 
children attend to quantity in the absence of explicit cues.   
Many previous studies that examined verbal number knowledge had small sample sizes 
in each knower-level group (Batchelor, Keeble, et al., 2015; Le Corre & Carey, 2007; 
Mix, 2008; Negen & Sarnecka, 2015; Sarnecka & Carey, 2008; Sarnecka & Wright, 
2013; Shusterman et al., 2017, 2016; Wagner & Johnson, 2011). To overcome power 
issues, researchers grouped together knower-level groups in several small groups (e.g., 1 
and 2-knowers vs. 3 and 4-knowers)  (Batchelor et al., 2015; Le Corre & Carey, 2007; 
Sarnecka & Carey, 2008) or one large group (i.e., subset-knowers vs. CP-knowers) (Mix, 
2008; Negen & Sarnecka, 2015; Sarnecka & Wright, 2013; Shusterman et al., 2017) for 
statistical analyses. Results from the current study highlight that learning each verbal 
number word influences the way that children attend to quantities. This indicates that a 
group of “subset-knowers” is a heterogeneous group. In view of this, future research that 
explores differences between knower-level groups should acquire a large enough sample 
size to analyze each knower-level group separately.   
5.4.3 Two-Systems of Nonsymbolic Cognition 
When examining the patterns of results from the current study, it is important to note that 
most children use a size strategy more than a number strategy on trains with five blocks. 
Indeed, the complete pattern of results from the current study reveal that children use a 
number strategy more than a size strategy for small quantities (i.e., up to three) if they 
know the corresponding verbal number word, number and size strategies are used equally 
frequently for trains with four blocks, and a size strategy is used more than a number 
strategy on trains with five blocks.  
A possible explanation for why children might consistently be using a size strategy more 
than a number strategy for trains with longer lengths (i.e., five blocks), is that children 
may be using two distinct systems to process small and large train lengths. It has been 
suggested that humans have two systems that represent nonsymbolic quantities (for 
review see, Hyde, 2011). These systems include 1) the parallel individuation system (PI), 
used to track objects in order to process the exact amount of small sets of objects (i.e., 
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quantities of one-four), and 2) the approximate number system (ANS), which uses 
approximate estimation to process larger quantities (i.e., quantities greater than four). 
Here we speculate that perhaps children are more likely to use a number strategy for 
trains with a small number of cars because they can track the exact number of cars in the 
train using parallel individuation. In contrast, a size strategy is perhaps the more salient 
strategy for trains with a greater number of blocks because these trains are processed 
using approximate estimation. Indeed, as trains with larger lengths have more items than 
can be processed using the PI system, the quantity of blocks in the trains can be 
processed using either automatic estimation or effortful counting. Therefore, we speculate 
that perhaps CP-knowers do not use a number strategy for long train lengths because an 
approximate size-based strategy aligns more closely with the system used to process the 
train.  
5.4.4 Flexibility of Strategy 
The finding that CP-knowers use a size strategy for trains with five cars, even when they 
know the verbal number word for five aligns with a related body of work that reveals that 
young children are more exploratory in their behaviour than are adults (Gopnik, 1996; 
Gopnik, Griffiths, & Lucas, 2015; Gopnik et al., 2017; Gopnik & Wellman, 2012; 
Plebanek & Sloutsky, 2017). Younger children outperform older children on learning 
tasks such as remembering information that the experimenter did not cue the participant 
to attend to, (Plebanek & Sloutsky, 2017; Sloutsky & Fisher, 2004) and learning atypical 
abstract causal principles from patterns of evidence (Gopnik et al., 2015). Authors of 
these studies have suggested that younger minds are intrinsically more flexible, and 
consequently more exploratory. It is perhaps for this reason that data from the current 
study revealed that children use a size strategy for a particular trial type when they likely 
have the ability to use a number strategy for that trial type.  
In view of this, it is logical that children who know their verbal number words will be 
able to flexibly switch between a number strategy and size strategy, depending on which 
strategy is optimal to solve the problem.  We discuss above that a number strategy may 
be more challenging to use for trains with five cars, as quantities with five or more 
objects are supported by the ANS, rather than the PI system.  However, a size strategy 
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may also be a less cognitively demanding strategy to solve the problem for trains with 
five cars because trains number and size are correlated.  This means that, in order to 
match a train on quantity, the participant must inhibit the fact that the two trains are 
different lengths and trains with more cars differ more in length. Critically, size has been 
reported to influence attention even when it is the irrelevant dimension (i.e., when 
participants are told to ignore the size of an object) (Henik & Tzelgov, 1982; Henik, 
Gliksman, Kallai, & Leibovich, 2017; Leibovich, Diesendruck, Rubinsten, & Henik, 
2013).  In the train task, although the size of the child’s individual blocks consistently 
differs from the experimenter’s blocks at a ratio of 2 cm to 3 cm, the absolute length of 
the train is inherently related to the number of blocks included in the train (Leibovich & 
Henik, 2013). For example, in a trial where the experimenter uses large blocks (length 9 
cm) and the child uses medium blocks (length 6cm), the absolute length of a train with 
two blocks would be 12 cm for the child and 18 cm for the experimenter (i.e., the 
absolute length difference is 6 cm). In contrast, if the experimenter uses large blocks 
(length 9 cm) and the child uses medium blocks (length 6cm) to build a train with five 
blocks, the absolute length of the child’s train would be 30 cm and the absolute length of 
the experimenter’s train would be 45 cm (i.e., the absolute length difference is 15 cm). 
Therefore, to match based on number requires a child to inhibit the difference of the 
absolute length of the two trains to a greater degree for trains with more blocks. In view 
of this, it is conceivable that on trials with more blocks, less effort is required for a child 
to use a size strategy compared to inhibiting the absolute length difference between the 
two cars, in order to use a number strategy.  
The key pattern of results from the current study (that children are more likely to use a 
number strategy if they know the verbal number word corresponding to the train length) 
is driven by one-knowers, two-knowers, and three-knowers. Four-knowers and CP-
knowers produce the same pattern of results as three-knowers. A potential explanation for 
this finding is that children flexibly shift to a size strategy on trains with four or five 
blocks to avoid the challenging task of inhibiting absolute length. Critically, future 
research should examine whether adjusting the absolute length of the trains, for those 
with more blocks, affects whether children use a number or a size strategy. 
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5.4.5 Conclusions 
Learning the meaning of verbal number words is a slow process that sets a critical 
foundation for young children’s numerical thinking. The key finding of the current study 
is that preschool-aged children were more likely to use a number strategy than a size 
strategy if they knew the verbal number word that corresponded to the number of cars 
comprising the train they were asked to match, particularly for small numbers. Results 
also revealed that children are more likely to use a size strategy than a number strategy 
for trains with five cars. Together, this study revealed that acquiring verbal number word 
knowledge may fundamentally affect the way that young children attend to quantities. In 
summary, this research provides a concrete example of how learning symbols influence 
behaviour within the domain of early number processing.   
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Chapter 6  
6 General Discussion 
The capacity to estimate and discriminate between nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes 
(e.g., the number of objects in a set) emerges early in development and is shared with 
non-human species (Cantlon, 2012; Dehaene, 2007; Dehaene et al., 1998; Nieder & 
Miller, 2004). Consequently, this ability to represent and process nonsymbolic numerical 
magnitudes is assumed to be evolutionarily ancient and biologically endowed. In 
contrast, the uniquely human capacity to process numbers symbolically has emerged 
relatively recently in human history and is acquired through enculturation (Ansari, 2008; 
Coolidge & Overmann, 2012).  The ability to conceptualize and use symbolic numbers is 
a necessary foundation for higher-level mathematical thinking, which is essential to a 
successful society (Bynner & Parsons, 1996; Duncan et al., 2007; Romano et al., 2010). 
The culturally mediated process of learning symbolic numbers is thought to be rooted in a 
pre-existing, innate and evolutionarily ancient abstract number processing system that 
evolved to process nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes (Brannon, 2006; Dehaene, 2007; 
Dehaene et al., 2003; Nieder & Dehaene, 2009).  
However, a growing body of recent evidence suggests that systems used to process 
symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes may be more distinct than previously 
assumed (Ansari, 2007; Bulthé, De Smedt, & Op de Beeck, 2014; Cohen Kadosh & 
Walsh, 2009; Lyons, Ansari, & Beilock, 2012, 2014; Lyons & Beilock, 2013; 
Sokolowski & Ansari, 2016). These data conflict with the notion that numbers are 
processed entirely abstractly. Despite years of research, the question of whether symbolic 
numerical magnitudes are processed using the evolutionarily ancient system that evolved 
to process nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes remains unanswered.  To address this 
question, this thesis examined the relationship between symbolic and nonsymbolic 
numerical magnitude processing at the neural level in human adults.  Additionally, this 
thesis explored how symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing is 
influenced by the participant’s attentional state, and how the relationship between 
symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing changes across 
developmental time.  In the following sections, I will discuss the results of the four 
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empirical chapters presented in this thesis and relate these findings to other data and 
theories in the field.  Following this, I will discuss the general limitations of these studies, 
implications of the findings, and future directions. 
6.1 The Neural Correlates of Symbolic and 
Nonsymbolic Numerical Magnitude Processing 
In recent years, there has been substantial growth in neuroimaging studies investigating 
the neural correlates of symbolic (e.g., Arabic numerals) and nonsymbolic (e.g., dot 
arrays) numerical magnitude processing. At present, it remains contested whether 
numbers are represented abstractly, or if number representations in the human brain are 
format-dependent (for review see: Cohen Kadosh, 2008). In chapter 2 of the current 
thesis (Sokolowski, Fias, Mousa, & Ansari, 2017), I used activation likelihood estimation 
(ALE) to conduct the first quantitative meta-analysis to synthesize all neuroimaging 
papers that examined symbolic and/or nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing in 
the human adult brain.  Results of this empirical chapter revealed that across all 
neuroimaging papers there are convergent areas of activation that are common to 
symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing. More specifically, 
conjunction analyses intended to quantify brain regions that supported both symbolic and 
nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing revealed overlapping activation for 
symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing in regions along the frontal 
and parietal lobes.  This finding of overlapping activation for symbolic and nonsymbolic 
numerical magnitude processing is consistent with the idea that there are regions in the 
human brain that process numerical magnitudes abstractly (Cantlon, 2012; Dehaene, 
2007; Dehaene et al., 1998; Piazza et al., 2007). However, there were also brain regions 
that were specifically associated with either symbolic or with nonsymbolic numerical 
magnitude processing. Specifically, contrast analyses revealed anatomically distinct 
frontoparietal activation associated with symbolic and with nonsymbolic numerical 
magnitude processing. These findings that symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical 
magnitudes are supported by distinct brain regions are consistent with the notion that 
regions within the human brain processes numbers in a format-dependent way (Bulthé et 
al., 2014; Cohen Kadosh, 2008; Holloway et al., 2010; Lyons et al., 2014; Lyons & 
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Beilock, 2013; Sokolowski & Ansari, 2016). Specifically, these contrast analyses 
revealed that the representations supporting symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical 
magnitudes may be lateralized within the partial cortex. Indeed, the meta-analysis 
reported in chapter 2, implicated the left angular gyrus as potentially important for 
supporting symbolic numerical magnitude processing, whereas the right superior parietal 
lobule may be important for processing nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes (Sokolowski 
et al., 2017). Unsurprisingly, this finding of lateralization of symbolic compared to 
nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes in the parietal cortex at the meta-analytic level aligns 
with findings reported in many individual empirical studies (For review see: Sokolowski 
and Ansari, 2016). Together, data from this chapter reveals that symbolic and 
nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are sub-served by both format-dependent and 
abstract neural systems, thus suggesting that some components of the evolutionarily 
ancient system used to process nonsymbolic magnitudes may be repurposed for the 
processing of symbols. However, due to several key inherent methodological limitations 
of meta-analyses that are discussed in the following paragraph, even the findings of 
overlapping activation for symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes, reported in 
chapter 2, cannot be used to conclude that symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical 
magnitudes are processed in the same way, using a single evolutionarily ancient system.  
The use of ALE methodology in chapter 2 is valuable because the algorithm can be used 
to extract regularities across a large set of empirical studies with vastly different 
methodologies. However, when using meta-analytic techniques, it is challenging to 
account for differences in statistical thresholding, spatial extent, and magnitude of 
activations across regions of activation both within and between studies (Arsalidou & 
Taylor, 2011; Christ et al., 2009; Di Martino et al., 2009; Ellison-Wright et al., 2008). 
Additionally, there are many limitations within the empirical studies that comprise the 
meta-analysis in chapter 2.  For example, the majority of the studies included in the meta-
analysis 1) did not adequately control for non-numerical magnitudes and 2) used active 
task designs. The lack of control for non-numerical magnitude processing means that the 
system being examined, that is assumed to be an abstract number processing system, 
may, in fact, be a general magnitude processing system used to processing both 
numerical and non-numerical magnitudes (Cantlon, Platt, & Brannon, 2009; Sokolowski, 
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Fias, Ononye, & Ansari, 2017; Van Opstal & Verguts, 2013; Walsh, 2003). Relatedly, the 
use of these active tasks makes it impossible to conclude whether the overlapping brain 
regions that support symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes is a consequence 
of abstractly processing the magnitude or if this overlapping activation relates to decision 
making, motor processing or task difficulty (Göbel et al., 2004).  In view of these 
limitations, it was critical to identify the neural correlates of symbolic and nonsymbolic 
numerical magnitude processing in a single set of participants using a paradigm that 
controls for non-numerical magnitude processing and activations associated with active 
tasks.   
In chapter 3 of the current thesis, I presented data from an experimental fMRI study in 
which I assessed whether symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing is 
supported by overlapping neural activation when controlling for confounds associated 
with active tasks and non-numerical magnitudes.  Specifically, I developed and used an 
fMRI adaptation paradigm that isolated the representations of symbolic numerical 
magnitudes, nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes, and physical size (a non-numerical 
magnitude), in forty-five human adults. Results from this chapter indicated that the neural 
correlates associated with the passive viewing of numerical symbols were distinct from 
the neural correlates that were associated with the passive viewing of nonsymbolic 
numerical magnitudes and physical size.  Surprisingly, no brain region was significantly 
activated by the passive viewing of both symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical 
magnitudes. Passive processing of symbolic numerical magnitudes correlated with 
activation in the left superior parietal lobule, whereas the processing of both nonsymbolic 
numerical magnitudes and physical size correlated with activation in the right 
intraparietal sulcus. This finding aligns with results from chapter 2 as well as previous 
research that reports hemispheric lateralization of symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical 
magnitude processing within the parietal cortex.  Data from chapter 3 also provide novel 
evidence to suggest that the overlapping brain regions that support symbolic and 
nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing, reported in chapter 2, as well as previous 
studies (e.g., Dehaene et al., 1998; Dehaene, 2007; Cohen Kadosh, 2008; Sokolowski and 
Ansari, 2016), may be due to overlapping task demands, and consequently may not be 
indicative of an abstract number processing region.  Notably, results from chapter 3 also 
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revealed that symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are distinct at the 
representational level, in addition to spatially. Specifically, representational similarity 
analyses (RSA) were conducted within regions of interest derived from regions that 
exhibited overlapping activation for symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude 
processing in chapter 2.  These RSA analyses revealed that the passive processing 
symbolic numerical magnitudes exhibited dissimilar normalized patterns of activation 
compared to the passive processing of nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes in the regions 
of interest in both the left and right parietal lobes. Notably, the patterns of activation 
associated with nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes and were practically 
indistinguishable from the patterns of activation associated with the non-numerical 
magnitude, physical size.  Therefore, the results from chapter 3 suggest the system used 
to process symbolic numerical magnitudes are quite distinct from the system that is used 
to process nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes in human adults. Additionally, these 
results provide evidence in support of the idea that the evolutionarily ancient system used 
to process nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes may be a general magnitude processing 
system rather than a specific abstract number processing system (For other research 
supporting the idea that numbers are processed using a general magnitude system see: 
Cantlon, Platt, et al., 2009; Cohen Kadosh et al., 2008; Sokolowski, Fias, Bosah Ononye, 
et al., 2017; Walsh, 2003). 
In summary, the results from chapter 2, revealed overlapping and distinct regions of 
activation for symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing when 
extracting regularities across a large set of attentional task demands.  However, using a 
paradigm that removed confounds associated with active task demands (i.e., chapter 3) 
revealed that symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing may be even 
more distinct than previously assumed.  These findings challenge the longstanding belief 
that the culturally acquired ability to conceptualize symbolic numbers is rooted in an 
evolutionarily ancient system that evolved to support nonsymbolic numerical magnitude 
processing. Moreover, these data revealed that the system used to process nonsymbolic 
numerical magnitudes may actually be a general magnitude processing system used to 
process nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes and non-numerical magnitudes.  
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6.2 Attentional Conditions Affect the Processing of 
Symbolic and Nonsymbolic Numerical Magnitudes 
Although the two methodologies reported in chapter 2 and chapter 3 are useful for 
developing our understanding of the way the human brain represents symbolic and 
nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes across multiple methodologies, and in the absence of 
task demands, they do not identify how different attentional conditions affect symbolic 
and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing.  Key findings from research exploring 
symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing reveal that although both 
symbolic and nonsymbolic magnitudes can be processed automatically, whether or not 
they are processed automatically depends upon their relevance to the task at hand 
(Furman & Rubinsten, 2012; Naparstek & Henik, 2010, 2012; Naparstek et al., 2015; 
Pansky & Algom, 2002). In other words, the degree to which a task requires a participant 
to attend to a symbolic and a nonsymbolic numerical magnitude affects the processing of 
the stimuli. In Chapter 4 of the current thesis, I explore the degree to which symbolic 
compared to nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing is influenced by attentional 
demands of the task.  
In chapter 4, I developed and used a Stroop-like paradigm to assesses the effortful and the 
automatic processing of symbolic numerical magnitudes compared to nonsymbolic 
numerical magnitudes.  In this paradigm, participants (NStudy1 = 80, NStudy2 = 63) 
compared adjacent arrays of number symbols (e.g., 4444 vs 333). Participants were 
instructed to indicate which side contained either the greater quantity of symbols 
(nonsymbolic task) or the numerically larger symbol (symbolic task). This manipulation 
allowed for both symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes to act as the relevant 
dimension and the irrelevant dimension.  The aspect of the stimulus that the participant 
was instructed to focus on was considered the relevant dimension and was used to assess 
effortful processing, whereas the aspect of the stimulus that participant could ignore 
when making the comparison was referred to as the irrelevant dimension and was used as 
a measure of automatic processing. Results revealed that the effortful processing of 
symbolic numerical magnitudes is more efficient (i.e., faster and more accurate) and less 
affected by numerical distance than the effortful processing of nonsymbolic numerical 
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magnitudes.  These results converge with findings from previous research that examined 
the effortful processing of symbolic compared to nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes 
using tasks that did not include an irrelevant dimension Holloway & Ansari, 2009; 
Holloway et al., 2010; Lyons & Ansari, 2009; Moyer & Landauer, 1967). Results from 
chapter 4 also provided novel evidence that, as the irrelevant dimension, symbolic and 
nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes both automatically influenced processing, but 
symbolic numerical magnitudes influenced the processing of nonsymbolic numerical 
magnitudes more than nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes influenced the processing of 
symbolic numerical magnitudes. Moreover, numerical distance influenced the automatic 
processing of nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes more than it influenced the processing 
of symbolic numerical magnitudes. Together, these findings indicate that symbolic 
numerical magnitudes are processed more automatically that nonsymbolic numerical 
magnitudes.   
The finding that symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing influence 
each other aligns with the dominant perspective in the field of numerical cognition that 
the same system is used to process symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes 
(e.g., Cantlon et al., 2009; Dehaene, 2007; Dehaene et al., 1998; Nieder & Dehaene, 
2009; Piazza et al., 2007).  However, taken together, the results from chapter 4 provide 
strong evidence that the processing of symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes 
is asymmetrical.  Indeed, symbolic numerical magnitudes are processed more 
automatically than nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes. This finding could be taken to 
suggest that symbols may not simply be labels for pre-existing representations of 
nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes. Moreover, these data suggest that a representation of 
a nonsymbolic numerical magnitude does not need to be accessed to automatically 
process the semantic meaning of a symbolic numerical magnitude.  In view of this, it 
should be considered that symbols may not be supported by a system that evolved to 
process nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes, but instead, by a superficially similar but 
ultimately distinct system (Lyons & Beilock, 2018; Núñez, 2017).  
215 
 
6.3 A Symbolic Number System 
The predominant view in the field of numerical cognition is that symbolic numerical 
magnitudes are processed using the system that evolved to process nonsymbolic 
numerical magnitudes (e.g., Cantlon, 2012; Dehaene, 2007, 2008; Feigenson, 2007; 
Lyons & Ansari, 2009; Nieder & Dehaene, 2009; Piazza, Pinel, Le Bihan, & Dehaene, 
2007).  However, the findings presented in chapter’s 2, 3 and 4 of the current thesis align 
with the growing body of data that indicate that symbolic numerical magnitudes are 
processed using a system that is distinct from the evolutionarily ancient system that is 
thought to support nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing in the adult human 
brain (e.g., Krajcsi et al., 2016; Lyons et al., 2012, 2014).  In view of this, it has been 
suggested that number symbols constitute a separate system in which the processing of 
symbols can be performed independently from accessing nonsymbolic representations of 
the quantities the symbols represent (Krajcsi, 2017; Krajcsi et al., 2018; Lyons et al., 
2014; Lyons & Beilock, 2018; Núñez, 2017). This idea, that symbols constitute their own 
system and can be conceptualized without accessing representations of associated 
nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes motivations the question: what is the representational 
structure of the symbolic number system? In the following two paragraphs I speculate on 
the representational structure of the symbolic number system. 
A key element of numerical symbols that differentiates them from the nonsymbolic 
numerical magnitudes that the symbols represent is that while nonsymbolic numerical 
magnitudes can only be represented approximately, symbols can and in fact must be 
represented exactly.  Therefore, while nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes may be 
processed using an analogue number system (ANS), in which the representations are 
noisy or approximate (Cantlon, 2012; Dehaene, 2007; Dehaene et al., 1998; Moyer & 
Landauer, 1967) the processing of symbols is likely supported by a different more exact 
system. Broadly, it has been suggested that symbols are understood based on their 
associations with other symbols (For a comprehensive review see, Núñez, 2017).  A 
discrete semantic system (DSS) has been proposed as a potential candidate for a system 
that represents symbolic numbers (Krajcsi et al., 2016).  The DSS operates using a 
network that resembles a conceptual network or mental lexicon.  In the DDS system, 
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symbolic numerical magnitudes are stored within a network with each symbolic 
numerical magnitude acting as a node.  The strength of the connections between the 
nodes (i.e., the symbolic numerical magnitudes) would be proportional to the strength of 
the semantic relations between the numbers, thus producing a distance effect. Recent 
behavioural data assessed whether symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude 
processing is more likely to be sub-served by a single system or two distinct systems 
(Krajcsi, 2017). Krajcsi and colleagues argued that if nonsymbolic and symbolic 
numerical magnitudes are supported by the same system, the distance and size effects 
should correlate with each other within formats, and the symbolic distance and size 
effects should correlate with the nonsymbolic distance and size effects.  Results revealed 
that while distance and size effects correlate with each other for nonsymbolic numerical 
magnitude processing, the distance and size effects did not correlate with each other for 
symbolic numerical magnitude processing. Moreover, the nonsymbolic effects (distance 
and size) did not correlate with the symbolic effects (Krajcsi, 2017).   In view of this, it is 
more likely that nonsymbolic and symbolic distance effects are sub-served by distinct 
systems.  This data converges with other related research to support the finding that 
nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are supported by an approximate number system, 
whereas symbolic numerical magnitudes are supported by the DSS (Krajcsi, 2017; 
Krajcsi et al., 2016, 2018; Lyons et al., 2015).  This growing body of research supports 
the idea that a semantic network model may be a better candidate than the evolutionarily 
ancient approximate number system to explain the processing of symbolic numerical 
magnitudes in human adults.  
At the neural level, the representational patterns of activation that underpin symbolic 
numerical magnitude processing is dissimilar to the representational patterns of activation 
that support nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing (Bulthé et al., 2014; Damarla 
& Just, 2013; Lyons et al., 2014). Indeed, the representational structure of the neural 
activity that supports the processing of nonsymbolic numerical magnitude aligns with 
predictions of representational structures that would arise from nonsymbolic numerical 
magnitude processing being supported by an analogue approximate number system. 
Specifically, the representation patterns of activation associated with the nonsymbolic 
numerical magnitudes relate to each other as a function of ratio (Bulthé et al., 2014; 
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Damarla & Just, 2013; Lyons et al., 2014).  In contrast, the patterns of neural 
representations supporting symbolic numerical magnitude processing do not vary 
systematically as a function of ratio (Bulthé et al., 2014; Damarla & Just, 2013; Lyons et 
al., 2014).  Instead, the representational structure of symbolic numerical magnitude 
processing aligns with a semantic network model in which symbolic numerical 
magnitudes operate like discrete categories that relate to one another based on lexical 
frequency (Lyons & Beilock, 2018).  Although this work is in its infancy, the 
combination of this behavioural and neuroimaging data provides compelling evidence 
that symbolic numerical magnitude processing is supported by a semantic 
representational system rather than the evolutionarily ancient approximate number 
system that supports nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing in human adults. The 
findings from the current thesis, that symbols are processed more distinctly from 
nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes both at the neural and behavioural level in adult and 
children lends further support to this account.  
6.4 The Emergence of Symbolic Thinking 
The majority of research reviewed above indicating that symbolic and nonsymbolic 
numerical magnitudes are supported by two distinct systems has been conducted in 
human adults and older children, who have already learned the semantic meaning of 
symbolic numerals.  However, in order to have a comprehensive understanding of the 
system that supports the processing of symbolic numerical magnitudes, it is necessary to 
explore how children acquire an understanding of the semantic meaning of these arbitrary 
symbols. Indeed, this question of how children acquire the semantic meaning of a symbol 
(such as a number word), often referred to as the “symbol-grounding problem,” is a key 
problem within the field of numerical cognition (Leibovich & Ansari, 2016), and 
cognition more broadly (Coolidge & Overmann, 2012; Harnad, 1990). 
Based on the dominant theory in the field of numerical cognition (Dehaene et al., 1998; 
Dehaene, 2007; Cantlon, 2012), that an evolutionarily ancient approximate number 
system supports the processing of both symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes, 
it has been predicted that children learn the meaning of symbolic numerical magnitudes 
by mapping an arbitrary symbolic label onto the pre-existing representation supporting 
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the corresponding nonsymbolic numerical magnitude (For review see: Leibovich and 
Ansari, 2016). However, the growing body of evidence, including from chapters 2-4 of 
this thesis, reveal that symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are likely 
supported by distinct systems suggests that the acquisition of symbolic number 
processing may not be a straightforward mapping of symbols onto pre-existing 
representations.  
Indeed, based on the finding that symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are 
supported with distinct systems, it is conceivable that the acquisition of the semantic 
meaning of symbolic numerical magnitudes actually constrains the pre-existing 
representations that support nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes (Barner, 2017; Merkley 
& Ansari, 2016). More specifically, it can be hypothesized the process of learning the 
semantic meanings of number words influences how salient the property of quantity is to 
a child when interacting with a nonsymbolic numerical magnitude (Barner, 2017; 
Merkley & Ansari, 2016).  In other words, learning the semantic meaning of number 
words may direct children’s attention toward discrete quantities as a relevant dimension 
to attend to when examining and interacting with a set of objects that contains a variety of 
other non-numerical dimensions, such as non-numerical magnitudes, colours, and object 
types (Merkley, Scerif, & Ansari, 2017; Mix, Levine, & Newcombe, 2016).  Taking a 
developmental approach to explore how acquiring knowledge of symbolic numerical 
magnitudes relates to the processing of nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes is a key 
avenue to enhance our understanding of how humans process symbolic and nonsymbolic 
numerical magnitudes across developmental time. 
Consequently, in chapter 5 of the current thesis, I used a developmental approach to 
explore whether the acquisition of verbal number words relates to the degree to which 
children spontaneously attend to nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes in the world. 
Specifically, I developed and used a matching task called, “The Train Task,” to measure 
whether children spontaneously used a number strategy or physical size strategy to build 
a train that “matched” a train built by an experimenter.  During this task, an experimenter 
built a train using five or fewer blocks using sets of blocks where the length of the child’s 
blocks differed from the length of the experimenter’s blocks. The experimenter then said 
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to the child “make your train the same as mine”. Results revealed that for small numbers 
(i.e., train’s that were made of two and three blocks) preschool-aged children used a 
number strategy on trials for which they knew the verbal number word that corresponded 
to the number of blocks that made up the train.  However, children used a size strategy 
more than a number strategy on trials with five blocks, regardless of verbal number 
knowledge.  These data indicate that verbal number word knowledge relates to the degree 
to which preschool-aged children attend to nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes, 
specifically for small numbers. Together, this suggests that when children learn the 
semantic meaning symbolic numerical magnitudes, it changes the way that they attend to 
small nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes in the world.  
This finding from chapter 5, that children’s performance on a nonsymbolic numerical 
magnitude matching task is be limited by their knowledge of the meaning of number 
words provides support for developmental theories (Barner, 2017; Merkley & Ansari, 
2016; Mussolin, Nys, Leybaert, et al., 2014) suggesting that learning the semantic 
meaning of symbols might affect the processing of nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes.  
Moreover, while this data cannot speak to whether children can conceptualize 
nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes prior to acquiring knowledge of symbolic numerical 
magnitudes, it certainly suggests that children who do not have knowledge of symbolic 
numerals do not spontaneously attend to nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes. In 
summary, the findings from this study relate to previous research in the field to support 
the idea that the evolutionarily ancient capacity to process nonsymbolic numerical 
magnitudes and the culturally acquired capacity to process symbolic numerical 
magnitudes are related across development (For review see: Mussolin et al., 2014).  
However, the findings from the current study also provide novel evidence for the less 
explored idea that learning the semantic meaning of symbolic numerical magnitudes, 
(i.e., forming a symbolic number system) may actually refine approximate 
representations of nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes.  
6.5 Implications 
Together, the four studies reported in this thesis provide novel insights into the 
relationship between symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes in both children 
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and adults.  Several of the studies in this thesis identify how this relationship between 
symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes can be influenced by an attentional 
state.  The key finding from the data presented in the current thesis is that the way 
humans process symbolic numerical magnitudes is quite distinct from the way humans 
process nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes.  Specifically, the behavioural and neural 
signatures associated with processing symbolic numerical magnitudes diverge from those 
that are associated with the processing of nonsymbolic magnitudes across methodologies, 
attentional conditions, and developmental periods.  These findings, namely that the 
culturally acquired symbolic number system is more distinct from the evolutionarily 
ancient nonsymbolic numerical magnitude system than previously assumed has several 
important implications for how to support children’s learning of early mathematical 
concepts.  
The dominant assumption in the field, that symbols are learned by mapping arbitrary 
symbolic labels onto pre-existing representations of quantities has led researchers to 
attempt to improve symbolic numerical abilities by training students on nonsymbolic 
numerical magnitude processing (Hyde, Khanum, & Spelke, 2014; Kuhn & Holling, 
2014; Obersteiner, Reiss, & Ufer, 2013; Park & Brannon, 2013; Sasanguie et al., 2013). 
Overall, there is no conclusive evidence that training nonsymbolic numerical magnitude 
processing improves symbolic mathematical competence (For review see: Szűcs & 
Myers, 2017).  The findings reported in the current thesis supporting the idea that 
symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are processed using distinct systems 
help illuminate why these nonsymbolic numerical magnitude training programs do not 
lead to significant improvements in symbolic math.  Indeed, training nonsymbolic 
numerical magnitude processing likely does not lead to improvements in symbolic math 
because the system that is being trained (i.e., the evolutionarily ancient nonsymbolic 
number processing system) is a similar but ultimately separate from the system that 
supports symbolic mathematical thinking (i.e., the symbolic number system).  In view of 
this, it is not surprising that these training studies have resulted in null findings.  
Consequently, the findings from the current thesis can be taken to suggest that efforts to 
train early numerical concepts should be focussed on training the symbolic number 
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system, rather than the system that evolved to process approximate nonsymbolic 
numerical magnitudes.  
Relatedly, a focus of early mathematical learning has been on teaching children the link 
between symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes, often referred to as mapping 
(Barth, Starr, & Sullivan, 2009; Huang, Spelke, & Snedeker, 2010; Le Corre & Carey, 
2007; Lipton & Spelke, 2005, 2006; Odic, Le Corre, & Halberda, 2015).  Recent research 
has implicated this ability to map symbols onto nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes as 
being important for later mathematical achievement (Libertus, Odic, Feigenson, & 
Halberda, 2016).  Although mapping for small numbers is likely an important skill for 
children to master at a particular point during development, findings from the current 
thesis imply that the ability to map symbols onto their corresponding nonsymbolic 
numerical magnitudes is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for children to form a 
symbolic number processing system.  In other words, in order for humans to develop a 
system that processes exact symbolic numerical magnitudes, children need to acquire 
knowledge of the structure of the symbolic number system, such as the learning that 
symbolic numerical magnitudes have an order and a lexical frequency, in addition to 
learning the semantic meaning of a symbolic numerical magnitude.  Together, findings 
from the current thesis can be used to inform our understanding of what basic number 
processing abilities must be learned to facilitate a child’s development of a 
comprehensive semantic system that can be used to support the higher-level processing of 
symbolic numerical magnitudes.  
6.6 Limitations and Future Directions 
The limitations associated with each specific study are reported in the discussion sections 
of each individual empirical chapter.  However, in addition to the specific limitations 
discussed in the individual chapters, there are several broad limitations.  In what follows, 
I will present and discuss these broad limitations and outline future directions that arise 
from these limitations, as well as provide future directions that go beyond simply 
addressing limitations.  
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As outlined in the introduction of this thesis, the processing of nonsymbolic numerical 
magnitudes is inherently confounded by non-numerical magnitudes such a physical size 
(For review see: Leibovich and Henik, 2013).  It was not possible to control for non-
numerical magnitudes in the meta-analysis, as this methodology requires using 
previously collected data.  There was a large amount of variability in the degree to which 
the empirical studies included in the meta-analysis controlled for non-numerical 
magnitude processing. However, in the three other empirical chapters presented in the 
current thesis (chapters 3-5), I included controls for the effect of non-numerical 
magnitudes.  In chapter 3 and 5, I included physical size as a variable of interest in order 
examine the neural representations supporting nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes 
(chapter 3) and degree of attention directed toward nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes 
(chapter 5), compared to physical size.  In chapter 4, I included ‘*’s rather than blank 
spaces in the arrays with the goal of ensuring that arrays with more symbols did not take 
up more physical space.  Critically, although I was cognizant of this need to account for 
the effect of non-numerical magnitudes on nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing 
in some way, and included the optimal control variables whenever possible, there is no 
way to create stimuli where at least one non-numerical magnitude (e.g., size, density, 
convex hull) does not correlate with nonsymbolic numerical magnitude (Leibovich & 
Henik, 2013).  Indeed, the natural correlation between nonsymbolic numerical 
magnitudes and non-numerical magnitudes makes it nearly impossible to study 
nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing in isolation from non-numerical 
magnitudes.  This tight link between the processing of nonsymbolic numerical 
magnitudes and non-numerical magnitudes is reflected in the findings from the parallel 
adaptation study reported chapter 3, showing that the brain region in the right 
intraparietal sulcus that is associated with nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing 
is completely overlapping with the region associated with non-numerical magnitude 
processing. Therefore, a key limitation of the current thesis is that the results associated 
with nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing may be influenced by correlated non-
numerical magnitudes. This interesting inherent limitation with studying nonsymbolic 
numerical magnitude processing leads to an important future direction. Namely, future 
research should not rest upon the assumption that nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes are 
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processed using a specific system that only processes discrete magnitudes.  Instead, 
future research should explore the link between the processing of symbolic numerical 
magnitudes, compared to the processing of nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes as well as 
non-numerical magnitudes.  Additionally, future research should test the role of non-
numerical magnitude processing in the formation of the symbolic number system 
(Leibovich et al., 2017). 
Another limitation associated with the experimental empirical studies included in this 
thesis is that, due to time constraints within the testing sessions, we were unable to 
include trial types that were of interest.  Specifically, in the fMRI adaptation study 
(chapter 3), we were only able to include a single deviant type within each condition.  For 
example, symbolic distance 1 only included the condition where the symbol six became 
the symbol seven.  This is because within a habituation paradigm each deviant trial must 
be preceded by five to nine habituation trials.  Including a small and large change of a 
symbolic, nonsymbolic and physical size condition required participants to remain still 
and attentive during a passive viewing task in an fMRI scanner for an hour. For this 
chapter, the decision was made to use fewer than optimal different trial types in order to 
increase the proportion of participants were able to remain still and attentive.  
Additionally, it was important to make this paradigm as concise as possible in order to 
have to option to implement this paradigm in a sample of children in the future. 
Critically, with the included number of trial types, only 45 of the 52 adult participants 
successfully passed the criteria for attention and motion.  Relatedly, in chapter 4, all trials 
included in the study used the same two symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical 
magnitudes within each trial.  For example, in a condition where the symbol was ‘2’ and 
‘4’ the quantities were also two and four either congruently (i.e., two ‘2’s vs. four ‘4’s) or 
incongruently (i.e., two ‘4’s vs. four ‘2’s).  It would have been ideal to include all 
combinations of symbolic and nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes (as has been done with 
the original Numerical Stroop task: Leibovich, Diesendruck, Rubinsten, & Henik, 2013).  
However, as this was the first study to implement a Symbolic-Nonsymbolic Stroop task, I 
included more trial types within conditions, rather than fewer trial types across many 
conditions.  In view of this, I was unable to examine the effect of differentially varying 
the distance of the relevant dimension compared to the irrelevant dimension. In a future 
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study, it would be ideal to compare participant’s speed and accuracy for trials where the 
distance of the relevant condition is different from the distance in the irrelevant condition.  
Finally, in chapter 5, there were many additional conditions that I was interested in 
examining. For example, I could have included conditions where I changed the colours of 
the trains, manipulated the ratio between the experimenter’s block size and the child’s 
block size, built the trains behind a screen, included longer train lengths (beyond five 
cars), and/or adjust the language of the instructions.  However, as the sample of 
participants in this study were between the ages of three and six years, the maximum 
duration that the participants were able to remain attentive was approximately 30 
minutes. Therefore, I chose a single set of conditions that best supported my key research 
questions. Future studies should examine whether verbal number knowledge continues to 
relate to the degree to which young children spontaneously attend to nonsymbolic 
numerical magnitudes under different experimental conditions. 
A final limitation that is specific to the neuroimaging studies is the fact that the vast 
majority of the participants in the meta-analysis (>98%), and all participants in chapter 3 
of the current thesis are right-handed.  Recent research indicated that association between 
the passive processing of symbolic numerical magnitudes and activation in the left 
parietal lobule was significant in a sample of right, but not left-handed individuals 
(Goffin, Sokolowski, Slipenski & Ansari, accepted 2019).  Future research is needed to 
further examine similarities and differences in the neural correlates of symbolic 
compared to nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing in left-handed compared to 
right-handed individuals. 
There are several additional future directions that are unrelated to the limitations of the 
current chapters. Specifically, the possible co-existence of domain-specific neural 
processes underlying numerical magnitude processing adults (reported in chapters 2-4), 
raises questions about developmental trajectories of the systems underlying basic number 
processing. An important avenue for future research is to conduct follow-up studies 
where children complete the Symbolic-Nonsymbolic Stroop task and the Parallel 
Adaptation task, to study developmental specialization of the symbolic number system. 
More specifically, the paradigms developed for this thesis can be used cross-sectionally 
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and/or longitudinally to examine age-related changes in the systems that support 
symbolic, nonsymbolic and non-numerical magnitudes.   
Moving forward, a fundamental goal for the field of numerical cognition should be to 
understand individual differences in the way children learn symbolic numbers and to use 
this knowledge in pursuit of optimized learning processes across development.  Once we 
as a field have reached a foundational understanding of the basic neuropsychological 
mechanisms supporting symbolic number learning, it will be of critical importance to 
focus on individual differences.  A large body of future research is needed to unravel the 
key question of why learning math is easy for some children and so challenging for 
others. 
6.7 General Conclusion 
In conclusion, the body of research presented above has identified and described the 
behavioural and neural signatures of symbolic compared to nonsymbolic numerical 
magnitude processing.  I identified converging brain activation associated with symbolic 
and nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing across all previously conducted 
neuroimaging research (chapter 2) and examined the neural correlates of symbolic and 
nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing in the absence of task demands (chapter 3).  
Additionally, I explored the role of attention on behavioural signatures of symbolic 
compared to nonsymbolic numerical magnitude processing in human adults (chapter 4). 
Finally, I investigated how learning symbolic numerical magnitudes relates to attending 
to nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes in young children (chapter 5).  
Studying the neurobiology of numeral magnitude processing is necessary to elevate our 
understanding of how culturally-mediated information interacts with and potentially even 
shapes biologically endowed systems in the human brain. This enhanced understanding 
of the neuropsychological foundation that supports the uniquely human capacity for 
symbolic thinking could simultaneously inform and inspire critical developments to math 
education practices and policy and illuminate the multifaceted and dynamic interplay 
underlying the uniquely human capacity for complex learning. 
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